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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of China’s film internationalism and coproduction strategy. 
International coproduction has become a new area of industry debate in regard to China’s 
film industry. However, there has been limited scholarly attention, in both English and 
Chinese scholarship, paid to the activities of film coproduction between China and offshore 
parties.  
Specifically, the research looks at three representative film coproduction cases: Hong Kong 
and China based on Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA); US and China 
without any state-level agreements; Australia and China based on official film coproduction 
treaty. The broad intent of this study is to analyse the extent to which Chinese coproduction 
strategy functions as a form of soft power competition. 
Film coproduction in China, through the transfer of human capital, technology and 
knowledge, has significant implications for promoting China’s film ‘going out’, thus 
improving China’s soft power and building a better international image. The aim is to 
investigate the evolution of coproduction in the film industry, the process of coproduction, 
the foreign film companies’ strategies of adjustment to China’s state policy, and the 
challenges that hinder the coproduction.  
The contribution of this study comes in two parts: first, understanding the current 
environment for film coproduction in China and how foreign partners, especially those from 
western countries, deal with the historical, cultural, institutional and linguistic differences for 
coproduction. Second, it investigates the degree to which film coproduction has been to this 
stage a contributor to increase China’s global cultural presence – its soft power. 
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Introduction 
The rise of China in the past 30 years is notable in modern history. For Australia (and for 
much of the world), China’s growing economic, political, and military force is the ‘most 
geopolitically significant development of this century’ (Australia in the Asian Century White 
Paper 2012). Undoubtedly, it is the dominant global force in manufacturing; however, the 
‘world factory’ model has led to many problems, such as pollution. The Chinese government 
is now seeking ways to develop beyond China’s manufacturing dominance toward a greater 
exercise of ‘soft power’. 
Joseph Nye, the leading theorist of soft power, identifies three main sources for a country to 
create soft power (attractiveness): its culture, its political values and its foreign policies (Nye 
2002:11). The Chinese government has been exercising its soft power through various 
strategies. These strategies include directly investing substantial amounts into Africa and 
Latin America; providing humanitarian aid around the world; establishing global media news 
services and Confucius Institutes; promoting the idea of the China Model (Yan 2013); 
supporting a variety of exchange programs; organising countless exhibitions, Chinese cultural 
programs, festivals, holding and founding multilateral institutions and forums (Kurlantzick 
2006; Zheng 2009). At the beginning of 2013, a non-profit organization – China Public 
Diplomacy Association (CPDA) - was established to mobilize and coordinate ‘social 
resources and civilian efforts’ towards the goal of ‘promoting China's soft power’, according 
to Li Zhaoxing, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's 
Congress (Keck 2013). 
China’s soft power projection and effectiveness is a complicated subject. Some argue that 
China’s investment in soft power has had little return as its top-down schemes are normally 
interpreted as propaganda (Nye 2012a). Some even go further to predict that China’s charm 
offensive is doomed to fail based on points like the Chinese government’s censoring of media 
and Internet access and its ability to tolerate (much less cultivate) ‘cultural ambassadors’ 
(Keck 2013). Others see China in an attractive light through the lens of Africa, Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and parts of Asia, where the popular impression of China might be seen as ‘a 
welcome partner’ or ‘a trusted long-time ally’ (Moss 2013). In contrast, the general 
perception of the West, where China lacks soft power in North America, Western Europe and 
parts of Asia, is that China tends to be a bad news source for everything from smoggy air to 
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its repression of dissidents, to its venal politics, to its apparent strangeness (Moss 2013).As 
Shambaugh (2013) points out: China did go global, but only partially.  
Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore (2011, cited from Shambaugh 2013: 1) 
says: ‘it is China’s intention to be the greatest power in the world’. China’s ambition of 
becoming the ‘greatest power’ is obviously not limited to hard power, such as economics and 
military, but also to soft power. The 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conference 
(October 2011) emphasized the issue of culture and declared that it was a national goal to 
‘build our country into a socialist cultural superpower’ (Shambaugh 2013:207-208). The 
connotation with Chinese soft power has some differences with Nye’s original approach, as 
will be discussed in Chapter One. My discussion of soft power in this thesis is grounded 
within a specifically cultural perspective.  
The 21st century is already being called the Asian century; a time for Asia to be culturally 
powerful. While Japan and Korea have become culturally significant beyond their borders, 
China has lagged behind. Gangnam Style and Hello Kitty are popular around the world but 
China has struggled to exert cultural influence regionally and globally. In this thesis I argue 
that film coproduction can function as a contributor to moving from the current situation of 
relative weakness to what China claims it plans to become, ‘a strong cultural nation’ (Li 
2014). With the extraordinary growth of the Chinese cinema box office in the past few years 
we have seen an unprecedented rise in collaborative screen production opportunities. These 
have facilitated transfers of human capital, technology and knowledge between Chinese, 
Korean, Taiwanese, Hong Kong, European, Australian and US media entrepreneurs and 
companies. However, there has been limited scholarly attention paid to the activities of film 
coproduction between China and foreign parties. There are few academic studies in English: 
Aynne Elizabeth Kokas’s PhD thesis (2012) Shot in Shanghai: Sino-US Media Coproduction 
in the Post-WTO Era and Wendy Su’s PhD thesis (2013) –China’s Encounter with Global 
Hollywood from 1994 to 2012 – Cultural Policy, Film Industry and Postsocialist Modernity, 
Frances (Xiao-Feng) Guo’s PhD thesis (2013) China’s Nationalism and Its Quest for Soft 
Power through Cinema partly deal with film coproduction in China.  
This thesis studies the history and current dynamics of Chinese film coproduction, examining 
the incentives and challenges for select countries to coproduce with China. It develops three 
detailed case studies: China-Hong Kong, China-US, and China-Australia coproductions. In 
the context of the current wave of ‘soft power competition’ (Chua, 2012), the broad purpose 
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of this study is to analyse the extent to which Chinese coproduction strategy functions as a 
form of soft power competition. The concept of soft power has been the subject of significant 
academic and policy debate, but primarily in the field of international relations. This research 
project joins the small amount of scholarship (Sun 2015, 2010; Curtin 2007, 2015; Keane 
2013, 2015; Chua 2012; Stanley 2015; 2011; 2010) which focuses on popular entertainment 
media as a crucial vehicle for soft power objectives. The research questions that this thesis 
will seek to answer are: what is the place of film coproduction in Chinese soft power 
strategies and ambitions? What form can a critical evaluation take in assessing the degree to 
which soft power objectives have been achieved in China’s film coproduction activities, with 
a focus on the past decade? Given they face complexity, bureaucracy and active censorship in 
dealing with China, what are the diverse motivations of non-Chinese makers to coproduce 
with Chinese filmmakers? 
 
1. Soft power  
Soft power is a concept that was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 to describe a nation’s 
capacity to exert influence through foreign policy, political values and culture (Nye 1990). 
China’s soft power model places heavy emphasis on culture. As I will discuss later, China 
has made a strong effort to develop the concept of soft power by playing to its supposed 
strength: a long cultural history.  This is quite different from the concept of soft power 
developed by Nye, where the emphasis is more on diplomacy. Nye has kept an eye on 
China’s soft power development. In 2005, he complimented China’s attractive traditional 
culture and noted that China was ‘entering the realm of global popular culture as well’. 
However, Nye critically pointed out that ‘China’s soft power still has a long way to go’, it 
doesn’t ‘have cultural industries like Hollywood’ (Nye 2005a:11). Later, in 2012, he called 
attention to the deficit of China’s soft power, especially when its economy and military are 
growing, something that alarms neighbouring countries. ‘If a country can also increase its 
soft power of attraction, its neighbours feel less need to balance its power’, he said (Nye 
2012b: 13).  
This sense of the importance of soft power – and specifically cultural soft power – in 
mitigating political tensions and anxieties about China’s activities and intentions in the region 
and around the world, has also been recognised by the Chinese government.  In 2011, former 
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President Hu Jintao pointed out that the overall strength of China’s culture and its 
international influence did not match China’s international status. Hu said: ‘The international 
culture of the West is strong while we are weak’ (Hu 2011). In 2006, five years after China 
joined the WTO, Ministry of Culture officials expressed concern about a ‘cultural trade 
deficit’ (Keane 2007) – that is, more cultural goods and services are imported into China than 
exported from China to other countries. Although China is a colossus in the export of 
manufactured goods, its cultural exports are extremely small by comparison. More 
importantly, over forty per cent of China’s cultural exports in 2012 were designed by 
businesses outside China, including those based in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Keane 2013). In 
other words, China, to some extent, is still the low-cost processing centre for advanced 
economies in many forms of cultural production, such as the subcontracting businesses 
existing in China’s animation and post-production sectors, rather than the origin or source of 
cultural products that are consumed around the world.  
The Chinese government has introduced many regulations to support the development of 
cultural industries in order to make these ‘pillar industries’ (zhizhu chanye). The Minister of 
Culture, Cai Wu announced that ‘we aim to establish a batch of world-famous cultural brands’ 
(cited in Shambaugh 2013: 209). There is no doubting the significance of cultural industries 
in China. They generate high level debate and they embody China’s cultural achievements. It 
is obvious that China has great ambitions to become a more dominant player in global 
cultural trade, to compete with Japan, Korea and even the US, to rebrand Chinese culture and 
to make it more attractive to foreign investors, regional audiences and China’s own 
population. 
However, according to Shambaugh (2013: 266-267), a professor of political science and 
international affairs at George Washington University, ‘China’s soft power and global 
cultural appeal remain very limited’. ‘In its search for status as a global power, China has 
discovered the importance of international image and soft power. But, in this arena too, we 
witness a large and growing number of China’s cultural activities abroad – but very little 
influence on global cultural trends’ (Shambaugh 2013:207). China’s aspiration to challenge 
the US is regarded by one scholar as ‘mission impossible’ (Sun 2010). Chua (2012) has used 
the term ‘soft power competition’ to reflect relative cultural power and influences. As Chua 
(2012) points out, the influence of Japanese and Korean pop culture – which is soft power – 
has grown noticeably in the past decade. Japanese and Korean cultural exports are focused 
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more on elements of contemporary pop culture, rather than traditional cultural imagery, ideas 
and products. Japanese cool and Hallyu (or the Korean wave) have been influential in Asia 
and around the world. In 2012, the music video Gangnam Style went viral on YouTube 
globally. By contrast, some commentators, such as Fareed Zakaria, argue that China is 
unlikely ever to come up with such a global pop phenomenon style (Zakaria cited in Joustra 
2012). Moreover, in China, a school of conservative scholars, discussed in Chapter One, still 
ignore the value of pop culture and insist on promoting China’s traditional culture as the most 
effective way to develop soft power; they think that the world today needs Chinese 
civilisation and Confucian morality. Some go even further and propose a ‘Chinese model’ 
(Yan 2013). By contrast, this thesis argues that pop culture is the critical shortcoming of 
China’s soft power deployment and investigates whether film coproduction could be a 
contributor to enhancing China’s global cultural presence.   
2. Film coproduction 
Coproduction is a broad term that means a variety of types of collaborative production. In this 
thesis, I will discuss the several types of collaborative production between Chinese and 
international partners. One of the difficulties that we face in discussing coproductions with/in 
China is the difficulty of definitions. That is to say, the terminology used in China to discuss 
coproduction does not directly align with the terminology used outside China.  
Outside China, we refer to ‘official coproduction’ and ‘unofficial coproduction’. ‘Official 
coproduction’ refers specifically to those films produced by international partners that are 
made under the terms of a coproduction treaty or formal agreement between two or more 
countries. Official coproduction is also sometimes called treaty coproduction. Unofficial 
coproduction means any other collaborative production between filmmakers that is not made 
under the terms of a coproduction treaty. 
In the official rules governing film production between Chinese and international partners, 
the general term to describe all types of collaboration is ‘Sino-Foreign Cooperative Film 
Production’ (zhongwai hezuo dianying paishe). In Chinese, this is often shortened to ‘hepai’ 
or in English, ‘coproduction’. The rules identifies three types of cooperative production: 
 Joint production (lianhe shezhi/hepai) (also somewhat confusingly called official 
coproduction): in which both Chinese and non-Chinese partners invest in production, 
contribute creatively to the production and are involved in the actual production 
6 
 
process, both under the terms of a formal international coproduction agreement and 
without such an agreement. 
 Assisted production (xiezuo shezhi/xiepai): in which a foreign party bears the cost of 
production in China and Chinese companies are contracted to provide services to 
foreign filmmakers working in China.  
 Entrusted or commissioned production (weituo shezhi): in which a foreign party bears 
the cost of production and contracts Chinese filmmakers to produce the film in China.  
Joint production is the most important type for this thesis, because it involves the Chinese and 
non-Chinese partners sharing creative and financial responsibility.  
All official or treaty coproductions are joint productions. However, not all joint productions 
are treaty coproductions or official coproductions. Joint production also covers collaborations 
between Chinese and Hong Kong filmmakers, and Chinese and American filmmakers, as 
well as collaboration between Chinese and other filmmakers that are not part of a treaty 
arrangement. However, both in China and in American trade journals, such as the Hollywood 
Reporter, or Variety, these collaborations are called ‘official coproductions’. To avoid 
confusion, in this thesis, I will only use the term official coproduction to refer to those films 
that are made under the terms of a coproduction treaty between China and another country, 
such as Australia. When I talk about Hong Kong-Chinese, and US-Chinese coproductions, I 
will call them joint productions. I will discuss all of these definitions in more detail in 
Chapter Three.  
Can Chinese soft power be developed through film coproduction? As I will discuss in later 
chapters, the role of film as an expression of cultural soft power has been emphasized by 
many policy officials in China. China’s film industry is developing rapidly under government 
protection. Its domestic cinema market (theatrical box office), according to an Ernst & Young 
report (2012), is expected to exceed that of the US in 2020. This makes working with, and in, 
China very attractive for international filmmakers, but it also threatens China’s proud cultural 
autonomy. The clear lack of international success of Chinese films does little to promote 
China’s cultural influence outside the mainland and thus does little to achieve China’s 
ambitious soft power goals. China’s soft power strategy ‘is spending billions of dollars on a 
charm offensive’, with an emphasis on ‘high-profile gestures’ such as rebuilding the 
Cambodian Parliament or Mozambique’s Foreign Affairs Ministry (Nye 2012a). Its efforts in 
the film industry include huge studio infrastructure developments, such as Shanghai Film 
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Studios, August First Film Studios (in Beijing’s Fengtai district), Hengdian World Studios (in 
Zhejiang province) and Wuxi Studios (in Jiangsu province). These studios are capable of 
supporting numerous simultaneous productions. Nevertheless, the creation of film soft power 
needs more than built infrastructure; it needs ‘soft’ skills. Nye says: ‘In an information age in 
which credibility is the scarcest resource, the best propaganda is not propaganda’ (Nye 
2012b:13). While billions have been invested to enable media services such as Xinhua and 
China Central Television to establish a global presence, the return on investment so far is 
minimal because the services are seen to be propaganda.  
What is actually required for telling a good story to the world are ‘soft’ skills. As Shambaugh 
(2013:25-26) says, ‘China has become obsessed with soft power. Where can China find it? 
Can it be bought?’ This soft power infrastructure can’t simply be bought with money, nor can 
it be built overnight. Coproduction, though, seems to be a good way to transfer skills and 
know-how and also serves as an effective way of attracting people with much needed skills to 
work in China. This corresponds with the third stage in Keane’s timeline of cultural 
innovation (see Appendix). Keane (2013: 80) identified six stages of development in China’s 
attempts to innovate in cultural and creative industries. The argument he presents is that 
China is moving towards collaborating more as a means of shifting away from low cost, low 
value production (which to date has dominated the timeline) to a higher value activity by 
learning and sharing knowledge. Collaboration (coproduction and various forms of sharing 
knowledge) is the stage following ‘Standardized production’ (Made in China) and ‘Imitation’ 
(import substitution, local versions and cloning).  
As will be discussed in Chapter Three, in the 1990s Chinese filmmakers had not much 
interest in competing in world film markets. Internationalisation of production became an 
accepted market strategy when the Chinese government started to focus on the development 
of cultural industries in the early 2000s. While China’s cinema has performed relatively well 
in recent years, much of the success can be attributed to the contribution of coproductions 
with Hong Kong SAR. In 2003, the signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) between  China and Hong Kong not only reclassified coproductions with Hong Kong 
as domestic Chinese films, but also opened ‘a back door for more international participation 
in coproductions organized through Hong Kong’ (Zhu and Nakajima 2010:33). Since then the 
PRC has shifted gears to become a willing collaborator with other international partners. 
Many companies from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea, US and other countries have set up in 
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Beijing, Shanghai, Hengdian and Guangzhou, or have entered into various models of 
collaboration with Chinese companies (Davis 2010). 
The huge domestic market is always China’s trump card. The size and growth of the Chinese 
box office drives producers globally to look for opportunities for coproduction in China. As 
China imposes a quota on foreign films, only allowing thirty-four revenue sharing films to be 
imported annually, coproduction is a good way to gain privileged access to China’s box 
office. New policy settings now make this more possible. Keane says that incoming 
filmmakers ‘bring ideas, investment, technology and know-how into China. Policy-makers 
are allowing these film players to generate ideas, to offer solutions to revitalise stagnant 
Chinese productions. The hope is that an increase in domestic quality, brought about by the 
infusion of creativity and technology, may counter the “cultural exports deficit” (wenhua 
maoyi chizi)’ (Keane 2013: 86-87). The data on Chinese film exports in recent years are 
dramatic – as we can see from Chapters One, Two and Three, coproduction films have made 
up most of China’s film exports. 
As Keane observes, there are other reasons for the interest in working with/in mainland China: 
production in China can be a stepping stone to the global market; economic decline in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan content industries is driving creative migration, especially to places like 
Beijing and Shanghai; media production on the mainland is relatively cost effective; 
preferential business policies on offer plus an availability of human capital (especially 
technical resources) make the mainland an attractive destination (Keane 2011); market entry 
costs are lower than in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea; and the benefits of cultural proximity 
and shared Asian values can compensate for political differences (Keane 2013; 2015). 
The investigation will look at the history of coproduction as well as new coproductions taking 
place and how foreign partners operate within China’s restrictive film industry environment. 
China has also signed official coproduction treaties or agreements with Australia, Canada, 
France, Singapore and Italy and Belgium. Treaties with Russia, India and South Korea and 
the UK were signed in 2014 to seek and encourage more coproduction opportunities. This 
thesis will expand the discussion based on China-US coproduction and China-Australia 
formal coproduction in Chapters Six and Seven. There has been an increase in coproduction 
activity globally. In comparison to most locations, China offers new challenges such as strict 
censorship, government intervention, unclear regulations and underdeveloped industry 
mechanisms. These obstacles need to be overcome if China is to be a competitor. Much 
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emphasis has fallen on the term ‘creativity’. Keane believes (2013: 80) that ‘creativity needs 
time; however, Chinese policy makers want to fast track progress’ which leads to government 
intervention in the film industry. Compared to other countries’ soft power promotion, the 
Chinese cultural soft power push is more government-guided, as will be further discussed in 
Chapter One. The desire to promote culture abroad and to build a national image and an 
approved soft power strategy has led to strict censorship of coproduction film content.   
There is a lack of academic attention being paid to film coproduction in China, especially 
how foreign partners operate in the film industry. The key questions include: how do foreign 
players adjust to changing policies? In particular, how do they confront cultural issues and 
political uncertainty? What is the process of working with Chinese partners to develop the 
overall project?  
Coproductions enable the transfer of creative ideas, technology, knowledge, professional 
skills and management skills. As Keane points out (2013: 95), ‘as practitioners engage in 
collaborations the pace of learning increases as well as knowledge of markets’. An example 
of skill transfer is the entry of Korean companies into the Chinese film market. Yecies, Shim 
and Goldsmith (2011) have shown how digital intermediate (DI)1 skills have been transferred 
from Korea and how they have affected the Chinese film industry. DI has become an 
essential process for film around the world since the mid-2000s. DI used to be ‘a cost-
prohibitive service offered by a small number of US, Canadian and Australian firms working 
with a select group of leading Chinese directors and their big-budget films’ in China (Yecies, 
Shim and Goldsmith 2011: 139). Since the Beijing-based Korean DI company LOLLOL 
media started to collaborate with Chinese filmmakers, as well as ‘providing digital technical 
and file-based workflow consultation’ with lower costs, many more filmmakers have been 
able to utilise this process. To give another example of technology transfer: in 2012, Cameron 
Pace Group (CPG) built its China headquarters in Tianjin and announced it would bring 3D 
technology to China.   
Unsurprisingly, the CEO of Dreams of the Dragon Pictures, Qiu Huashun, has emphasized 
the importance of transfer of knowledge in his company’s work with Cloud Atlas Productions. 
He said that the most important thing that he learned by coproducing the film Cloud Atlas 
                                                            
1 ‘Digital Intermediate’ is the stage in the filmmaking process when footage is transferred from celluloid to a 
digital file for editing, before being transferred back to film for screening. 
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(yuntu 2012) with Hollywood is that ‘we have met so many of the most professional and 
excellent filmmakers in the world and we have learned how to produce a good film’ (Qiu 
2012). Zhang Zhao, CEO of Le Vision Pictures, said that the purpose for his company in 
coproducing Expendables 2 (gansi dui 2 2012) was to learn the coproduction process, from 
content to production, as well as to learn about international insurance, financial management 
and legal procedures (Zhang 2012). These transfers through collaboration and coproduction 
have had an effect on China’s film industry and have contributed to the development of 
China’s cultural soft power. Coproductions are necessary preconditions for these transfers to 
occur regularly and extensively. This thesis will not focus on documenting these transfers, 
although this is a worthy subject for future research, rather it will focus on studying the 
preconditions, through three representative case studies. 
Sino-Hong Kong collaboration has the longest history. We will see how the mainland film 
industry has benefited from coproductions with Hong Kong. Hong Kong directors moved 
north together after CEPA and not only brought capital but, more importantly, contributed to 
a transfer of knowledge, skills and know-how – soft skills – to the mainland film industry. 
This case represents coproduction based on a long-standing relationship of cultural proximity 
and this has facilitated the coproduction process. However, China-Hong Kong collaboration 
is still a fraught relationship with ongoing distinct cultures. In such a relationship, the Hong 
Kong filmmakers compromise with censorship regulations and adapt to the mainland market. 
By examining Peter Chan’s case, I argue that this led to the development of the Hong Kong 
film industry while simultaneously accelerating the demise of the cultural identity of Hong 
Kong films.  
The Sino-US case represents the most challenging environment in coproduction. The US has 
the world’s most dominant film industry. In this thesis, we will see how the US has tried to 
test the attitude of the Chinese film authority and play with coproduction rules, hoping to gain 
more market return with less sacrifice, which has led to the fake coproduction phenomenon. 
The CEO of Le Vision Pictures, Zhang Zhao, said: ‘coproduction with Hong Kong has 
promoted the development of domestic film for the past ten years; the coproduction with US 
will support us for fifty years in the future’ (Zhang 2012:54). Chinese filmmakers want to 
learn from Hollywood and make use of its global distribution system. The Chinese 
government wants to borrow the Hollywood ‘boat’ to send Chinese culture around the world. 
A precondition for soft power to become attractive to foreign audiences is in how it is 
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received. The acceptance of Chinese culture and elements by international audiences is 
therefore based on two conditions: channels to distribute these products, and the packaging 
and marketing of the product. The US possesses ample room for meeting both conditions. 
Though real coproduction between China and the US is full of challenges, it has the promise 
of blue sky rewards.  
The Sino-Australia case represents coproduction with a small film industry, and substantial 
cultural difference. It is also coproduction under formal treaty. In comparison, Sino-US 
coproduction is less formal as no treaty has been signed, while Hong Kong is geographically 
part of China. This case is an illustration of the wider system at work. In this case, we will see 
how, in most situations, second tier Chinese filmmakers and second tier Australian players 
used the wider system to learn how to internationalise. However, I argue that being ‘blessed’ 
by government is not necessarily an indication that things will be successful. The complexity 
of the dual bureaucratic nature of the processes in coproduction greatly hindered the 
filmmakers’ creativity and freedom, which led to low output and low-profile treaty 
coproductions, and which speaks little for China’s soft power.  
3. Methodology 
The research uses a triangulating qualitative method to investigate and examine issues and 
central questions. There are three methodological components to this thesis’s qualitative 
method: document analysis, case studies and semi-structured interviews. Included was a one 
month fieldwork trip carried out in China to collect key primary data. 
Document Analysis 
Document analysis is widely used in the humanities and social sciences and also in the 
research of media and cultural industries (Stokes 2003:109). In this thesis, this method plays 
a crucial role to provide valuable primary and secondary data which helps to identify 
information about the state regulatory environment, the history and current situation of film 
coproduction fields, and the gaps in existing academic work. Many Chinese language sources 
were accessed due to the lack of up-to-date documents in English. These Chinese sources 
include Chinese policies, regulations and reports related to film; leading Chinese scholars’ 
writings on soft power, the film industry and specifically Chinese coproduction. While 
priority has been given to English literature in this thesis, the use of Chinese documents 
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enriches the English literature on the topic, and is one of this thesis’s major contributions to 
knowledge. 
Three types of documents are focused on:  
- Official government policies and regulations introduced by State Administration of 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT)  impacting on the sector, (Chinese 
and English);  
- Academic works and national reports (Chinese and English). English-language reports 
relating to the US and Australia film industries were mainly accessed through the websites of 
Motion Picture Association of America, and Screen Australia online. Chinese academic 
articles mostly come from Chinese film journals such as Contemporary Film (dangdai 
dianying) and Movies (dianying) which were downloaded from CNKI (China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure). Chinese-language reports include The Annual Report on 
International Cultural Trade of China, Report on Development of China’s Media, Chinese 
Creative Industries Report, Annual Report on Development of China’s Radio, Film and 
Television, Chinese Creative Industries Report, International Cultural Market Report. These 
documents provide authoritative data on the Chinese film industry, as well as scholarly 
communication practice in China.  
- Non-academic and informal documents from trade journals and inter-industry reports, 
books published by industry practitioners, promotional materials, newspapers, blogs, and 
websites. Because of the fast changing character of the film industry, a considerable amount 
of data and information has been sourced from online media, newspapers and other ‘grey’ 
channels. The variety of non-academic and informal sources in English and Chinese include 
Entgroup, The Hollywood Reporter, Variety, IMDB, The Diplomat, China Law Blog, 
Chinafilmbiz, Film Business Asia, and Screen Australia.  
Case Studies 
John Gerring (2006) defines case study as ‘an intensive study of a single case (or a small set 
of cases) with an aim to generalize across a larger set of cases of the same general type’. It is 
a good way to develop a better understanding of a particular phenomenon or topic by 
collecting data from each case (Creswell, 2005, 2009). According to Yin (2003), case studies 
are ‘the preferred strategy when how or why questions are being posed’ and it allows the 
13 
 
researcher to keep the ‘holistic and meaningful characteristics of the real-life events’. For the 
purpose of my research, the case study, in Stake’s words (2003:134), provides ‘a secondary, 
supportive role to facilitate our understanding’ of three representative models of film 
coproduction and the relevant issues identified in China: (1) Hong Kong and China, based on 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA); (2) US and China, based on no 
agreement; and (3) Australia and China, based on an official film coproduction treaty.  
This thesis covers various types of coproduction with China based on different case studies. 
China-Hong Kong was chosen because this is the case with the longest history, greatest 
cultural similarity, and earliest access to the Mainland market. China-US was chosen because 
the American film industry is globally dominant, because Chinese and American cultures are 
not proximate, and because no formal coproduction agreement between the two countries 
exists. China-Australia was chosen to provide an example that extends both previous cases. 
Although, like the China-US case, Chinese and Australian cultures are very different, unlike 
the US a formal state-level agreement was signed between the two countries in 2006. There 
are also other good cases such as China-Korea film coproduction which is not included in this 
research. China-Korea film coproduction has been much more numerous and successful in 
comparison with China-Australia coproduction. Considering the variety of cases being 
chosen, the China-Korea case was not pursued because at the time of conducting research no 
formal agreement existed. In addition, the perspective of cultural proximity existing in China-
Korea coproduction has been partly covered by the China-Hong Kong case. 
Hong Kong is a Special Administration Region (SAR) of China. Hong Kong enjoys a 
privileged position in the process of coproduction, which can be seen from the CEPA 
provisions detailed in Chapter Five. The China-Hong Kong case study mostly focused on the 
period after CEPA (2003) is based on much academic literature and document analysis.  
The US and China case consists of much secondary data from non-academic and informal 
sources as this case including great amount of descriptive analysis of separate films or 
phenomena around or after 2012 which has not been paid much attention academically in 
English and Chinese. The primary data comes from forums and interviews I conducted with 
two people from the film industry, one entertainment lawyer, and two government officials. I 
also attended the 2014 17th Shanghai International Film Festival during fieldwork, which 
gave me a chance to hear the discussions and presentations by first-tier industry people 
involved in Sino-US film projects. Most of them are listed in the following interview section. 
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China-Australian coproduction was founded on a coproduction treaty signed in 2007 and 
implemented in 2008. The treaty shows clearly how coproduction operates, and provides 
detailed rules. China-Australia film coproduction is much under-researched. Only a few 
academic works directly related to this area are available. Australian governmental reports 
and data from Screen Australia are very helpful. Not as much secondary data from informal 
sources can be relied on as in the case of China-US research due to the low-profile and low-
output of Sino-Australia coproduction. A substantial amount of primary data was provided by 
attending forum and interviewing industry representatives and government officials. I 
conducted three interviews with one current and two former government officials, and four 
interviews with industry people who are currently doing treaty coproductions with China. As 
I was located in Australia during this research, I was able to conduct interviews with 
filmmakers who are currently engaged in developing an official coproduction with China. 
The writing about The Stone Forest in this thesis is all based on my interviews with the 
producers as well as data provided by the producers. The detailed discussion of this current 
treaty coproduction contributes to understand the preparation and process of a project and the 
bureaucratic complexities in formal coproduction. 
 
Interviews 
 
According to Glesne (2006), interviews are one of the most important methods in qualitative 
research; they are frequently used to collect in-depth expert data and get a better 
understanding of the participants’ perspective in the research field. Interviews are mainly 
divided into six types: structured, standardised, semi-structured, unstructured, intensive, and 
the focus group. I used semi-structured interviews in my research as it is a proven way to 
collect effective data (Burns, 2000; Patton, 2002). It ‘allows the interviewer some latitude to 
ask further questions’ (Bryman, 2008:113). The questions being asked may not follow the 
guide, the researcher can ‘pick up on the things said by the interviewee’ (Bryman, 2008:321). 
Patton (2002:347) also points out that ‘a combined strategy offers the interviewer flexibility 
in probing and in determining when it is appropriate to explore certain subjects in greater 
depth, or pose other questions not anticipated in the interview development’. A one-on-one 
semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method for allowing the interviewee to talk 
openly about their own experiences, ideas, perspectives, attitudes, values and feelings. In this 
project, thirteen one-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted. Nine were conducted 
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by me alone, and four with two or three interviewers (the author, Prof Michael Keane and 
Prof Brian Yecies). A list of interviewees is provided as an Appendix to this thesis. 
 
Interviews with filmmakers and producers, from an insider’s point of view, shed light on the 
challenges in China-US and China-Australia coproduction. Interviews with government 
officials and lawyers provide an understanding of the larger picture, future trends, as well as 
why and how those challenges emerged. I identified my interview subjects through 
participating in coproduction-related forums in Australia and China.  
 
Most of the interviews were conducted as face-to-face conversations in Australia or during 
my fieldwork trip to China. One was conducted by telephone. Most of the interviews lasted 
for more than the proposed time of one hour. The form of semi-structured interview was 
employed. I designed different questions depending on different interview subjects. Most 
interviewees were willing to extend the questions to talk more about their experience and 
professional insights. I also sometimes asked new questions depending on the answers 
provided. Government officials, especially Chinese officials such as Miao Xiaotian, President 
of China Film Coproduction Corporation (CFCC), and Xu Shujun (Susan Xu), Vice President 
of CFCC, were more cautious. Locations were chosen for the convenience of interviewees. 
All the interviewees provided permission for me to identify them in my thesis writing and 
future publications. All the face-to-face interviews were audio-recorded. I have kept in 
contact with most of the interviewees such as Wang Jun (Allen Wang)-IP & Entertainment 
Lawyer from Yingke Law Firm, American Chinese young producer-Wan Long, Australian 
producers Nicholas McCallum, Lynda Woods and Jeff Tseng. I have asked further questions 
through emails and Wechat (a popular mobile app for interpersonal communication 
developed by Tencent). These further discussions have provided useful information for me to 
improve the overall arguments of the thesis. For the ongoing China-Australia project Stone 
Forest, the interviewees McCallum and Woods sent me emails to update me on their progress 
following two formal interviews.  
 
Industry Forums 
 
In December 2013, I attended the APSA (Asia Pacific Screen Awards) MPA (Motion Picture 
Association) Film Financing Forum in Brisbane. This forum offered me a chance to hear 
speeches about how to conduct coproduction with China and raise finance in China, including 
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from the Chief Representative of the China Office for the Motion Picture Association (MPA) 
William Feng, the producer and president of the Film and Television Academy at Shanghai 
Theatre Academy, Sherwood Hu (Hu Xuehua), and Australian film producer and director 
Chris Brown who had just released his coproduction work with Singapore Bait 3D in China.  
While I was not able to secure interviews with these industry figures, I draw directly on their 
forum speeches and questions posed and answers given at these forums. 
 
I made contacts in the Australia screen industry through this forum which laid the foundation 
for recruiting my interviewees especially for the China-Australia case study. One of the 
interviewees, Chris Oliver, then Screen Australia’s Manager Partnerships, was introduced by 
my supervisor Stuart Cunningham.  
 
Similarly, my attendance at the 17th Shanghai International Film Festival Forum 
(SIFFORUM) gave me access to up-to-date speeches, information and discussions given by 
the first-tier industry people involved in China-US coproduction as I mentioned above, 
including the CEO of Shanghai Film Group Ren Zhiqiang, Jack Gao from SVP News 
Corporation, the ex-manager of China Film Promotion International Zhou Tiedong, Hugo 
Xiong from IDG, Eben Davidson Senior Vice President from Paramount Pictures, and Jill 
Tandy, Executive Vice President from Universal Pictures International. I draw directly on 
their forum speeches and questions posed and answers given at these forums. I also attended 
the fourth Australia-China Film industry Forum in Shanghai in July 2014 where I was able to 
organise several interviews with government officials, lawyers and other industry figures. 
 
As China’s film industry and coproduction activity is developing rapidly, industry forums 
and interviews not only provided up-to-date information in this area, but also greatly 
complemented data that I could not obtain from the existing documents, and assisted in 
authenticating information from informal documents such as newspaper articles.   
4. Thesis outline 
Chapter One introduces the term ‘soft power’ and provides a select academic literature 
review of current scholarship on China’s soft power that informs the study. This chapter 
begins with an introduction to Nye’s concept of soft power. Next, I look at the origin of 
China’s soft power and review academic literature on Chinese soft power in its various forms, 
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focusing on how it differentiates from Nye’s original concept and emphasizes culture. I then 
examine the content of Chinese cultural soft power and how the government and scholars 
initially placed an emphasis on traditional culture as the basis of soft power. I note that the 
relative lack of foregrounding of Chinese pop culture is the obvious shortcoming. I review 
academic literature on popular culture and soft power, as well as soft power competition in 
the East Asian region by discussing the US’s use of soft power through its entertainment 
industry complex. The final section looks at film as an exemplary form of cultural soft power, 
China’s ‘going out’ strategy for film and how film coproduction plays a vital role in China’s 
film export.  
Chapter Two, ‘China’s film industry’, is an overview of the Chinese film industry in the 
context of the rise (and decline) of East Asian film. I first look at the current state of the 
Chinese film industry using baseline data, and detail its distribution as well as revenue-
sharing mechanisms. I then examine why the Chinese film industry appears to be booming 
from two perspectives: policy and financial support. Following that, I look at the import and 
export situation of China’s film industry, which leads to the point that the size of the 
domestic market hides the reality of a lack of international success. The following section 
addresses the dark side of China’s film industry and tries to answer the question why Chinese 
film lacks international success from two aspects: structural problems and self-imposed 
obstacles, such as censorship. The final section describes the major players in China and their 
internationalization strategies, which focuses heavily on coproduction.  
Chapter Three, ‘Film coproduction’, begins with the inception of international coproduction. 
It discusses the definition of coproduction and how it works for other countries, as well as 
providing an academic review of its advantages and disadvantages. Next, I outline the history 
of film coproduction in China from the 1980s to 2010, detailing its status in the Chinese film 
industry and outlining current models. This chapter provides background information to show 
why coproduction is a viable way forward. The ensuing chapters answer the question ‘how’. 
Chapter Four examines the incentives as well as the complexities for Chinese coproductions. 
After addressing the incentives for China to engage in coproduction, it addresses the 
complexities including: How do foreign parties find partners in China? What are the official 
bodies? What are the application and approval processes? Despite the complexities and often 
straightforward obstacles to successfully completing coproductions with China, there remain 
considerable advantages. This chapter then examines coproduction challenges with China 
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from three perspectives: content, finance and underdeveloped industry mechanism, China’s 
film censorship policy.  The following chapters – case studies of Sino-Hong Kong, Sino-
United States, and Sino-Australian coproductions – illustrate in significant detail these 
attractions and the obstacles. 
Chapter Five, ‘Sino-Hong Kong coproduction’, is the first case study. Sino-Hong Kong 
represents the longest coproduction history and brings in the concept of ‘cultural proximity’ 
(Straubhaar 1991). I begin with a background on the Hong Kong film industry and note its 
decline and its need to engage with the mainland market. I outline the particular advantages 
enjoyed by Hong Kong in coproducing with China based on the CEPA. The chapter then 
examines the challenges and problems faced by Hong Kong filmmakers in past years by 
looking at Peter Chan’s experience from Hong Kong filmmaker to Greater China filmmaker. 
After that, I briefly look at Johnnie To’s compromise following his insistence on a Hong 
Kong identity. The chapter concludes with a discussion about how coproductions with Hong 
Kong benefit the mainland film industry, as well as prospects for internationalization. This 
leads to the issue of what this mode of filmmaking means for a Hong Kong film identity. I 
argue that Sino-Hong Kong coproduction contributes to the development of Hong Kong film 
while accelerating the demise of the cultural identity of Hong Kong film.  
Chapter Six, ‘Sino-US coproduction’, represents the case of coproduction with the biggest 
film industry in the world. This is coproduction under conditions of ‘cultural distance’ rather 
than proximity. I begin by outlining the history of Sino-US collaboration, which can be 
summarised as stages of assisted production, fake coproduction and real coproduction. ‘Fake’ 
here means coproduction that does not fully fulfil the criteria that the Chinese government 
uses to measure whether a film can be counted as a joint production or approved as a 
domestic film. The following section discusses challenges based on film examples from 2012 
to 2014. I argue that fake coproductions may speak even louder about Chinese soft power 
than real coproductions or local films. The ensuing section analyses challenges existing in 
joint coproduction between China and the US. In this chapter, we can see that China’s soft 
power strategies are stretched to their limit in their dealings with the US.  
Chapter Seven, ‘Sino-Australia coproduction’, provides the final case study. It represents 
coproduction with a small film industry under a treaty, but again under conditions of cultural 
distance. It reflects formal coproduction between nations. This chapter first looks at the 
incentives for China and Australia to coproduce with each other. It then details the rules of 
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treaty coproduction and policies on the Australian side which gives necessary background to 
illustrate the doubly complex nature of treaty productions, since formal treaty coproduction 
requires full compliance with the rules of two countries. I finally examine those films made 
under the treaty to demonstrate the complexity of a dual bureaucratic process.  
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Chapter 1 Soft power competition 
1.1 Soft power 
The term ‘soft power’ was coined and further developed by Joseph S. Nye Jr, former dean of 
the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Assistant US Secretary of 
Defence. In 1990, Nye published Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power 
in which he proposed the idea of soft versus hard power. Nye pointed out that aside from ‘the 
active command power behaviour of getting others to do what you want’ there is an aspect of 
power which could ‘get others to want what you want’. This kind of power can ‘rest on the 
attraction of one’s idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the 
preferences that others express… the ability to establish preferences tends to be associated 
with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension 
can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually associated 
with tangible resources like military and economic strength’ (Nye 1990: 31-32).  
Soft power, Nye later wrote, is a nation’s cultural and ideological appeal beyond its borders; 
it is the ability to get desired outcomes through attraction instead of force (Nye, 1999: 30). In 
2002, Nye developed the concept further, arguing that ‘the soft power of a country rests 
primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political 
values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are 
seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’ (Nye, 2002: 11).  
Nye explained that ‘power is the ability to alter the behaviour of others to get what you want, 
and there are basically three ways to do that: coercion (sticks), payments (carrots) and 
attraction (soft power)’ (Nye, 2006). ‘This attractiveness’, as Kurlantzick (2007:5) notes, 
could be called a nation’s brand and can be transmitted in various ways, which include ‘a 
nation’s popular and elite culture, its public diplomacy (government-funded programs 
intended to influence public opinion abroad), its business’ actions abroad, international 
perception of its government’s policies, and the gravitational pull of a nation’s economic 
strength’.  
For the first time, Nye proposed and elaborated the concept of soft power emphasizing the 
importance of using culture, political values and policy attraction to promote the development 
of a nation. Nye’s soft power concept has been embraced enthusiastically by the Chinese 
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government in a manner ‘rarely seen in other parts of the world’, as Rawnsley (2012: 126) 
observes. Some scholars believe that the state’s enthusiasm for soft power is believed to 
relate to the political value of ‘peaceful rise’ that became popular among Chinese Communist 
Party leaders in the 2000s (Brown 2010). The concept of a ‘peaceful rise’ not only refers to 
the rise of economic power, but also reflects the sense of the rise of status to be a leading 
regional or even global player, after the long period of depredations and the relative isolation 
under Mao’s rule (Medeiros 2009). The emphasis on ‘peaceful’ reflects the needs to counter 
the negative perception of taking China’s rise as a threat to other countries (Broomfield 2003). 
The embrace of soft power by the Chinese government addresses the contradiction of the rise 
of China’s hard power and limited influence in international diplomatic and cultural fields 
(Ding 2008; Wang 2011; Blanchard and Lu 2012). As Cabestan (2010:3) notes ‘the key 
objective of this new discourse has been to change the outside perception of China for the 
better, and build a positive image of China’s contribution to the world’ (cited in Flew and 
Hartig 2014:8). Nowadays, the concept of soft power is more connected to the ‘strong 
cultural nation’ discourse (W. Li, 2014). As Kurlantzick (2007:6) points out, the Chinese 
government, and nations influenced by China, developed a broader soft power idea than Nye 
proposed, which I will discuss later in this chapter. 
1.2 China’s soft power 
In recent years, the term ‘China’s soft power’ has been regularly mentioned in Chinese policy 
statements and has appeared in news reports and scholarly works. Although the concept of 
soft power was first proposed by Nye, the idea has always been embedded in ancient Chinese 
ideology and culture. According to Ding (2008:24), the idea of soft power can be found in 
ancient Chinese philosophies; China’s dominant ideology – Confucianism – encourages a 
country to achieve its leading role by setting itself up as an example rather than imposing its 
values on others. In Confucius’ teachings, he hardly advocated the use of power, not to 
mention war. The thought of ‘culture winning over an enemy’ and ‘winning a battle before it 
is fought’ is found throughout China’s strategic culture. Another great philosopher and 
thinker in ancient China, Laozi, states in his masterpiece Daode Jing that the softest under 
heaven will overcome the hardest (tianxia zhi zhirou, chicheng tianxia zhi zhijian) (Han, 
2011: 467).  
The greatest strategist of China’s ancient military, Sunzi, in his famous masterpiece The Art 
of War, wrote that ‘not fighting and subjugating the enemy’s army is the supreme level of 
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skill’ (buzhan er quren zhi bin, shan zhi shanzhe ye), ‘the best strategy is to attack the 
enemy’s mind rather than to attack the fortified cities’ (shangbin famou, gongcheng zhifa wei 
bu deyi) (Lin, 2011). Sunzi’s ‘supreme level of skill’ is like the concept of soft power, as 
currently defined. ‘Influenced by these philosophies, ancient Chinese governors historically 
preferred to defuse security threats internally through moral government, that is, the 
benevolent king set a good example for his people’ (Johnston 1995: 118 cited in Ding 
2008:24). 
Before Nye’s soft power theory was formally introduced to China, the idea of soft power had 
a history there. One of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s policy advisors, Zheng Bijian, 
stated in 1988 that ‘cultural power is an important national power and is an important 
component of comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli)’ (Zheng 2005). Entering the 
twenty-first century, with the comprehensive enhancement of China’s hard power, especially 
the high speed development of the economy, ‘Chinese decision makers and opinion leaders 
have paid close attention to the progress of their nation’s soft power’ (Li, 2008:288).  
The term ‘China’s soft power’ has been increasingly cited by political leaders, academic 
journals and newspapers. In 2002, the political report to the 16th Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Congress indicated that culture demonstrates a more prominent role in the competition 
of comprehensive national power (Jiang 2002). In 2006, former Chinese president Hu Jintao 
pointed out that ‘the increase in our nation’s international status and influence will have to be 
demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defence, as 
well as in soft power such as culture’ (Ma 2007:35-38). In the 17th Communist Party (CCP) 
Congress, Hu Jintao put forward an idea to ‘promote nation’s culture soft power’ in a national 
strategic way for the first time, and pointed out that culture has become an important source 
of national cohesion and creativity, and an important factor for the competition of 
comprehensive national power (Hu, 2007).  
However, the soft power mentioned by Chinese political elites is not the same as Nye’s 
definition of soft power (Ding, 2008:28). It has its own discourse and ramifications. 
According to Zhang Guozuo (2011), the dean of China’s culture soft power research centre in 
Hunan, the connotation and function of soft power should have wider scope within China, 
rather than only recognizing soft power as a strategy in an international political game. He 
emphasizes that the development of China’s soft power focuses more on the improvement of 
China’s comprehensive national power. Ding (2008:28) points out that ‘Comprehensive 
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National Power (CNP) is notable as an original Chinese political concept with no roots in 
Western political theories’. It can be assessed by military, economic, political and cultural 
factors. He further states that the Chinese concept of comprehensive national power 
obviously includes not only hard power but also all the aspects of soft power mentioned by 
Nye. The concept of CNP is a formulaic prescription to be applied to all areas of 
development, not only to international success abroad but also to assist the state to govern at 
home.  
Li (2008:288) indicates that China’s soft power is not limited to Nye’s specific scope: ‘unlike 
Nye’s exclusive focus on the efficacy of soft power in achieving foreign policy goals, 
Chinese discourse frequently refers to a domestic context, evincing a mission for domestic 
purposes’. Barr (2011: 81-83) also notices the connection between the domestic and 
international agenda of Chinese soft power and points out that Beijing’s effort to promote soft 
power to build a national brand does ‘more than merely construct and manage China’s 
reputation, [it] also … instil[s] loyalty to the Party brand and strengthen[s] Beijing’s own 
legitimacy, amongst both its domestic population and international audience’. He further 
points out that the domestic need for soft power is to help ‘the Party sustain its legitimacy and 
acceptance amongst China’s fifty-six different ethnic minority groups’ by promoting Han 
culture (Barr 2011; Zhu and Quan 2009) and the need ‘for social justice, improved moral 
standards, anti-corruption measures, and the development of innovative social scientific 
research as a means to compete internationally’ (Barr 2011; Yi 2009). Furthermore, as Keane 
notes, ‘resisting cultural imperialism (mainly from US) was a founding plank of the Chinese 
Peoples’ Revolution’ (Keane 2015:86). It goes without saying that the best way to maintain 
national cultural security is probably to enhance its own culture’s influence and peoples’ 
belief in it. However, the Chinese leadership acknowledges that Chinese soft power, whether 
directed outwards or domestically, is not anywhere near as developed as its economic, 
defensive and strategic hard power. This motivates an ambitious drive to improve first 
domestically and regionally and then, ultimately, taking on the US. Film coproductions are 
part of this larger narrative.  
From the government’s point of view, when Chinese cultural influence is not strong enough 
to resist other countries’ (mainly US) imperialism, the best response currently is to censor it. 
Although Barr (2011: 83-92) argues that those moves of ‘raw state power’ such as censoring 
its citizens by controlling access to social networking sites and retaliating against everything 
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the Party considers as being anti-China, actually damages Beijing’s soft power. In film, 
Shambaugh (2013) overall view is that films critical of China can’t be made, reinforcing the 
perception, however outdated, that China is authoritarian in cultural terms.  
The other major difference between Chinese and Nye’s concepts of soft power, according to 
Zhang (2011), is that Nye identifies equal parameters of soft power: culture, political values 
and foreign policy. However, China’s understanding of soft power puts more emphasis on 
culture. Culture is the soul and frame of soft power in China, the trait of various elements of 
soft power depend on corresponding cultural values and intellectual thinking. In fact, Wang 
Huning, one of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat members who delivered the first 
Chinese article on soft power in 1993, argued that culture is the main source of a nation’s soft 
power (Li, 2008:292). When many Chinese scholars and politicians mention soft power, they 
are actually referring to cultural soft power. 
1.3 Cultural soft power and cultural diplomacy 
In China, the core value of culture is embraced by Chinese leading sociologists and 
philosophers and is emphasized by the Chinese leadership. According to Glaser and Murphy 
(2009), the proposal to include soft power in the work report of the 17th CCP (Chinese 
Communist Party) Congress (October 2007) was submitted by the Ministry of Culture rather 
than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soft power in foreign policy has focused on cultural 
policy such as establishing Confucius Institutes outside China, enhancing the influence of 
Chinese media in the world and promoting cultural export trade. Thus the term ‘cultural soft 
power’ appears frequently in Chinese official documents and scholarly works. 
When we speak of culture we are often referring to many things. According to Raymond 
Williams (2011:76), ‘culture is one of the two or three most complicated English words’. He 
summarizes three general categories for the definition of culture. First, the ‘ideal’, refers to ‘a 
state or process of human perfection’; second, ‘documentary’, means ‘the body of intellectual 
and imaginative work’; and third, the ‘social’, in which culture is a description of a particular 
way of life (Williams, 1961:57). The American anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckholn have 
listed 165 different definitions of culture (Kroeber and Kluckholn 1952 cited in Gao 2006).  
Culture in China, however, has a more established base. In relation to the meaning of culture 
in the concept of cultural soft power, a prominent Chinese scholar from Peking University, 
Wang Yichuan (2011:30-31), writes that culture is the value system and is a symbolic form of 
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social lives, including institutional systems, behaviour systems and knowledge systems; and 
more detailed fields such as myth, religion, language, history, science and arts. Wang 
believes that the connotation of culture, defined from this perspective, is in accordance with 
the ‘cultural’ in the term ‘national cultural soft power’ as used by Chinese leaders.  
Unlike Chinese soft power, which has both an inward- and an outward-facing dimension, soft 
power internationally tends only to have an outward focus. The Chinese understanding of soft 
power as intrinsically cultural equates with what is sometimes termed ‘cultural diplomacy’ 
(Flew and Hartig 2015:6-9). Cull (2008:32-35) describes the functions of cultural diplomacy 
as promoting a nation’s cultural resources overseas and /or facilitating cultural transmission 
abroad. Flew and Hartig (2015:8) argue that ‘China has invested heavily in cultural 
diplomacy over the last decade through arts and cultural exchanges, Confucius Institutes’ and 
many other forms. Sun (2015:403) argues that media-dependent public diplomacy should be 
seen as ‘one facet of cultural diplomacy’. She notes that limited attention has been paid to the 
media domain in discussions of cultural diplomacy, despite the fact that cultural diplomacy is 
principally pursued through media. This thesis exemplifies this fact through its attention to 
the outward direction of China’s soft power though film coproduction. There have been long 
academic debates on which kinds of cultural expression and cultural production should be the 
core of China’s soft power. The following section will briefly discuss the current scholarly 
debate in this regard. 
1.4 The content of China’s cultural soft power 
When Nye defines culture as a source for soft power, he mainly refers to contemporary 
popular culture. Hollywood films are mentioned by scholars as tools to softly affect the world. 
Mathew Fraser (2003) in his book Soft Power and American Empire characterises American 
movies, television, pop music and fast food as ‘awesome weapons of mass distraction’. Nye 
and Kennedy (2004: 711-713) reviewed this book and agreed with Fraser’s arguments about 
the soft power of popular culture. 
By contrast, some Chinese scholars have regarded traditional culture as ‘always the most 
reliable soft power resource’ (Ding 2008: 29). For example, Cheng Yugang (cited in 
McGiffert 2009) believes that not only will China’s ancient history and traditional culture 
attract those neighbours who share the same Confucian heritage in Asia, but they are also 
tremendous attractions for Western countries. From my point of view, one of the reasons for 
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China’s soft power being massively underdeveloped compared to its hard power is due to 
Chinese traditionalists’ adherence to the idea of over-emphasizing the importance and 
attraction of China’s traditional culture and values to other nations. Some scholars hold the 
view that Chinese traditional values are ‘people oriented’ (yi ren wei ben). The theory that 
humans are an integral part of nature (tian ren he yi), harmony in diversity (he er bu tong) 
and so on, could be a good approach to solving global problems such as poverty, environment 
deterioration, ethnic conflicts and so on (Glaser and Murphy 2009:14).  
In China, many scholars and political leaders focus on glorifying traditional culture and 
history, and are eager to build social values based on such traditional culture. For example, 
Gan Yang, a leading Chinese scholar who has worked at many universities in China, 
including Peking University and Qinghua University, and is regarded as a representative of 
China’s New Left (2005), states that so-called soft power depends on what you have, and 
China’s splendid traditional culture provides the basic resources of cultural soft power. Yet 
Kang Xiaoguang (2014), Professor of Renmin University of China, argues that the key for 
building China’s soft power is ‘cultural reconstruction’, the reconstruction of value systems, 
moral systems and political philosophy in China. According to Kang, the weakness of 
China’s soft power stems from a lack of core values. In the case of China, its traditional 
culture is a core value, and since Confucianism is the core philosophy of China’s traditional 
culture, so he proposes making Confucianism the state’s religion. Based on this kind of 
ideology, the Chinese government established around 350 Confucius Institute (CIs) in over 
100 countries all over the world (Churchman, 2011). Their main task is to spread Chinese 
language and traditional culture and values. Barr (2011) hails the setting up of Confucius 
Institutes, but points out that people outside China find it hard to believe the traditional 
Chinese values of harmony and peace when they witness the problems China is confronted 
with today, such as territorial disputes, corruption and environmental damage.  
‘Great powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their 
national interests, but it is not an easy sell when the message is inconsistent with their 
domestic realities’, Nye (2012b:13) also observes. I have no intention of denying creative 
industries’ effect on promoting China’s soft power internationally. What I would like to call 
attention to in this thesis is the importance of pop culture in exercising soft power, which the 
government and academy have paid less attention to in past decades. As Nye (2005b:41) 
notes, ‘narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power. The United 
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States benefits from a universalistic culture’. As will be further discussed in the following 
section, though the traditional and old Chinese philosophical values are full of wisdom, they 
really need to be translated into modern and pop language that non-Chinese people are able to 
read and understand. For example, the film Avatar (a fan da 2009) is far more effective in 
rousing people’s awareness of human and nature than the mechanical expounding of 
Confucius’s tian ren he yi in classrooms. 
In regard to the content of the media field which my thesis mainly focuses on, Shambaugh 
(2010:6) notes that China has spent a reported $8.7 billion from 2009-2010 on its ‘external 
publicity work’, mainly on the Big Four: China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio 
International (CRI), Xinhua News Agency and the China Daily newspaper. Although these 
media are penetrating into the developing world and becoming the major sources of news for 
many people in Africa by ‘marketing a cheaper news report’ (Shambaugh 2010:6), they 
hardly affect countries in which China seeks to compete with the likes of the US, Korea, and 
Japan. In terms of China’s domestic media products, Keane (2012) points out that there 
remains a focus on historical productions. However, ‘the successes of Japan, Korea have 
come not from the historical themes but from pop culture and stories of modern life’. He 
further indicates that if China keeps making historical epics and kung-fu, stereotypes of 
China will just be reinforced. There is one obvious reason for those producers to make 
historical productions. Those productions, which reflect Chinese history and traditional 
values, are much more likely to gain a licence from The State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television2, China's chief broadcast regulator (Keane 2012).  
The former Chinese president Hu Jintao (2011) said that China’s cultural soft power should 
be enhanced to match China’s international status. The Chinese government has funded many 
projects all over the world to establish Confucius Institutes to promote Chinese language and 
traditional culture. However, Joshua Kurlantzick (2007:229) points out that ‘Although 
Chinese-language studies and Chinese culture have become more popular, they remain no 
match for American popular culture. The United States stands as the biggest source of film, 
television, popular music, and fiction and non-fiction books’. The development of China’s 
popular culture is the obvious shortcoming of cultural soft power.  
                                                            
2 The MRFT changed its name to State Administration of Radio, Film, TV (SARFT) in the institutional reform 
of the State Council in 1998. The SARFT incorporated with The General Administration of Press and 
Publication in 2013. The name also has been changed to State Administration of Press and Publication, Radio, 
Film, TV (SAPPRFT). 
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Just as the concept of culture itself is complex, it is also hard to precisely define popular 
culture. It contains all the basic characteristics of culture and also implies its own peculiar 
nature (Storey. 1997:1). In addition, Bennett (1980: 18) points out that it is useless to seek a 
precise definition of popular culture because it always leads to a very vague and even 
confusing concept. Popular culture includes fashion, consumer culture, popular lifestyle, 
popular taste, urban culture, sub-culture, media culture and so on. Gao Xuanyang (2006) 
states that more than one hundred years ago, confronted with the basic structure of classical 
capitalism, Marx reached the conclusion that commodity is the general form of society.  
However, today we might say that popular culture is the general form of society.  
In Chinese, popular culture can be translated variously as liuxing wenhua, dazhong wenhua 
or tongsu wenhua. Dai Jinhua (2012: 127-133) prefers to use the term dazhong wenhua, 
which literally means mass culture, and formerly meant official state culture for the masses, 
but has come to mean mass culture in the critical Frankfurt School sense. She points out that 
dazhong wenhua, ‘characterized by commodities, consumption and amusement, was actually 
consumed by minority groups (the new Chinese middle class)’ when it was introduced to 
mainland China in the 1990s. When the internet was introduced in China in the mid-1990s, 
many products gradually become ‘mass’ or ‘popular’ in China. These products, according to 
Dai, included ‘Hollywood movies, pubs, cafes, lofts, magazines introducing luxurious 
lifestyles and computer games’.  
Stuart Hall (1994) proposed that popular culture encompasses the daily life of the mass; it is a 
concept that contrasts with high culture or elite culture. Nye (2005b:41) also says that ‘it is 
common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which 
appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment’. Hall (1994) 
further suggests that pop culture be used to indicate commercially-produced, profit-driven, 
media-based mass entertainment, which is part of popular culture (Hall: 1994). Thus 
conceived, pop culture should include fields like film, TV, pop music, online games and 
animation, and so on. However, most scholars do not distinguish between popular culture and 
pop culture. Popular culture and pop culture can be literally translated into liuxing wenhua in 
Chinese. When most scholars use the term liuxing wenhua, they actually refer to pop culture 
according to Hall’s definition. This could be proved by leading Chinese arts scholar Jia’s 
definition of liuxing wenhua. Jia states that liuxing wenhua is a kind of cultural art form that 
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includes film, TV, pop music, song and dance that was spread by mass media (Jia:2012). In 
this thesis, I also will not focus on precisely distinguishing and using these two words.  
The poet Carl Sandburg appraised the value of popular culture by saying that ‘all movies 
good or bad are educational and Hollywood is the foremost educational institute on earth… 
What, Hollywood’s more important than Harvard? The answer is, not as clean as Harvard, 
but nevertheless, farther reaching’ (quoted in Johnston 2000: 20). He also vividly described 
the penetration and influence of pop culture saying that as early as 1989, before the Berlin 
Wall was demolished; it already had a hundred holes created by western TV and film. Keane 
(2012) states clearly that the way for China to best deploy soft power, would be to shift its 
focus from traditional culture towards more contemporary popular culture.  
Jia (2012) states that cultural soft power is not only about the inner power of one kind of 
culture, but it is also about the power of that culture to be accepted by others. Jia argues that 
traditional culture is important and powerful, but it is not easily appreciated by non-Chinese 
people. Pop culture, on the other hand, often more easily travels across borders.  Jia further 
argues that although not all pop culture can usefully be deployed as a form of soft power, the 
forms which will make the most powerful contribution to the exercise of soft power will 
come from pop culture rather than traditional culture. However, China currently lacks pop 
culture like Hollywood movies, Japanese anime and British jazz. To remedy this, he suggests 
that China’s cultural products should draw from pop culture. I agree with Jia’s statement, 
though this challenges the Chinese saying: ‘yueshi minzu de, yueshi shijie de’ ‘what is of 
national is of international /the more national, the more of the world’ or ‘what is culturally 
distinctive is worldly’. In my view, following Jia, what is culturally distinctive, eg, China’s 
Peking Opera, can be made worldly by incorporating pop culture elements. This will make it 
more acceptable for audiences in other nations. On the other hand, what is worldly can be 
made culturally distinctive. For example, animation is universal, but anime (Japanese 
animation) is culturally distinct and easily accepted internationally.  
Many intellectuals and critics disdain popular culture because of its crude commercialism. 
They regard it as providing mass entertainment rather than information, and thus has little 
political effect (Nye 2005b:45). Actually, pop culture has a universal attraction to people 
from various classes, nations and beliefs. Nye (2005b:45, 2006) emphasizes ‘the political 
importance of popular culture’ and states that the positive effect of pop culture could make 
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the process of carrying out policy more easily and effectively, as will be discussed below by 
taking the US as an example.  
1.5 US’s use of soft power through its entertainment industry complex  
Street (1997) discusses the complex connections linking commercial culture to political 
power and points out that popular culture can be used as a powerful political tool due to its 
ability to articulate feelings that contribute to form the identity of individuals, including 
political thought and action. He uses the term ‘packing of politics’ to describe the 
phenomenon that when politics becomes more theatrical, the line between politics and 
popular culture blurs. Nye (2005b:45) says that ‘popular entertainment often contains 
subliminal images and messages about individualism, consumer choice, and other values that 
have important political effects’. As Wattenberg argues, ‘content is more powerful than 
politics or economics. It drives politics and economics’ (1991:213). The predominance of US 
mass entertainment in the world, especially its dominant film industry, contributes to the 
favourable global image of America. This is illustrated in the results of the Pew Global 
Attitudes project. In figure 1.1 below, the higher the number, the higher the positive opinion 
of the US.  
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Figure 1.1: Opinion of U.S. in 22 countries 2014 
 
 (Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, U.S. Image in 2014) 
A number of scholars have shown that Hollywood films have long been used to promote 
American cultural influence around the world (Guback 1969; Thompson 1985; Jarvie 1992; 
Smith and Ricci 1995; Puttnam 1997; Stokes and Maltby 2004; Mingant 2010; Fattor 2014). 
Smith and Ricci (1995) observe that since the end of the First World War, anguished voices 
have been raised in Europe about the need to counter Hollywood's domination of the movie 
marketplace – for the balance of payments, for the protection of indigenous industries, and 
for the preservation of national identity. Fattor (2014) points out that entertainment plays an 
essential role in the rise and persistence of American power, and in many aspects, has been a 
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weapon against the rejection of American influence abroad. In the twenty-first century, new 
technologies such as online platforms and social networking have reinforced old sources of 
American soft power such as print media, theme parks, film and television. Stokes and 
Maltby (2004) not only point out Hollywood’s global reach but also examine the reception of 
Hollywood movies by non-American audiences from many other countries. They 
demonstrate that the story of the reception of American films overseas is less one of 
domination than of a complex adoption of Hollywood into various cultures.  
Fraser (2005) also notes the propaganda purpose of Hollywood since the First World War and 
the strong connection between Hollywood and Washington even today. For example, after 
9/11, meetings were held between Hollywood studio executives and White House officials 
about how Hollywood films could help to combat world terrorism. In total, US film 
(including its domestic market) represents at least 70 per cent of the global box office. 
Hollywood promotes a favourable international image of the US, characterized by American 
values that are ‘open, mobile, individualistic, anti-establishment, pluralistic, voluntaristic, 
populist and free’ (Nye 2005b:45). As Walt (2006) states: ‘America’s leaders have sought to 
persuade as many countries as possible to embrace their particular vision of a liberal-
capitalist world order’. Hollywood is one of the cornerstones of this endeavour. In a winner-
takes-all market, its ascendancy and ability to transcend other cultures (Zoysa and Newman 
2002:189) ‘has led to other nations fearing that their own cultural identity would be tainted, 
altered somehow by this Hollywood influence’ (Burrowes 2011). It ‘follows, shapes and 
leads in anticipating cultural demand’, and has been ‘beneficial for American business export 
and sustaining the exercise of soft power, a role facilitated by the American government, 
which presses hard for the further global liberalization of services’ (Zoysa and Newman 2002: 
199-200). 
In part, because Chinese films in general have not travelled well, many people around the 
world have formed a view of China and Chinese people from their portrayal in Hollywood 
films. In addition, the Chinese inclination to make historical productions has sometimes 
worked to reinforce stereotypes; for example, that all Chinese people might still wear pigtails. 
To return again to Jia, if Chinese films have a stronger grounding in popular culture, they 
may travel further and at the same time provide a more realistic view of Chinese life and 
society.   
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Soft power competition 
Chinese soft power aspirations are complex. Whereas the original concept of soft power 
identified culture, political values and foreign policies (Nye 1990), China’s model places 
heavy emphasis on traditional culture (Ding 2008; Li 2008). However, the formula for much 
of East Asian soft power is not tradition. Chua (2012) has coined the term ‘soft power 
competition’ to describe how countries in East Asia have used pop culture exports to 
positively influence opinions and attitudes of transnational audiences. In 2002, McGray 
(2002) used the term ‘Gross National Cool’ to describe trendy Japanese pop culture; 
following this, Doobo Shim (2006) drew attention to ‘the Korean wave.’  
No matter what the core source is, the core point of soft power – to attract, to coopt and to 
seduce – is to generate favourable impressions among receiving audiences. If China wants to 
sell its traditional culture and values, it can’t sell it in a traditional way, but must sell it in a 
more easily acceptable pop way. Given that Chinese film is still a rarity abroad, foreigners 
often do not know how to read Chinese texts (Chu 2014). Besides reasons like cultural 
differences and different histories of ideas, Chu (2014: 169-170) points out that the failure of 
Chinese soft power is not entirely China’s failure. The logic of transnational politics, the 
Western fears of a rising China ‘powerfully intervenes in cross-cultural media consumption’. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government, especially in the past, did not choose to use easily 
acceptable pop media products to achieve its soft power ambitions, but rather used heavy 
propaganda programs or Confucius Institutes. China’s political and cultural frames in media 
production – the inward looking and outward looking soft power purpose – further 
complicate cultural products and make them unreadable.  
The Beijing government, in the past several years, has started to shift focus from investing in 
Confucius Institutes and ramping up Chinese media presence overseas by funding declining 
media like broadcast television and radio to produce pure propaganda programs toward more 
ostensibly pop areas, such as animation, commercial film, and online video gaming. In 2009, 
the State Council released its plan to adjust and reinvigorate the cultural industries and has 
formulated numerous sector-specific policies that target pop areas. The recent cultural soft 
power strategies observed by Keane are ‘largely an effect of regional competition as much as 
a head-to head battle with Hollywood’. The stimulus for the shift is not ‘just the rise of the 
great European powers but Korea as the interloper’. The Korean Wave was ‘eroding the 
beachheads of China’s cultural sovereignty. Television dramas constituted the crest of the 
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wave but the backwash was evident in the popularity of Korean fashions, food, music, video 
games, anime and celebrities…China’s former vassal territory, Korea, had been able to 
successfully generate culture exports by mixing traditional aesthetics with postmodern pop 
cultural sensibilities’ (Keane 2015: 93).  
In addition to the US’s existing influential soft power, regional neighbours’ alertness to the 
potential of media production has further forced the Chinese government’s hand. The Korean 
Creative Content Association was established in 2009 to assist the growth of the Korea’s 
content industry. While China was promoting its traditional culture, Japan markets its ‘cool’ 
contemporary pop and sub-culture in music, cuisine, anime, manga, video games and fashion 
(McGray 2002; Newcomb 2008), through a public-private approach which encouraged and 
gave official blessing to the private sector to ‘sell the Japanese dream’ (Aso 2006). ‘Ironically, 
being cool, fun and hip have now become serious business for the Japanese state’ (Lam 2007: 
351).  In comparison, China’s soft power style emphasizes high profile gestures such as 
building infrastructure (Nye 2012b) and adopts a top-down approach that is largely led by 
government, contradicting Nye’s (2005b:46) observation that ‘soft power does not belong to 
the government in the same degree that hard power does’. Popular culture has altered 
impressions of Japan from being economic titan to being creative and cool, (Heng 2010: 275). 
Heng (2010) also notes that a soft power competition era is a looming possibly in the Asia-
Pacific. By undertaking a comparative evaluation of the soft power strategies of Japan and 
China, Heng (2010: 276) concludes that Japan appears the more successful exponent of soft 
power.  
In the Asia-Pacific region, Chua (2012) points out that Japanese, Korean, Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese soft power have been dominant in the past decade. However, China has an 
advantage in the soft power competition: its massive audience/consumer market, which 
drives regional producers to coproduce in China (Chua 2012: 8). Chua’s argument has turned 
Nye’s original concept into a regional index of pop culture success. Chua argues that pop 
culture engenders culture presence, which offers China a strategy for becoming more 
competitive. 
1.6 Film and soft power 
Allmendinga (2001:52) states that ‘society created the media and through the predominance 
of signs the media is increasingly influencing and creating society’.  Nowadays, media 
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messages influence every individual aspect of the way we live and consume, the religion we 
follow and the policy or politicians we support. Zoysa and Newman (2002: 199) note that 
‘film and television are an integral part of American soft power, effortlessly extolling virtues 
attributable to the American way of life, including its downside’. Film, of all kinds of media, 
is traditionally recognized as the most powerful and effective tool for soft power. As Gluszak 
(2013) argues: ‘cinema is the most popular and universal medium of mass entertainment.  It 
is through film that we have learned to appreciate art, experiment with form, and 
communicate with spheres not usually available through direct contact. Cinema has allowed 
us to gain new ways of experiencing the world and obtaining information’. ‘If I could control 
the medium of the American motion picture, I would need nothing else to convert the entire 
world to Communism’, remarked Joseph Stalin (Cited in Zhu 2014). Through Hollywood, 
American cinemas have become ‘part of the socialization process’ for people around the 
world and ‘a prime mover in the globalization of consumerism and image making’ (Zoysa 
and Newman 2002:189-201).  
Soft power is described as an ‘important reality’ by Nye (2002:9).  This reality is reflected in 
the dominant US film industry (Sin 2012:7). As the French politician Hubert Vedrine notes 
that Americans are so powerful because they can ‘inspire the dreams and desires of others, 
thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these 
same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to 
finish their studies’ (quoted in Nye 2002:9). In a global information age ‘success depends not 
only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins’ (Nye 2005a: 11). Film has 
traditionally been the best tool for telling global stories.  
In China, film is not only a tool for telling a story. As Chu (2002:44) points out, the Chinese 
Communist Party ‘inherited Lenin’s conviction that cinema is the most important art form’. 
The CCP has a long tradition of using film as a vehicle for communication of the ideology of 
the one-party state. Under Mao, the film sector’s primary role was mass education, to 
promote Marxism, to ensure public loyalty to the Party, and to coordinate social or political 
campaigns (Chan 2003:159). The profit motive was non-existent. Although Deng Xiaoping’s 
open-door policy enabled the industrialization and commercialization of the film sector, the 
CCP through the Culture department and SARFT, retained a firm hold over script selection, 
film review and censorship.   
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Flew and Hartig (2015:8-9) argue that such strict government control over media and cultural 
institutions has limited the effectiveness of Chinese soft power: 
 China possesses a significant problem in projecting its soft power through public 
diplomacy, arising from the perceived lack of distance between its media and cultural 
institutions and the government, in a one-party state that is seen as authoritarian by 
other nations. The perception of government control over the output of CCTV, the 
Xinhua News Agency or Chinese cinema constitutes an important barrier to the 
capacity of such institutions to have international influence 
This view has been argued and supported by many other scholars (eg. Sparks 2014, McClory 
2010, Shambaugh 2013). However, as discussed in the previous section, the Chinese 
authorities’ need to exercise control over media and cultural industries is deeply grounded in 
the logic and history of the one-party state’s political system. On the one hand, the Chinese 
government understands the subtleties of film and has been attempting to employ film to 
promote soft power inwardly and outwardly. On the other hand, the government is hesitant to 
loosen its hold over the media, even though it may recognise the ‘barriers’ this continues to 
impose on the promotion of soft power, because the need to retain political control is strongly 
felt in part as a means to counter external ‘cultural imperialism’. 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, China experienced the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, 
invasion by foreign countries, internal conflicts, occupation by Japan, and civil war. After 
half a century’s storm and stress, the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. In 
the second half of the century, the PRC was involved in several international conflicts, while 
internally the Chinese people suffered greatly from the economic and cultural upheavals of 
Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. This turbulent history has had a 
profound impact on China. The government now employs soft power more for ‘defensive 
purpose[s]’ (Li 2009), to positively build a stronger cultural image both within and outside 
China and to assert media power to contest western dominance. The level of control exerted 
over media and cultural production reflects the weakness felt by the state in the international 
mediasphere. 
In the past decade, huge amounts of money have been invested in developing national 
champions to counter global giants like News Corporation and Time Warner. Rosen (2011) 
points out that the ‘Chinese film industry is also expected to play its role in this effort, with 
the official China Film Promotion International (CFPI), established under the China Film 
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Group in April 2004, taking the lead’. CFPI is committed to providing assistance and service 
for the promotion and commercial distribution of Chinese national films overseas.  
Su (2010: 317) argues that the Beijing government recognized the film industry as an 
indispensable manifestation of soft power. She further argues that it purposely employs new 
strategies and represents a potential Chinawood that features kung-fu movies and Chinese 
culture as ‘part of an exercise in soft power in an attempt to counter the Western/American 
cultural hegemony’ and also to maintain its legitimacy and a stable society full of conflicts 
(2010: 321).  These strategies, according to Su (2010: 318), include ‘redefining film as 
market-oriented cultural industry to be part of soft power’. As will be discussed in Chapter 
Two, the Chinese film sector has been part of a socialist planned economy for a long time. 
The evolution of Chinese film as an industry growing out of the pure propaganda role can be 
seen from the early 1990s (Zhu and Nakajima 2010:27). Humanizing and commercializing 
Main Melody3 movies, as Su (2010:319-320) states, reflects the double status of the Chinese 
film sector in which Chinese filmmakers try to ‘compromise the official political principle 
and the emergence of a more neutral/humanistic perspective suggests a new trend in 
propagandistic films in the market-oriented film economy’. ‘Incorporating traditional Chinese 
cultural elements and Hollywood techniques to Kung Fu movies’: the historical themes, due 
to censorship in China, are seen by both Hollywood and Chinese filmmakers as ‘politically 
safe, financially less risky and commercially successful’, which leads to the fact that kung-fu 
movies have become ‘a major genre of transnational production’ (Su 2010:321). Su’s 
argument points to the ambivalent status of the Chinese film industry. Along with the rapid 
growth of the film box office in the past few years, more policy and financial support has 
been put into the industry, as will be discussed in Chapter Two. The techniques for 
commercializing patriotic films are better enhanced when filmmakers are playing within the 
boundaries set by the state. However, only incorporating Hollywood techniques in to kung-fu 
films certainly has not satisfied the ambitions of the state or Chinese filmmakers. More 
strategies and action in the coproduction area are required, and that will be discussed in this 
thesis. Whereas film production is tied to the idea of the nation, it is through transnational 
arrangements particularly coproduction that this is being channelled (Berry 2014). 
                                                            
3 ‘Zhu xuanlu, ‘main melody’ or keynote pictures, initiated in 1987. These state-sponsored works are 
propaganda films – glorifying the lives of Party officials, celebrating heroic incidents, or portraying war stories 
and patriotic melodramas’ (Davis 2010: 125). 
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Yecies (2014) observes that Chinese international films are trying to close the gap with 
Hollywood using soft power at home and abroad. That is to say, Chinese international films, 
including coproductions, function as a form of soft power in the domestic and international 
market. Sin (2012:11) notes the intention of the Chinese government to utilise film and its 
images as a soft power tool and attempt to program the perceptions of the country for the 
global audience, largely by means of ‘controlling the national film industry, distributing ideal 
images and relating stories with impressive but predefined themes’.  The importance of film 
to the deployment of soft power is also recognised by a school of prominent Chinese scholars. 
Yin Hong, a leading film scholar at Qinghua University, mentions the connection of Chinese 
film and the softer image of the country (Yin and Shi 2012: 17-20) and the soft power of 
Chinese film in the global background, and says that Chinese film ‘going out’ needs more 
‘compromise’ to appeal to foreign audiences (Yin and Tang 2012:10-14). Yin and Tang 
(2012:10-14) emphasize the importance of ‘universal culture’ for Chinese films going out, 
which requires the films to transfer local, ethnic or traditional culture into universally 
appealing forms. He rejects the idea of focusing on the purity of national culture and stands 
for more compromise with the international market. In Chapter Five, I discuss how Hong 
Kong’s film identity has been compromised by stepping into the mainland market. Chinese 
identity has also been compromised by playing to global sensibilities. Zhang Yiwu, a 
prominent cultural scholar at Peking University (2012:21), argues for the vital place film 
occupies in the soft power development of China in the 21st century. The dean of the Art 
College of Peking University, Wang Yichuan (2012: 27-30), further discusses the soft power 
of film and its hierarchy of effect.  
The value of film in exercising soft power is well-established. For China, the question is how 
can Chinese films attract global audiences through international coproduction in order to 
promote Chinese soft power?  
1.7 China Film ‘going out’ 
The idea of a ‘going out strategy’ or ‘go global’ campaign’ (zou chuqu zhanlue) was 
proposed by Jiang Zemin as an overseas investment strategy in the 15th Chinese Communist 
Party Congress in 1997 (Jiang, 1997). After that, big Chinese corporations started to invest 
abroad and established overseas branches (Jacques 2009: 162). In the media industry, Jiang 
Zemin proposed to ‘let China’s voice broadcast to the world’ in 2001. Responding to Jiang’s 
call, SARFT launched a ‘going out’ project which was to ‘first establish Chinese television 
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and radio channels overseas in five years and then to provide, in ten years, multi-language, 
regionalized broadcasting and coverage’. CCTV-4 (the Chinese language International 
Channel) and CCTV-9 (the English-language International Channel, renamed the 
Documentary Channel on January 1, 2011), were gradually broadcast around the world (Zhu 
2012: 32).  
After the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, the term ‘Chinese culture going out’ was 
frequently used in Chinese media. In 2009, the Chinese government introduced a cultural 
industry promotion plan to strengthen Chinese influence internationally. Li and Yan 
(2012:371) point out that Chinese culture, as a matter of fact, had already gone out passively 
in the dynasty of Han and Tang; at present, ‘going out’ contains two different meanings: first, 
the export of Chinese cultural products; and, second, making Chinese culture, represented in 
the products, accepted generally by people around the world.  
According to Li Huailiang (2014: 2), the director of the national cultural trade research centre, 
the most influential media products, film and television works, made up close to zero per cent 
of China’s cultural exports. Li (2014) believes that the export of film and television can be 
viewed as the vital standard to measure if a nation’s culture can ‘go out’ or not.  He further 
argues that the market mechanism of culture industry in China is underdeveloped. Basically, 
the American cultural industries are market-led, while China’s cultural industries are 
government-led. As Li (2014: 4) has it: ‘the culture’ currently being ‘sent out’ by government, 
regardless of the cost, can not create any real influence, and only the ‘cultural products’ sold 
by companies through the market are able to generate ‘attractiveness’.  
In terms of the export of Chinese films, the data is disappointingly stable. While the Chinese 
domestic box office has rapidly grown from 3.33 billion RMB in 2007 to 20.3 billion RMB 
in 2013, the overseas revenue in 2013, with RMB around 1.5 billion, is even less than 2007 
where it was around 2 billion RMB (SARFT data, cited in Li, H 2014: 117). After the success 
of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000, directed by Li An/Ang Lee, $USD 128 million 
box office) and Hero (2002, directed by Zhang Yimou, $USD 53.71 million box office), it is 
hard to find any films making any impact internationally. A few kung-fu films earned some 
box office revenue overseas, such as House of Flying Daggers (shimian maifu 2004), Kung 
Fu Hustle (gongfu 2004), Fearless (huo Yuanjia 2006), The Grandmaster (yidai zongshi 
2013). However, the other genre films which were successful in China, did not perform well 
overseas. Lost in Thailand (renzai jiongtu zhi taijiong 2012) made 1200 million RMB 
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domestically in comparison to its overseas box office $US 57,000 and So Young (zhi women 
zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun 2013) made 700 million RMB compared to its overseas box 
office $US 9, 990 (Li, H 2014: 119). 
Although film export can be recognised as a very effective way to exercise soft power, 
China’s current situation in this field is very depressing. The other phenomenon we can 
observe is that coproduced films made up almost the whole export data. In 2011, 52 films, 
including 50 coproductions, from 23 producers, were exported to 22 overseas countries and 
regions. More data to support this can be found in Chapters Two and Three (The Annual 
Report on International Culture Trade of China 2012: 183).  
From this data, it is clear that coproduction plays a vital role in China’s film exports. This is 
recognised by the Chinese Government, which positively encourages other countries to 
coproduce with China by signing official coproduction treaties, allowing the setting up of 
joint-venture media companies and improving coproduction finance mechanisms. Most 
importantly, the crucial factor is the huge domestic film market, which is now seducing 
countries all over the world to share a slice of the pie. The following chapters will discuss 
Chinese film coproduction and the internationalism (going out) of China’s film industry 
within the context of the Party-state’s embrace of cultural soft power to enhance its national 
image.  
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Chapter 2 China’s Film Industry 
This chapter will examine the recent rapid growth of China’s film industry against the 
background of the rise (and decline) of other East Asia media industries. This chapter begins 
with background on China’s film industry, its history, strengths and weaknesses. From this 
background we are able to see why coproduction has emerged as a viable means to make the 
industry more competitive, not just a place for film consumption but for a complete industry 
chain to emerge. To show how the Chinese film industry is coming to term with the 
challenges of competition and coproduction I examine the way that films are made financed 
and distributed, as well as the key players. Examining the extent to which Chinese film is 
actually traded beyond its borders, it is apparent that the booming domestic market hides the 
reality of the industry’s underdeveloped international profile. This leads to the important 
question: if the domestic market is so strong, why isn't Chinese film competing abroad? 
2.1 The rise (and decline) of East Asia 
The success and failures of the Chinese film industry need to be seen in the context of both 
media imperialism and the rise of East Asian media industries.  In 1980, Oliver Boyd-Barrett 
wrote about the imbalance of power and media flows globally, and argued that American 
media controlled the world, a phenomenon labelled ‘media imperialism’. In more recent work, 
Boyd-Barrett (2014) analyses how structures of power and control still continue to regulate 
access to and consumption of media, and argues that media imperialism still matters today. 
Lee (1980) also examined the indicators or levels of media imperialism. He focused on the 
flows of television programs, adoption of foreign models and foreign investment, as well as 
how these have cultural effects. Straubhaar (1991) cast doubt on the simple dominance of US 
media, suggesting the influential idea of cultural proximity as a factor in media flows through 
research on television, although this idea is useful in other media areas, too. In similar vein, 
he (1991:55) points out that ‘the increasing interdependence of the world television market 
seems to bear a strong regional flavour’ based on distinct regional cultural patterns. Language 
groups, as Straubhaar (1991:55) proposed, ‘tend to reinforce regionality’. Further, Straubhaar 
demonstrated that cultural proximity can overcome language differences by looking at the 
success of Brazilian programming dubbed into Spanish and circulated throughout Latin 
America. In 1993, Thomas Gold wrote about the powerful attraction of Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese pop culture (gang-tai) in mainland China. Gold wrote about the influence of 
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trendy Taiwanese and Hong Kong content in the Chinese market, which was then dominated 
by political themes (Gold 1993). In 1996, Sinclair, Cunningham and Jacka (1996) introduced 
the term ‘peripheral vision’, which argued that the rise of other peripheral media nations was 
challenging the media imperialism thesis. This built on Michael Tracey’s ‘patchwork quilt’ 
metaphor (Tracey 1985), which identified a diversity of cultural flows. 
More analysis of East Asian media followed, leading to the popularity of the concept of soft 
power. In 2002, McGray (2002) coined the term ‘Gross National Cool’ to describe trendy 
Japanese pop culture. Iwabuchi, Muecke and Thomas (2004) discuss cultural flows and 
consumption across different regions in Asia, and the role of such flows in creating 
contemporary Asian national identities. Shim (2006) identified the rising popularity of 
Korean popular culture in Asia. Chua and Iwabuchi (2008) built on this by analysing an 
emerging regional East Asian media culture formed in part by the Korean Wave of television 
drama that was then washing through the region. Black et al (2010) also analyse the Korean 
Wave, and identify variations on the theme of cultural flows between Japan or China and 
other East Asian countries.  Fung (2013) examines different aspects of Asian popular culture, 
arguing that while local social formations and patterns of consumption and participation in 
Asia are still very much dependent on global cultural developments and the phenomena of 
modernity, such dependence is often concretised, reshaped and distorted by the local media to 
cater for the local market. Chua (2012) coined the term ‘soft power competition’ to describe 
how East Asian countries use popular culture to gain a presence or influence in other 
countries. All of these analyses focus principally on the flows and sales of finished programs. 
Collectively, they have expanded knowledge and thinking about East Asian media. For the 
most part, however, they do not discuss media production and soft power, or cover the kind 
of international coproduction relationships that are my focus in this thesis. 
In recent years East Asian film and television industries have faced new challenges. Hong 
Kong film production has declined while the Korean Wave is showing signs of weakening. In 
part, this changing situation has fuelled the desire of international filmmakers to work on 
coproductions in China despite the problems that filmmakers encounter there, such as 
censorship (Chua Beng-Huat 2012, Fung 2013 and Keane 2013).  
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2.2 The state of the Chinese film industry 
In January 1993, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) 
implemented the “Opinion on deepening of the reform of film industry mechanisms” 
(guanyu dangqian shenhua dianying hangye jizhi gaige de ruogan yijian). From this point, 
the Chinese film sector started to move from a planned economy to a market economy model. 
The purchase and distribution of domestic films was no longer only controlled by one (state-
controlled) organisation, the China Film Group. Other film companies and studios now had 
the right to distribute films overseas, while 32 provincial and municipal film distribution 
companies also now had the right to distribute films nationally. Profit and loss would now be 
determined by the market. The period from 1993 to 2001 signalled the genesis of commercial 
filmmaking in China.  Along with the central government’s focus on the development of 
cultural industries and the intent to deal with competition from Hollywood, more practical 
reform actions were implemented to stimulate the development of the film industry between 
2002 and 2003. Amended regulation-the Film Management Act (dianying guanli tiaoli), was 
issued on 25 Dec 2001 by the SARFT, and took effect after 1 Feb 2002. These regulations 
significantly reduced the industry access threshold, allowing people and institutions outside 
the state-owned film company to engage in filmmaking. This brought more funding, 
creativity and vitality to the film industry. However, strict censorship still existed in the new 
regulations (Yin 2003:4-8). In 2003, SARFT issued three new regulations: Interim Provisions 
on the Access of Operational Qualifications for Movie Production Distribution and Screening 
(dianying zhipian faxing fangyin jingying zige zhunru zanxing guiding), The Provisions on 
the Administration of Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Production of Films (zhongwai hezuo 
shezhi dianying pian guanli guiding), and Interim Provisions on Film Script Registration and 
Film Review (dianying juben(genggai) lixiang dianying pian shencha zanxing 
guiding).These documents, based on the Film Management Act in 2002, provided more 
supportive policies for the film industry. They opened up film production to private film 
companies, encouraged the investment of private capital and the establishment of private film 
production companies independently or with state-run studios, and reduced the conditions for 
film project approval. Also, foreigners were now allowed to form a joint venture with state-
owned film production companies. Along with other policy developments that will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, these three new regulations were crucial to 
promoting the development of coproduction between Chinese and overseas companies. Due 
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to the further release of policy in 2002 and 2003, the Chinese film industry entered into a 
rapid expansion stage, especially after 2006（Yin 2003:4-8） 
Figure 2.1: Annual feature film production volume 2001–2013 
 
(Created by author based on SARFT data, Entgroup film industry report (2010–2014), Yin 
Hong’s report (Yin 2013:5–7)) 
The number of feature films produced in China reached 745 in 2012, which is roughly equal 
with India, and one of the highest totals in the world (See figure 2.1 above). China’s movie-
going and box office revenues also grew rapidly. In 2010, China’s box office revenues sky-
rocketed, reaching RMB 10 billion, a 63.9 per cent increase over the previous year (Yin 
2011:6). In 2012, the total revenue of the film industry reached RMB 20.9 billion. The 
domestic box office was RMB 17.073 billion (see figure 2.2 below), an annual growth rate of 
30 per cent per cent. China surpassed Japan and became the second largest film market 
globally. As mentioned before, it is predicted that China will become the largest film market 
by 2020. However, overseas sales and other revenue for Chinese films are still low, which 
increases the investment risk; if a film fails at the Chinese box office, this means that the 
chances of recouping investment overseas or from other sources are limited (see figure 2.3 
below). 
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Figure 2.2: 2003–2014 The Scale of Chinese Film Industry (Billion RMB) 
 
 (Created by author, based on SARFT data, Entgroup film industry report 2013–2014, Yin’s 
report (Yin 2013:5–7)) 
Figure 2.3: 2009–2014 Film industry revenue excluding domestic box office and foreign 
sales4. (Billion RMB) 
  
 (Created by author based on SARFT data, Entgroup film industry report 2013–2014) 
 
                                                            
4 Other revenues include television sales, DVD sales and sales to airline and hotels.  
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The total number of theatres and screens in China is expanding rapidly (See Figure 2.4 
below). Roughly, an average of 10 new screens have opened each day from 2010. The total 
number of digital screens has also risen dramatically since 2010 and now nearly 95 per cent 
per cent of all screens are digital (See Figure 2.5 below).  
Figure 2.4: The number of theatre and screen from 2002 to 2014  
 
(Created by author based on SARFT data, Entgroup film industry report 2013–2014, Yin’s 
report(Yin 2013:5–7)) 
Figure 2.5: The number of digital screens from 2007 to 2013 in China  
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(Created by author based on SARFT data, Entgroup film industry report 2012–2013) 
2.3 Distribution in China 
In 2002, the Chinese government extended the reforms of the film distribution system that 
began in 1993. The new distribution system consisted of distributor, cinema circuit and 
theatre. The distributors directly distributed films to the cinema circuit, and the circuit 
supplied films to the subordinate theatres. As the following table shows, there are two kinds 
of cinema circuits in China, ‘asset connected’ and ‘contracted alliance’. 
Table 2.1: Two kinds of cinema circuits in China  
Form  
Relations between 
the cinema  
circuit and the 
theatre  
Representative 
theatre  
Entgroup’s comment  
Asset 
Connected  
The theatre circuit or 
the mother company 
of the theatre circuit 
directly invest in the 
building of the theatre; 
the theatre belongs to 
the cinema circuit.  
Wanda Cinema 
Chain, G.Z. JinYi, 
ZhuJiang Film 
Circuit, Guangdong 
Dadi Digital Cinema 
The cinema circuits own and 
manage the operation of 
cinemas in the circuit. This is a 
common practice in foreign 
countries.  
Contracted 
Alliance  
The theatre is not 
affiliated to the 
cinema circuit; the 
alliance is formed 
contractually 
China Film Stellar 
Theatre Chain, 
Beijing New Film 
Association  
Cinema circuits do not own 
the cinemas in the alliance. 
Cinemas in the alliance may 
have very different 
management and brand 
cultures. Cinema circuit here is 
only a loose organization that 
arranges screening schedules 
for the cinemas. It’s a unique 
system in China.  
(Entgroup 2010:35–36) 
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In mainland China there are now more than 250 distribution companies, of which 90 per cent 
are private. However, state-owned companies like China Film Group (CFG) and Huaxia Film 
Distribution still take the lion’s share of profit while the remainder is mainly commanded by 
several large private companies such as Bona Film Group, Enlight Pictures, and Huayi 
Brothers New Picture (Entgroup 2012:16–17). The China Film Group and Huaxia 
Distribution have a relatively stable market share. According to IHS Screen Digest’s data, 
CFG distributes an average of 140 films per year (165 in 2012) which accounts for around 38 
per cent per cent of market share each year. Huaxia distributed 95 films in 2012 with a 
market share of 23.5 per cent. The market share of other private companies was influenced by 
the quality of individual films each year. The figure below illustrates the market share of the 
top 10 distribution companies from 2011–2013 (Entgroup 2014). 
Figure 2.6: Market Share of Top 10 Distribution Companies 2011–2013 
 
(Created by author based on Entgroup China Film industry 2014:16) 
The four distribution models in China have implications for overseas companies wanting to 
participate in the Chinese film market, and for those seeking to coproduce. The first is a 
revenue-sharing model, which is most common: theatrical revenues minus deductions for the 
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National Film Development Funds5, business taxes and surcharges, are shared by the 
producer, distributor, cinema circuit and the theatre based on a fixed ratio, as detailed in the 
following paragraph. Thirty four imported films through revenue sharing way or Chinese 
domestic medium or blockbusters use this model. The producer of revenue-sharing imported 
films will pay the print costs; for other films, these costs are paid by distributors. The second 
distribution model is a flat-fee deal model. The distributor of the film purchases the mainland 
distribution right, the right to screen on Chinese airlines and domestic television copyright for 
a flat fee. The distributor will pay for all distribution expenses, including advertising, copy 
and print, copy management and so on. The producer is not entitled to an extra share of 
theatrical revenues. This model is adopted by imported films mostly. The third distribution 
model is the distribution agent model whereby the distributor serves as an agent and charges 
a certain percentage of the film’s theatrical revenue, but does not pay for expenses like 
advertising, copy and print or copy transportation. The final model is called assisted 
promotion. It is used for flat-fee imported films and is unique to China. China Film Group 
and Huaxia Film Distribution are the only two companies to import foreign flat-fee films. 
These imported films sometimes are handed to other qualified companies to distribute in the 
name of assisted promotion. China Film Group and Huaxia Film Distribution are nominal 
distributors. Usually, they purchase the copyright at the price of about US$50,000 and charge 
the assisted distributor RMB 100,000 (roughly US $16.000) as a management fee. They will 
share the theatrical revenue with the distributor (Cain 2012b; Entgroup 2010:30-31). 
Theatrical revenue in China takes two forms: Actual Theatrical Revenues and Theatrical 
Revenues for Share. Actual Theatrical Revenues means the value of all tickets sold by 
cinema circuits and distributors (admissions multiplied by ticket price). The Theatrical 
Revenues for Share applies to producers, distributors and exhibitors. They are the Actual 
Theatrical Revenues minus the National Film Development Funds (5 per cent of Actual 
Theatrical Revenues), and business taxes and surcharges (3.3 per cent of the remainder) 
(Entgroup 2010:31–32). 
The Actual Theatrical Revenues shared by producers, distributors and exhibitors can be 
divided into two types. First, domestic films/joint productions and flat-fee imported films – 
                                                            
5 National Film Development Funds or China Film Special Funds is a subsidiary body of the Film Bureau, is 
responsible for box office statistics in China. It collects 5 per cent from every film’s theatrical gross as special 
funds for supporting local film production and theatre construction. One thing to note is that the 5 per cent they 
collect is not counted as part of the theatre’s business tax (Cain 2012).  
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flat-fee imported films refer to those foreign films only brought into China by the China Film 
Group on a flat-fee basis. Second, revenue-sharing imported films-the quota was twenty 
before 2012 and was expanded to thirty-four after the signing of the Sino-US Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) in Feb 2012.  The table 2.2 below roughly shows the revenue 
division scheme in Chinese film industry. The actual revenue division percentage may 
fluctuate due to the power-play between the distributor and the cinema circuit, and between 
the cinema circuit and the cinema. If a film is joint production and counted as a domestic film, 
then the coproducer and its partner in China can receive 43 per cent of the whole actual 
theatrical revenue. If a film is not a joint production, the revenue from the Chinese market is 
25 per cent. Before 2012, the revenue share for imported films was even lower, only 13 per 
cent (Cain 2012b). Apart from avoiding the competition to be part of the quota of imported 
films, the award of official status in China allows foreign coproducers to share in a larger 
proportion of revenue. This is one of the most important factors driving foreign producers to 
establish coproduction arrangements in China.  
Table 2.2: Film revenue division scheme in China  
 Producer Distributor Cinema circuit Theatre
Domestic films (including joint 
productions) and flat-fee 
imported film 
43% 7% 50% 
Revenue-sharing Imported films 
25% /13-17.5% 
(before MOU) 
20%/32% or less 
(before MOU) 
5% 50% 
(Entgroup 2010:32) 
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Figure 2.7: Film Industry Chain in China 
Source: Entgroup 2010:12 
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2.4 Is the industry booming or just the market? 
There are many reasons for the expansion of China’s film market, especially after 2010. In 
addition to an expanding urban population with increased disposable income, the 
government’s emphasis on cultural industries has been the key factor. In 2012, the signing of 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)6 between the US and China increased the import 
quota from twenty to thirty-four films, which put pressure on domestic films. Increasingly 
supportive policies for the film industry have been implemented in recent years. The National 
Film Development Funds (NFDF) implemented new regulations (19 Nov 2012) to encourage 
domestic production of more high tech films, for theatres to screen more domestic films and 
for investors to develop more new theatres.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 See content about MOU in the table below. 
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Table 2.3: Important policies related to film industry introduced from 2010 to 2013 
Date Policy Content and Impact 
2010 
Guidelines on promoting 
the prosperity and 
development of the industry 
The first time that the film industry was lifted to 
the level of a strategic industry. 
2011/3/6 
Outline of the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social 
Development in the 
People’s Republic of China 
This document clearly mentioned ‘strongly 
developing cultural activities and cultural 
industries’ with the goal of making cultural 
industries a major part of the national economy. 
It also specifically mentioned ‘accelerating the 
building of cinemas in small and medium cities 
in central and western regions’ as well as 
strengthening the influence and competitiveness 
of Chinese cultural internationally and putting 
greater emphasis on China’s soft power policy. 
2011/12/1 
SARFT's guidance on 
promoting the coordinated 
development of film 
production, distribution and 
exhibition 
1. Theatres cannot take more than 50% of profit 
during first-round screenings; 2. Theatre rental 
annually should not exceed more than 15% of 
box office revenue; 3. Theatres that sign on with 
theatre chains should, in principle, sign for time 
durations of no less than three years; if a theatre 
does enter into an agreement with a theatre chain 
whose joint assets are more than 50%, the 
agreement may be renegotiated in order to be a 
part of the chain; 4. Operations of preshow ads 
revert to theatres; production companies will no 
longer operate ad placements. These policies are 
trying to coordinate the economic interest 
between theatre, production company and 
distribution company to avoid cutthroat 
competition.  
2012/2/18 Memorandum of 1. China will allow the import of 20 films and an 
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Understanding (MOU) 
between US and China  
additional 14 3D or IMAX films; 2. Box office 
shares to the US will be increased from the 
original 13% to 25%; 3. Increase the 
opportunities for private companies to release 
imported films, and put an end to this monopoly 
held by SOEs in the past 
2012/11/19 
 
Subsidise the creation and 
production of domestic 
high-tech films 
 
 
 
Refund policy for newly 
developed theatres 
 
 
 
 
Subsidise the installation of 
digital projection systems 
The government will subsidise domestically 
produced and distributed 3D, IMAX and high-
tech films, based on box office revenue. (This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.)  
 
 
Theatres open since 2002, 2003, 2004, if 
approved, will enjoy correspondingly one year, 
two years and three years of ‘firstly collect and 
then return’ the NFDF to the theatres. Theatres 
with a 45% or more box office gross revenue 
from domestic film also enjoy special subsidised 
refunds 
2013/7/17 
Notice of the General Office 
of the State Council on 
Issuing the Provisions on 
the Main Functions, Internal 
Bodies and Staffing of the 
SAPPRFT 
Provision 14: cancel the script review of general 
movie subjects and publicise the film outline. It 
was indicated by the media as the further release 
of policy. However, the concept for ‘general 
subjects’ is not being clearly defined in the 
notice.  
(Created by author based on Entgroup reports from 2010-2013) 
Due to the policy encouragement, a rush of private capital has flowed into the film industry, 
creating the impression that the industry is buoyant. The tables below illustrate the surge of 
film investment. Chinese film scholar Yin (2008:16-17) observed that China’s film industry 
entered into the capital age in 2007. The source of capital in 2007 mainly came from PE 
(private equity investment), stock market, venture capital and industry groups. Venture 
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capital firms such as IDG, Sequoia and SIG, and listed companies such as Focus Media, 
Hurray! Holding and Jiahe Holdings all have built close relationships with film production 
companies, like Huayi Brothers, Polybona Films, Enlight Media Group and Chengtian 
Entertainment Group (see table 2.4 below). 
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Table 2.4: 2007-2011 Significant venture capital investments in the Chinese media 
industry  
Year Investor 
Value 
(Million 
US dollars) 
Investee 
Primary 
business 
2011 Zhenghe Hongyi Venture Capital 4.72 WestCoast TV series/Film
2011 Tiantu Capital TVZone 8.18 TVZone TV series/Film
2011 Tencent Huayi Bros. 69.99 
Huayi Bros. 
Media Group 
TV series/Film
2011 
IDG Capital Partners/China 
Consumer Capital 
20.09 
Imagi 
Animation 
Studios 
Cartoon 
2011 
CCB International/Kaixin 
Investment/China Equity/Zero2IPO 
Ventures/Hantao Private Equity 
117.98 
Beijing 
Galloping 
Horse Media 
TV series/Film
2010 Tiger Fund/AIA Group Limited 30 
HaiRun 
Movies & TV 
TV series/Film
2010 
ZheShang Venture Capital/ Tianyue 
VC/Huijin Lifang Capital  
17.5 
Zhongnan 
Cartoon 
Cartoon/Film 
2010 
Sequoia/PreIPO/Matrix Partners 
China/Zero2IPO Venture/SAI 
5 
BONA FILM 
GROUP 
LIMITED 
Film 
2010 
COPOWER Venture 
Capital/Kaichen Capital/ GIG  
9 
HERUN 
Media 
Advertisement 
2009 
Sequoia/ Matrix Partners 
China/Mattix/ Zero2IPO Venture 
9.5 
BONA FILM 
GROUP 
LIMITED 
Film 
2009 ZheShang Venture Capital 4.39 
Huace Film & 
TV 
TV series/Film
2008 Baring Private Equity Asia 40.7 
Beijing 
Galloping 
Horse Media 
TV series/Film
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2008 HTVC 27.2 
Great Dreams 
Cartoon Media 
Cartoon 
2007 
IDG Capital Partners/ Goldman 
Sachs/ SAI  
25 
Impression 
Creative 
Performance 
(Yin 2012:8) 
In addition, more film companies were listed on stock markets in China and abroad. 
Chengtian Entertainment back-door listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange by buying the 
majority of Hong Kong listed Golden Harvest and changing its name to Orange Sky Golden 
Harvest (Chengtian means Orange Sky in Chinese). After that, Huayi Brothers listed on the 
ChiNext of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in October 2009. Bona listed on the NASDAQ 
(National Association of Securities Deal Automated Quotations) in 2010. Enlight Media 
Group listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in 2011. The other listed film 
companies are Huace Media (IPO 2010-10-26), Beijing HualuBaina Film & TV Company 
(IPO 2012-02-09). In addition, China Film Group, Shanghai Film Group, Wanda Cinema 
Line, and Galloping Horse are all planning to list domestically or outside China. 
The central government has encouraged financial institutions to support the development of 
the film industry since 2010. In 2011, Minsheng Banking offered a RMB 150 million loan to 
the production and marketing of the film Flowers of War (jinling shisan chai 2011) by 
pledging the copyright. BONA film group received a RMB 100 million loan from the Bank 
of Beijing for the production of Flying Swords of Dragon Gate (longmen feijia 2011), and 
other films, by pledging its films and cinema circuits guarantee (Yin 2012:7-9). Shanda 
Media Group was the major investor for the film Flying Swords of Dragon Gate (Pang 
2012:107-109).  
In 2012, the Shanghai government introduced “Opinions on the implementation of promoting 
flourishing development in the Shanghai film industry” (guanyu cujin shanghai dianying 
chanye fanrong fazhan de shishi yijian), which encouraged the financial industry to support 
the development of the film industry and to enable Shanghai to become a film investment and 
financing centre. Eight banks, including Bank of China and China Construction Bank, 
provided loans of 1.3 billion RMB to the film industry in the following five years (Pang 
2013:118–119). New media-focussed companies began to buy shares from film companies 
and invest in the production and distribution of films. For example, on 14 April 2011, 
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Tencent set up a fund with RMB 500 billion (around US $80 billion) for the development of 
the film industry.  
In addition, the scale of film funding was increasing. By August 2013, there were altogether 
twenty-four funds (see table 2.5 below) focusing on film investment among all the private 
equity funds set up by VC/PE in China. National Film Capital and Hony Film Investment 
Fund are the largest funds in China (Entgroup 2014:13–14). 
Table 2.5: Film funds established from 2010 to 2013 
Name Establishment 
Year 
Target 
(million) 
Fund Management 
Companies 
Hony Film Investment Fund 2013 3000 Hony Capital 
Zhongxi Film Industry Fund  2013 1500 Zhongxi Film Industry 
Fund  
Bona Noah Film and TV 
Special Investment Fund 
2013 1000 NOAH Private Wealth 
Management 
Harvest Seven Stars Media 
Fund 
2012 800 USD Harvest Seven Stars 
Media Private Equity 
Group 
China Holly Movie Fund 2012 1000 The eagle venture 
Le Vision Film and TV 
Cultural Fund 
2012 1000 Le Vision Investment 
Xi'an Qujiang Film Investment 
Fund 
2012 200 (Initial 
stage) 
Xi'an Qujiang Culture 
Industry Venture Capital 
Flamingo Film Fund 2012 N/A N/A 
Huayingxing Picture Media 
Fund 
2011 500 Huayingxing Pictures 
Investment 
Chinawood Fund 2011 1000 APF 
Chinawood Fund 2011 100 USD APF 
Tencent Film Investment Fund 2011 500 Tencent 
Zhongguancun Film TV New 
media Copyright Fund 
2011 200 (Initial 
stage) 
Holder Fund 
Chinese Film  TV and 2010 5000 Qianxin Culture 
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Publishing Industry Investment 
Fund 
China New Film and TV 
Integration Fund  
2010 800 WDH Private Equity 
Fund Management 
China Holly Movie Fund 2010 300 HuiLi Fund 
National Film Capital 2010 5000 N/A 
Xing Kong Da Di Ying Shi 
Culture Development Fund 
2010 1500-2000 IDG Capital Partners 
HOPEFUL Film Fund (The 
first phase) 
2010 N/A HOPEFUL CAPITAL 
HOLDING GROUP 
(Entgroup 2014:14, Chinese version) 
In total, there are currently more than ten financing channels in China to raise budget for film 
production, as shown in figure 2.8 below. Product placement is becoming an increasingly 
popular means of financing production in China, in which the producer can gain revenue 
from advertisers while keeping operation costs relatively low. Pre-sale is a common financing 
option as well, and is normally used by big-budget films, in which production firms can sell 
their film copyright to different countries and earn guaranteed revenue before or during 
shooting. Private equity greatly benefits the development of some film companies. Huayi 
Brothers is a typical example. It raised a substantial amount of funds through private equity 
funds such as Taihe Media, Tom Group and HURRAY! and from individuals like the 
Chairman of Alibaba, the CEO of Focus Media, and the president of WanXiang Group. 
Venture capital started to invest in China’s film industry in 2007, as mentioned above. Bona 
Film Group and Beijing Galloping Horse are two companies that expanded quickly through 
receiving millions in venture capital. Bank loans have not been a common financing option 
due to the high risk of film investment. However, as was mentioned above, an increasing 
number of banks have been offering loans to producers in recent years, especially after 2010, 
because of encouraging signs from government policy in such things as “financial industry 
supporting cultural industry” and also because of the growth of the Chinese film industry 
itself. Film funds, like venture capital, have a very short history in the Chinese film industry. 
The extraordinary growth of film funds was discussed earlier. According to the Engroup 
report (2009–2010:21), film fund investments were usually made by international and 
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professional teams, and this brought not only money but a professional management and 
transparency to financial operations for film projects. Stock market listings started in 2008.  
Joint investment (cofinancing) is a common way for investing in film as it shares the cost and 
greatly lowers the investment risk. Also, investors from different countries or areas help 
gather resources and open up new markets. Government funds are currently mainly given to 
state-owned film companies to produce propaganda films. The available funds from the 
central government include the Special Film Fund, the Film and TV Mutual Fund, the 
Imported Film Revenue Fund (the fund takes a certain percentage of imported films revenue) 
and the Special Film Subsidy on Major Subject Matters. According to the Entgroup report 
(2009–2010:20), government funding exceeds RMB100M each year. Local government also 
provides funds. There has also been a lot of ‘hot’ money (money from sources outside the 
film industry) flowing into the film industry in recent years. In 2014, e-commerce giant 
Alibaba brought crowd funding for movies to China and launched a new finance product 
called Yu Le Bao, which gave common people a chance to invest in dramas or film 
productions (CMM-I 2014). Nowadays, films financed from multiple and mixed sources 
represent the norm. 
Figure 2.8: Film financing channels in China 
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(Source: Entgroup 2010:19) 
Foreign producers can not directly access these financial options except through their partner 
in China, which will be further discussed in Chapter Four. Looking at the figures, observers 
would be optimistic about the future of the Chinese film industry. The question remains, 
however: if the film industry is so strong, why is the government encouraging coproductions? 
Is the market producing an illusion of success? 
2.5 Import and Export  
Despite the rush of film finance from within China, the booming Chinese domestic market 
hides another ‘dark reality’, which is the lack of international success. Almost half of the 
Chinese market is dominated by imported films, most of which are American. The Chinese 
film import quota is almost entirely filled by American films. In contrast, the export data of 
Chinese film is very poor especially in terms of its global export. This section will briefly 
look at China’s import and export situation. Then I will examine the reasons for Chinese 
films’ poor performance globally, after looking at the problems inherent in Chinese 
filmmaking. 
In order to stimulate the domestic box office, the government allowed the CFCC to import 
ten Hollywood films per annum on a revenue sharing basis from 1994. A Warner Bros film 
The Fugitive (1993) was imported under the quota, marking the PRC’s first step in opening 
up the film industry; it achieved significant box office success (Miller 2005:319-325). 
Although the ten Hollywood films revived national cinema attendance, they accounted for 
over half of the gross revenue, which caused deep concern and led to heated debate on how to 
protect the domestic film industry. In 1996, the government introduced the rule that at least 
two-thirds of screen time should be occupied by domestic films, a policy that remains in 
place today (Rosen 2002). There are other protective policies, which have already been 
mentioned above and will be further discussed in Chapter Four to reflect the reasons for 
gaining the status of official coproduction in China. The US also pressured China to further 
increase annual import quotas and loosen the strict approval procedure for imported films. 
Hollywood went to great lengths to persuade China to end the China Film Group’s 
distribution monopoly. In 2003, this pressure was reflected in the opening up of foreign 
distribution competition in the form of the Huaxia Film Distribution Co. (Miller 2005:319-
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325). China Film Group, representing the central government, has controlled film import. 
This can be seen as the government’s control of culture and ideology coming into China.  
Currently, the Chinese government has allowed around 64 films to be imported annually 
since 2012. 34 films have been imported, mostly from Hollywood, using the sharing revenue 
modal (yinjin pian), including 14 IMAX or 3D films, and the other 30 films were flat-fee 
films, or imported buyout films (maiduan pian or pipian); effectively a flat-fee is paid for the 
copyright of the film to the independent producer, mostly American but also from other 
countries. There were some special imports allowed, such as those from Hong Kong. China 
Film Group and Huaxia Film are the only two companies that are allowed to import films into 
China. More competition may be introduced at a later time; China Culture & Art Corporation 
(CNCAC) under China’s Ministry of Culture (MOC) (Zhongyi)7 may become the third 
imported film distribution company, which will break the duopoly of China Film Group and 
Huaxia Group (CMM-I 2014). 
The procedure for importing revenue-sharing films and flat-fee films are different (see figure 
2.9; 2.10 below). For flat-fee films, other distribution companies can participate and compete 
in the initial selection, and recommend films to China Film Group and the China Film Import 
and Export Company. After a review by SARFT, the China Film Import and Export 
Company will be responsible for the customs entry. The distribution company then assists in 
the promotion of the film in China. Compared to revenue-sharing films, flat-fee films have 
more difficulty in earning strong box office returns in China, as revenue-sharing films 
(mostly US blockbusters) will prioritise theatre schedules and (distributors and exhibitors) 
will also tend to market the product more prominently. Due to the extremely restrictive 
import quotas for revenue-sharing films, coproduction is the only way for foreign filmmakers 
to access the explosive growth in the Chinese film market.     
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Founded in January 1987 and affiliated to the Ministry of Culture, CNCAC mainly deals with commercial 
performances, art exhibitions and other foreign-related cultural projects. The company has a license to import 
stage plays, musicals and dance performances.  
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Figure 2.9: Operation of Revenue-Sharing Imported Films 
 
（Entgroup 2010: 45） 
 
Figure 2.10: Operation of Importing Flat-fee Films 
 
（Entgroup 2010: 46） 
Chinese films are mainly exported to North America, the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. 
The Asia Pacific region is the main revenue stream for Chinese film exports. Most exported 
films are coproductions by major players in China – Shanghai Film Group, China Film Group, 
and Bona Film Group, Huayi Brothers, Sil-Metropol, Le Vision, Enlight Pictures, New 
Pictures. China Film Promotion International (CFPI) was established to be responsible for 
promoting the export of Chinese films. However, overseas revenues have remained low. The 
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poor performance of Chinese films overseas has become a major strategic challenge for the 
government. From Table 2.6 below, we can see that overseas revenue increased gradually 
from 2003 to 2010. The year 2010 marks the peak revenue of more than 3.5 billion RMB. In 
that year, the Sino-US coproduction The Karate Kid (gongfu zhimeng 2012) contributed 
almost half of that revenue. According to the figure from CFPI, 75 films were exported in 
2012, out of a total domestic production volume of more than 700. The forty-six 
coproductions constituted 61.33 per cent of total exports. Of the 2012 overseas revenue of 
RMB1063 million, most came from key Chinese coproductions: Huayi Brothers distributed 
nine coproductions overseas in 2012, with total revenue of RMB338 million; followed by Le 
Vision: three coproductions with RMB 113 million. China Film Group distributed five 
coproductions abroad, receiving revenue worth RMB111 million. Bona Film Group sold four 
coproductions overseas and earned RMB 104 million, followed by Sil-Meltropole, four 
coproductions worth around RMB 87 million (Media.China 2014).   
Table 2.6: The overseas revenue of Chinese film 2003-2014 (Unit: 100 million RMB) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Oversea 
revenue 
5.00 12.00 16.50 19.00 20.20 25.30 27.59 35.17 20.46 10.63 15 18.7 
Created by author based on Li 2014: 117 
Promoting Chinese film ‘going out’ is not only a commercial problem but also a political 
issue, one which, as we have seen previously, directly goes to the nation’s capacity for soft 
power. Coproduction is a strategy to address this issue. It offers the opportunity for 
satisfaction for both sides and is also a constant challenge to the ability to compromise 
without sacrificing quality. The Chinese film industry has approached the challenge of 
coproduction as a way of transitioning from excluding Hollywood through the use of quotas 
to improving China’s film industry through collaboration, which in turn leads to a strong 
learning curve for local producers from their more experienced international partners. 
2.6 The dark (and bright) side 
No one can deny that China has become a huge market for film production and consumption. 
However, a substantial number of films are never distributed (see figure 2.11 below) and on 
average more than 80 per cent of a film’s cost is not covered by box office revenue. Chinese 
film scholar Yin Hong (2011:10) believes the reason for this is that a vast amount of non-
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commercial capital, such as government funds and hot money, flow into the film industry and 
this results in the production of films that lack commercial appeal. Some of the films made 
are just testing the water, but some return money to investors. Nevertheless, there has been a 
considerable rise in films that make it to cinema release compared to previous years – in 2012, 
roughly 30 per cent. In 2013, production volume decreased, but more films were screened. 
This trend indicates that domestic filmmaking has started to transition from being driven by 
hot money to more reasonable and commercial arrangements. 
Figure 2.11: Total Number of Domestic Feature Films and Number of Screened 
Domestic films 2005–2013  
 
 (Created by author based on Entgroup China Film Industry Report 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 
2013–2014) 
Unlike Korea and Japan, most films released in China are domestic productions. In 2014, 
Korea screened over 800 films of which only 210 were domestic films. Japan released over 
1000 films with about half being domestic. In those two countries, local films constitute a 
much lower ratio of the total films being screened than is the case in China.  In China, a small 
number of imported films, mostly from Hollywood, take nearly half of total box office 
revenue per annum (see figure 2.12 below). In 2014, more than 300 films were screened in 
China, of which only 67 were imported films. Hollywood has long pushed the Chinese 
government to further open the booming film market and, after the increase in the import 
quota from 20 to 34 in 2012, many local producers predict that the import quota share will 
increase in 2017–2018 when the China-US Memorandum expires. According to Clifford 
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Coonan, China’s foreign movie quota expansion is just a matter of time. How will Chinese 
filmmakers face the challenge of greater Hollywood competition? (Coonan 2014b) 
 
Figure 2.12: 2005–2013 Box office of domestic and imported films (Billion) 
 
(Created by author based on Entgroup China Film Industry Report 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 
2013–2014) 
In 2012, the first year of the revised Sino-US Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
imported film revenue surpassed domestic revenue, even though domestic films were 
strongly protected by the government. The top 10 box office films in 2012 included only 
three Chinese films: Lost in Thailand (taijiong 2012), Chinese Zodiac (shier shengxiao 2012) 
and Painted Skin: the Resurrection (huapi 2012) (see Table 2.7 below). The latter two are 
China-Hong Kong joint productions, the others are Hollywood productions. All the top 10 
films are high-cost 3D or IMAX, except for Lost in Thailand. The addition of an extra 14 
IMAX and 3D films to the quota after the signing of the MOU between China and America 
in 2012 stimulated Chinese film producers to invest more in high-cost films. The figures for 
2013 and 2014 saw domestic films’ box office revenues exceed those of imported films again. 
An obvious trend in recent years, especially 2013 and 2014, is that more and more small and 
light (compared to big budget blockbuster) films, focusing on reality (films with 
contemporary settings and reflecting some current social values and problems)  or romantic 
subjects, are becoming even more popular than Hollywood blockbusters in China. Examples 
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include So young (zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun 2013), Finding Mr.Right (Beijing 
yushang xiyatu 2013), Tiny times (xiao shidai 2013), American dreams in China (zhongguo 
hehuoren 2013).   
 
Table 2.7: Top 10 box offices in 2012 
Monthly 
Distribution 
Ranking of 
Box Office 
Film Category 
Total Box 
Office 
(100 million) 
January 4 Mission: Impossible Action 6.48 
February 10 
Journey 2: The 
Mysterious Island 
Action / 
Adventure 
3.71 
April 2 Titanic in 3D 
Drama 
/Romance 
9.77 
May 
5 The Avengers 
Action/ 
Fantasy 
5.75 
8 Men in Black 3 Action/ Sci-Fi 5.20 
June 3 
Painted Skin: The 
Resurrection 
Mystery / 
Romance 
7.26 
July 9 
Ice Age: Continental 
Drift 
Animation 4.58 
November 6 Life of Pi 
Adventure/ 
Drama 
5.70 
December 
1 Lost in Thailand Comedy 9.94/12.48 
7 Chinese Zodiac 2012 Action 5.29/8.6 
Source: Entgroup 2013: 25 (Chinese version) 
Moreover, in most major film producing countries like America, the national theatrical box 
office only accounts for less than a half of a film’s total revenue. The majority comes from 
foreign sales revenue, TV and online broadcasting, and merchandising (Yin 2013:17-18). 
However, the film market in China is not a diversified market and relies heavily on domestic 
box office revenue. This can be shown in the division of film industry revenues from 2007–
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2013 (see figure 2.13 below). This shows up as a small percentage for domestic non-box 
office in the total revenue. Wang Changtian, the CEO of Enlight Media Group, said: ‘the film 
market in China is quite underdeveloped. It is not normal that the box office takes up 90% of 
the total revenue of a film. In addition, piracy further reduces the box office revenue. In a 
word, it is rather difficult to get profit in China by investing in film’ (Yin 2013:17-18). 
Figure 2.13: Chinese box office from 2007–2013 
 
On the bright side is the development of online video-sharing websites in recent years that 
have provided a new platform for the film industry. In China, websites such as Youku, Tudou, 
Ku6, Sohu, iQIYI, Douban, Funshion, CNTV, Mtime, Le TV, PPTV, have jointly established 
‘New Media digital Cinema Chain distribution platform’ and promoted video-on-demand 
services, usually charging 3–5 RMB for new films (Pang 2012: 106). The new concept of 
Internet Theatre is gradually forming. An agreement was reached by the major video-sharing 
websites that films can be shown online, for a fee, for 60 to 90 days after a film’s domestic 
release. The agreement also requires a complete copyright protection system and no 
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interstitial ads. These online distribution sites therefore provide a new revenue source for 
domestic films (Yin 2013:17-18).  
2.7 Explaining the lack of international success 
The discussion above attempts to reveal the problems from an industry perspective. There are 
several important factors that explain why Chinese filmmaking lacks international success. 
Before entering into discussion about the disadvantages that China possesses in international 
market competition, it is better to be clear about what ‘success’ means. Rosen (2010: 51) 
states that ‘it is unrealistic for China, or any other country, to expect to match Hollywood’s 
box-office success in North America or in the international market … China (including Hong 
Kong) has probably done at least as well as other nation in terms of box-office success 
outside its home market’. American-Chinese film scholar Zhu Ying (2002) points out that, 
given the short time that the mainland film industry has been commercialised and 
industrialised, its achievements are considerable. Nevertheless, as we have seen with some of 
the more ambitious claims around Chinese soft power canvassed in the Introduction, if the 
ambition is to compete with Hollywood, then there is little success to point to at this stage. 
Amongst the formidable obstacles to achieving this goal must be counted those that are self-
imposed, such as government interference and censorship. But the main ones are structural. 
As Rosen (2010: 36) notes: ‘there are clear limitations on how successful any country can be 
in competing with Hollywood outside (and in most cases inside as well) that country’s home 
market’. The next section will look at external factors and then at the self-imposed, internal 
obstacles.  
Cultural discounts, referring to the problem of translation of movie and audio-visual works 
when they cross state and linguistic borders (Straubhaar 2007), are certainly primary issues. 
As Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (2000:127) argue: ‘one characteristic of films – and of 
media products in general – is that they suffer a cultural discount when traded across 
international boundaries’. Consider certain blockbusters produced by China’s ‘fifth 
generation’ directors as cases in point. The Chinese-style black comedy blockbuster Let The 
Bullets Fly (rang zidan fei 2010), directed by Jiangwen, and Feng Xiaogang’s blockbuster 
Aftershock (tangshan da dizhen 2010) were difficult for international audiences, especially 
Western viewers, to read due to the background knowledge and social values needed to 
appreciate these kinds of films. Unlike, for example, Mr. Bean, who entertains global 
audiences in all kinds of embarrassing situations without relying on dialogue, Let the Bullets 
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Fly amused Chinese audiences by its long dialogues of black humour, which not only 
required a knowledge of the Chinese language but also knowledge of the Northern Warlords 
era in history and ‘the introspection of the negative side of the national character of the 
Chinese’ (Hu, 2010 cited in Chen 2012) to appreciate the depth of the humour. Feng’s 
Aftershock tells a story about family reunion after the 1976 earthquake in Tangshan that 
killed 2.4 million people. Even though knowledge or memory about the painful earthquake is 
not necessarily required, an understanding of the impact that traditional son-favoured social 
values have on today’s Chinese society is needed. However, this value is difficult to read for 
Western audiences. The whole story about the long-awaited reunion of a broken family in 
that earthquake, which started from a difficult choice of a mother to save her son while giving 
up her daughter to the rubble, does not have the same emotional connections for a viewer 
from a different cultural background (Chen 2012).  
The more familiar audiences are with Chinese films, the better they will understand them. As 
Brasell (1992: 55) says, processing media messages is ‘a learned cultural practice’. That is to 
say, as Chu points out, ‘If the West is to become a more competent reader of Chinese media 
products, it needs to significantly expand its interpretive frame of references’ (Chu 2014:161) 
and embrace an ‘accumulation of media experience’ (Staiger 2005:59). This accumulation, as 
Zhang (2004) notices, has mainly worked through Chinese film reception, foremost through 
the films of Zhang Yimou. Zhang Yimou’s early films, which were received enthusiastically 
in the West, insist on picturing an ugly China full of poverty and immorality, and were 
banned in China, while Zhang’s later approved films received much less flattery. Yingchi 
Chu (2014: 159-169) addresses some reasons for the ‘apparent incommensurability of 
interpretative attitudes in the consumption of Chinese media products in the West’ and notes 
the significant role that differences in political systems play in the communication between 
China and the West, ‘so much so that many Chinese soft power products are viewed as 
propaganda in the West simply because they issue from a Communist regime’ (Chu 
2014:159). Chu (2014: 160) notices ‘the logic of transnational politics that powerfully 
intervenes in cross-cultural media consumption’ and discusses the problem of cross-culture 
audience expectations and ‘politics of reception’, which can be understood as the ‘politics of 
media consumption practices’ in the regime of Western audiences and Chinese media 
products consumption. ‘There is a degree of reticence in the western reception of Chinese 
media products that has less to do with cultural Chineseness than with the fact that soft power 
package also contains a hefty dose of the ideological persuasion of the current Chinese 
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government’. Zhang Yimou withdrew his films Not One Less and The Road Home from the 
Cannes Film Festival in 1999, saying that he ‘can’t accept that the West has for a long time 
politicized Chinese films. If they are not anti-government, they are just considered 
propaganda’ (Cited in Rosen 2010: 54). Rosen (2010:53) asserts that ‘it is not uncommon for 
critics and audiences to read politics-either positively or negatively-into Chinese films’. If an 
approved film coincidently tapped into the expectations of the West, there is always suspicion 
alongside the appreciation that the film’s ‘benign surface may cover some subtle propaganda 
on behalf of China’s centralized government’ (cited in Rosen 2010:53).  
The response to Flowers of War (jinling shisan chai 2011) in the US exemplifies the way in 
which Chinese films are often interpreted through a political lens. It was the first Chinese 
film with a major Hollywood star (Christian Bale), and was also equipped with huge budget. 
40 per cent of the dialogue was in English and it had the leading provider of international 
marketing services to the film industry, DDA Public Relations, for marketing and distribution. 
However, with powerful political elements of Japanese imperialism in the narrative, concern 
soon transferred from an artistic to a political discussion. It was criticised by media and 
audiences as a nationalistic patriotic film manipulated by the Chinese government to portray 
a distorted history of the Nanjing massacre (Chen 2012). Donald and Voci (2008) state that 
‘selling a ‘banned’ film to a non-Chinese-speaking audience is easier than trying to persuade 
people that a mainstream film with subtitles might be educational and entertaining’. Chen 
(2012) goes further, to make two ironic equations: politically sensitive or offensive Chinese 
films, usually are internationally acknowledged/acclaimed Chinese films; those politically 
implicated or supportive Chinese films are often internationally slighted and disliked. Thus, 
those underground films (films banned by the government in mainland China) such as Zhang 
Yimou’s To Live (huozhe 1994), Joan Chen’s Xiuxiu (1999), to some extent occupy a 
considerable amount of the international market. ‘The underground quality appears in many 
cases to be a question of style rather than substance, again sceptics allege that some young 
filmmakers are not actually censored by the Film Bureau, but elect to bypass its official 
approval processes so that they can claim the status of being banned, dissident or 
underground and so enhance their recognition and credibility abroad’ (Donald and Voci 
2008). The reasons for the popularity of underground Chinese films are multiple. From my 
point of view, banning something is an easy way to stimulate the curiosity of human beings. 
Also, as the Chinese government is notorious for its propaganda in Western minds, people 
abroad tend to believe that the banned content reflects more of the reality about China. In 
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addition, ‘accumulation of media experience’ (Staiger 2005:59) about negative aspects of 
China in the past can affect foreigners’ choice of today’s media content. To answer why the 
West always tends to politicise Chinese films and has expectations of an ugly China is 
beyond the scope of my research. The long-term censorship and government interference in 
film production is well-known to the West and definitely contributes to the answer, but this 
can not all be attributed to China. As some scholars observe, ‘it has partly to do with a 
westerner fear of a rising China beneath which one can discover a deeper set of questions 
concerning identity’ (Chu 2014:170); ‘This fear is an expression of the West facing “a loss of 
centrality” which amounts to nothing less than a serious identity crisis’ (Barr 2011: 3-6, Chu 
2014:170)  
Reform and the opening up of the Chinese film industry certainly have promoted the role for 
commercialisation and entertainment in film production while toning down politics and 
propaganda. However, as Darrell William Davis (2010:123) puts it: ‘marketization is not an 
end in itself but is rather intended to boost the quality and quantity of Chinese films, moving 
the PRC steadily toward a major soft-power role in the international arena … marketization 
must assist Chinese cinema, but it must also uphold socialist tenets while entertaining and 
enlightening audiences regarding Party legitimacy … “freedom” in the market 
place….subject to proper authority and control’. Zhu and Nakajima (2010: 33) also state that 
‘the Chinese state has managed the marketization of the Chinese film industry with two goals 
utmost in mind: making the industry competitive in globalized markets while also 
maintaining the state’s grip on culture’. This ‘grip on culture’ is mainly processed though 
government interference and censorship which has been criticised by both insiders and 
outsiders in the Chinese film industry as a great obstacle to film creation and industry 
development. Nye (2012a:8) urges that ‘the development of soft power needs to be a zero 
sum game. All countries can gain from finding attraction in one another’s cultures. But for 
China to succeed in this, its politics must unleash the talents of its civil society. Unfortunately, 
that does not seem about to happen soon’. Due to China’s political structure, and philosophy 
behind the structure, as discussed in Chapter One, it is unavoidable for a cultural industry, 
especially the film industry, to ‘dance with shackles’ to seek a balance in its ‘ambivalent or 
double-functioned’ status at the ‘discursive disposal of the government’ (Su 2010:318). 
Insiders such as Hanhan, a very popular blogger, novelist, and new generation film director, 
argue that ‘the restriction on cultural activities makes it impossible for China to influence 
literature and cinema on a global basis or for us culturati to raise our heads up proud’ (cited in 
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Nye 2012a:8). When Zhang Yimou was asked why his films are always set in the past, his 
answer was that contemporary Chinese topics would be ‘neutered by the censors’ (Cited in 
Nye 2012b:13). This consideration must resonate with most filmmakers, given the 
proliferation of historical films and melodramas in China.  
However, as for the Chinese ‘inward-looking’ and ‘outward-looking’ (Barr 2011: 28; 2012: 
82) soft power implications mentioned in Chapter One, the soft power product offered 
domestically ‘needs to avoid chaos at all cost, including heavy-handed censorship, in order to 
ensure social stability and national unity’ (Sun 2010:66), ‘while what is disseminated abroad 
must take greater cognizance of western audience expectations’ (Chu 2014: 161). The 
interpretive ‘horizons of expectations’ characteristic of Western and Chinese audiences are, 
not surprisingly different (Chu 2014: 169). As the former Beijing bureau chief of the 
Washington Post, John Pomfret asserts, ‘almost every major cultural export from China over 
the past 25 years that has made it in the West has flopped in China, from the early movies of 
director Zhang Yimou, to the Nobel Prize-winning work of author Gao Xinjian’ (cited in 
Rosen 2010:52). The government has been conducting a strategy to humanise and 
commercialise main melody movies and to incorporate traditional Chinese cultural elements 
and Hollywood techniques into kung-fu movies, as mentioned in Chapter One, to exercise 
soft power. It might create some box office success domestically because of market 
protection from the government to ‘ensure domestic box office performance for favoured 
films which are produced for political reasons’ (Rosen 2011). Examples can be seen from 
The Founding of a Republic (jianguo daye 2009), which was made to celebrate the 60th 
anniversary of the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Almost all of the cast in this film are A-
listed pop stars in China. Needless to say, ‘such films do little to promote Chinese soft power 
abroad’ (Rosen 2011)  
Rosen (2010:54) points out that if China’s goal is to compete with Hollywood at the box 
office, the strategy is continuing to ‘do coproductions and to partner with Hollywood 
distributors to promote their films globally, with wide releases, and to develop franchise titles 
through sequels of successful films’. Though he urges the government to ‘reduce censorship 
and political considerations and promote the artistic visions of talented directors for a 
healthier domestic market’ (Rosen 2010:54), the practice does not seem easy. The former 
coproduction strategy is actively employed by government to deploy soft power. State-owned 
and private media conglomerates in China are encouraged to seek box office success and 
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increase artistic recognition in Western markets through coproduction. The following section 
will look at the internationalizing strategies of these large media companies.  
2.8 Major players and their Internationalisation strategy  
Except for the two state-owed conglomerates, China Film Group and Shanghai Film Group, 
the major players in China are private companies, including Huayi Brothers, Bona Film 
Group, Orange Sky Golden Harvest Ltd. Stellar Film Group and new film companies like 
Enlight Picture, Galloping Horse, Dadi Movie, and Le Vision Pictures. Those major players 
are trying to build a complete vertical industry chain and, therefore, have been engaged in 
production, distribution and exhibition. State-owned companies such as China Film Group 
and Shanghai Film Group and private companies such as Huayi Brothers and Bona Film 
Group all have invested in cinema. Huayi Brothers is a good example. It started to grow 
following the liberalisation of China’s film industry in 2001–02. Now it has a complete film 
and TV production and distribution chain, including a chain of multiplex cinemas. The 
company has also built theme parks. One on Hainan Island features concepts from the Huayi-
produced movies of Feng Xiaogang (Frater 2014b). 
Horizontally, mergers and acquisitions are used by major players to enter into the 
international market. In 2012, Dalian Wanda Group announced the acquisition of AMC 
Entertainment for $2.6 billion, which made Wanda the biggest theatre operator in the US. 
The CEO, Wang Jianlin, said that the goal of the Wanda Group was to become a first-class 
transnational enterprise by 2020. The AMC acquisition was just the first step of this 
internationalist strategy (Xinhua News 2012). Galloping Horse (70 per cent) and India’s 
Reliance Media came together in a joint venture to purchase the Hollywood-based VFX 
company Digital Domain’s core assets. Shambaugh (2013:255) points out that ‘China’s film 
industry is trying to go global … it is trying to buy soft power rather than build it’.  
I do not totally agree with Shambaugh’s statement. The key players are trying to go global by 
establishing long-term relationships with the US through coproduction. It takes time. ‘Buying 
Hollywood’ is the first and necessary step. The CEO of Huayi Brothers, Wang Zhongjun, 
said: ‘I have spent lots of time to meet Hollywood producers and directors and to learn from 
Hollywood last year (2013). I found that Hollywood film formats actually are similar to 
China. If I can have three leading director from Hollywood, there is a chance that we could 
become first-class film companies in America’ (Wang cited in Meng 2014). Also, News Corp 
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took nearly a 19.9 per cent stake in Bona in 2012. Bona Film will now be financed by News 
Corp and signed an agreement with Fox for future coproduction. Bona also has coproduction 
agreements with Universal and Working Title. Bona CEO, Yudong, said, ‘If Bona is able to 
control 7 per cent to 10 per cent of the market going forward, we’re in position to become 
one of the biggest film companies in the world’ (Tartaglione 2013).   
China Film Group has made an eight-figure equity investment in projects with Thomas Tull’s 
Legendary Entertainment, including productions of Seventh Son and Warcraft and Paramount 
Pictures 3D fantasy-action movie Marco Polo. Seventh Son and Warcraft marked the first 
time that the state film group had taken a stake in a Hollywood project. The newly installed 
China Film Group CEO, La Peikang, said, ‘China Film Group has been paying close 
attention and great devotion to expanding its overseas market’ (Coonan 2014a). Shanghai 
Media Group signed a multi-year partnership agreement with Walt Disney Studios to 
codevelop Disney-branded movies for Sino-US coproductions in March 2014. Under the deal, 
US-based writers will cooperate with Chinese writers and filmmakers to develop scripts that 
combine Disney’s storytelling with Chinese elements (The Deadline Team 2014) 
It is not only China’s film companies that are seeking opportunities to please Hollywood, but 
Hollywood is trying very hard to find a way to work with China, which contributes to local 
film companies becoming international. In 2012, in addition to the News Corp’s purchase of 
a stake in Bona, Cameron Pace Group formed a joint venture with Tianjin 
Hitech Holding Group and Tianjin North Film Group to focus on 3D entertainment in China 
in 2012 (Xinhua 2012). Discovery and IPTV player Wasu also established a joint venture, 
with registered capital of US$20 million, in Hangzhou that aims at producing high quality 
documentaries for distribution via the Discovery Network to more than 220 countries (CMM-
I 2014). The phenomena of capital investment and joint production have blossomed since 
2012. In recent times, seven Hollywood deals were signed during two weeks in March 2014 
(CMM-I 2014).  
Keane believes that it will still be some time before the wider world starts watching Chinese 
films in the way people in China watch Hollywood films. ‘Everyone in the world understands 
what a Hollywood film is, which is transparent. Everyone in the world understands what 
Hollywood is, so Hollywood can travel anywhere, but Chinese film has a great deal of 
difficulty getting out of its own container’ (cited in Birtles 2013). That is true. However, the 
time for people to watch Hollywood blockbusters produced with Chinese companies, or 
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through funds invested in those companies, seems to be coming. As we will see in the next 
chapter, coproduction has already contributed to nearly half, or even more, of the mainland 
box office in the past several years. However, most of these productions are with Hong Kong, 
based on a long-standing relationship. How much box office will come from Sino-US and 
other Sino-foreign productions in the future is still a question to be decided. Though the topic 
of coproducing with other countries, especially the US, is debated heatedly at home and 
abroad when talking about Chinese film industry, the real situation is far from sure due to the 
many cultural and political challenges that face foreign relationships. This factor will be 
discussed in the Sino-US and Sino-Australia chapters. 
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Chapter 3 Film coproduction  
In the previous chapter I discussed the revenue sharing models that apply in China. One of 
the key points is that coproductions offer a better return for the filmmaker. However, 
executing a successful coproduction is far from easy. This applies not only to coproductions 
involving Chinese partners. This chapter, therefore, begins with the inception of international 
coproduction and explains why coproductions have emerged as a strategic model of film 
industry development. It then describes China’s coproduction history. Finally, it outlines 
current coproduction models. This chapter shows why coproduction is seen as a viable way 
forward. The ensuing chapters trace the vicissitudes in detail of the coproduction case studies. 
3.1 Defining International Coproduction 
An international coproduction is where two or more production companies or broadcasters 
from different countries get together produce a film under an official treaty or other type of 
formal cooperative arrangement. Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (1997:102-103) use the term 
“international coproduction”, or just “coproduction” to include any production/business 
arrangement between organisations based in different countries, ranging from cofinancing, 
where one partner’s primary role is provision of a cash investment, to full coproduction 
where the creative, artistic, and financial contributions are roughly equal. “Treaty 
coproduction” refers specifically to a coproduction undertaken through a bilateral or multi-
party treaty; the treaty works are counted as domestic content in each of the partner countries 
for quota purposes and have access to investment and tax incentives from the relevant 
government funding agencies. Non-treaty coproduction is sometimes known as ‘coventure’ to 
refer to international coproduction with countries with which there is no treaty existing, 
notably the US. 
Miller et al (2005: 173-213) use the term coproduction to describe different types of 
collaborative work in film and television emphasising the international division of cultural 
labour, and divide it into treaty coproduction (official coproduction) and equity coproduction 
(non-treaty coproduction). They (2005: 182) state that official coproduction means that each 
partners’ government recognises the work ‘as a product of national culture, and accordingly 
grant[s] subsidies and tax breaks in the name of protecting national culture and fortifying 
national industry’. Non-treaty coproduction, according to Miller et al (2005: 182), applies 
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when both partners hold equity: ‘they take a percentage ownership in a project or production 
company, rather than buying territory rights for initial distribution. Equity partners have a 
voice in the projects that are developed, but the level of input into creative decisions can vary 
considerably’.  As collaboration in filmmaking is capital driven, some participants even 
equate international ‘coproducing’ with ‘cofinancing’ (Morawetz, Hardy, Haslam and Randle 
2007 cited in Baltruschat 2010:27). However, Light (1994:79-80) points out that the 
distinction between these two concepts depends on whether or not there is a shared creativity 
in the development and production. Baltruschat (2010: 27) argues that although there is a 
difference between the terms treaty coproduction and non-treaty coproduction, they tend to 
be used interchangeably. ‘Non-treaty coproductions – better referred to as coventures – 
include collaborative business ventures between countries that do not have a treaty and 
coproductions that fall outside specifications outlined in a treaty’. 
The classification system in China is a little different from the broad definitions above. 
According to the Rules for the Administration of Sino-Foreign Cooperative Film Production 
(Order of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television No.31, 2004), the term 
“Chinese-foreign cooperative film production” refers to collaboration between domestic film 
producers who have obtained a License for Film Production (referred to as Chinese parties) 
and overseas film producers (referred to as foreign parties). The current provisions apply to 
coproductions between Chinese and foreign parties within or outside China, including feature 
films, animated works, films for television and documentaries. There are three approaches to 
Chinese foreign cooperative film production: joint production, assisted production and 
entrusted production. 
Treaty coproductions (films produced under formal state-level agreements between China 
and other countries), are joint productions. These films are automatically recognised as 
equivalent to domestic films in both countries. Coproductions with countries that have not 
enacted agreements with China, like the US, but where the product meets the Chinese 
government’s qualification for films can be exempt from import quotas and treated as a 
domestic film in China if they are classified as joint productions. In the main, this thesis 
focuses on joint production, where investment, production and the benefits and risks are 
shared by the Chinese and foreign parties. Joint production is the type of coproduction in 
which we see most transfer of knowledge and know-how and is mostly encouraged by the 
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Chinese government. How these concepts work in practice will be shown in the next and 
subsequent chapters.  
In Mandarin, coproduction literally translates as hepai, which means producing together. 
Most coproductions are referred to as joint productions (lianhe shezhi, or hepai) under the 
regulation classification; that is, Chinese and foreign parties share investment, jointly produce 
the film, and jointly share the benefits and the risks. The China-International Film 
Coproduction Handbook (English version) published by CFCC (2014) directly names joint 
production as coproduced films that are ‘subject to preferential policies that are typically 
applied to domestic Chinese films within the Chinese marketplace’. In China, there are three 
criteria since 2012 that must be met for joint productions to be approved as an official 
coproduction if not under a treaty. First, the ratio of the Chinese party’s capital contributions 
should be not less than one third of the budget. Second, a Chinese actor should be cast in one 
of the main roles. And third, some parts of the movie should be shot in China. Treaty 
coproductions comply with the rules of a treaty or agreement between governments, although 
the requirements may differ from agreement to agreement. Because Hong Kong is 
geographically part of China and has a long coproduction history with China, all the Hong 
Kong-China coproductions mentioned in this thesis, and especially those made after the 
implementation of the CEPA in 2003, are joint productions and treated as domestic films in 
China. Coproduction with Hong Kong will be further discussed in Chapter Five. 
There are another two kinds of cooperation in film production between Chinese and foreign 
parties. One is assisted production (xiezuo shezhi, or xiepai), whereby a foreign party invests 
in production in China, and the equipment, apparatus, sites, services and so on are provided 
by the Chinese party. That is, Chinese companies are contracted to provide services to the 
foreign party. The other is entrusted production or commissioned production (weituo shezhi, 
or daipai), whereby the Chinese party is entrusted by the foreign party to produce films 
within China. Table 3.1 shows the differences between these three types of coproduction as 
represented in an unpublished document of major Chinese law firm Hylands. 
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Table 3.1: Sino-Foreign coproduction films  
Key Points Joint Production Assisted Production 
 
Commissioned 
Production 
Funds 
 
Jointly invested by 
the parties 
Invested by the 
Foreign Party 
Invested by the Foreign 
Party 
Equipment 
&Facility 
Determined in the 
agreement 
Provided by the 
Chinese Party 
Provided by the Chinese 
Party 
Site of 
Production 
Inside or outside 
China 
Inside China Inside China 
 
Labor Determined in the 
agreement 
Provided by the 
Chinese Party 
Provided by the Chinese 
Party 
Profit Shared by the parties Rent and employment Contracting 
Loss Jointly absorbed by 
the parties 
Undertaken by the 
Foreign Party 
Undertaken by the 
Foreign Party 
Source: Hylands Law (unpublished 2014: 4)  
As assisted production and commissioned production do not involve any financial investment 
from a Chinese partner, the copyright only belongs to the foreign party. In joint production, 
both parties invest in the film. There are usually two models for revenue sharing and 
distribution between China and foreign producers in joint production. One is called area 
revenue sharing (quyu fenzhang); that is, the different territory producers will take their 
respective share. The other is global revenue sharing; that is, the copyright in each geographic 
area is collectively possessed by all investors and shared, while each of them is solely 
responsible for the distribution in their own territory (Entgroup 2011: 20). The former model 
is widely used for Chinese coproductions due to the underdeveloped film mechanisms and 
challenges of coproducing in China, as will be discussed in the following chapter. However, 
the latter model is increasingly being adopted along with the rapid growth of Chinese 
domestic market. According to a leading Chinese film lawyer, Wang Jun, almost all the 
coproductions in process currently use the global revenue sharing model (Wang 2014). 
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3.2 Why Coproduce? 
International coproduction agreements or treaties signed by governments seek to achieve 
cultural, economic and diplomatic goals. The treaties or agreements allow coproducers to 
develop and produce a film jointly, enable access to support and benefits in both countries, as 
films are treated as domestic productions in both countries, and provide a way to pool 
creative, financial and technical resources from the cooperating countries. To qualify as an 
international coproduction, the film must meet the criteria set out in one or more of the 
various treaties and/or approval systems in participating countries. The Standing Committee 
on Canadian Heritage (2003 cited in Baltruschat 2010:24) indicates that coproductions are of 
‘considerable cultural significance, particularly in the areas of cooperation and coordination’. 
It should be noted, however, that some coproduction treaties that Canada has signed were 
actually part of an economic strategy to improve trade relations and serve only for economic 
or diplomatic needs rather than cultural purposes.  
Canada is very active in the international coproduction area and has 57 coproduction treaties 
with 53 countries. However, many of these treaties have never been activated. The initial 
impetus for treaty negotiations, according to Baltruschat (2010), is to enhance and strengthen 
Canada’s film industry through creating employment and exposure to more experienced 
partners and through pooling resources from other countries. This strategy aims to increase 
feature film production and offset US domination of the Canadian film industry (Baltruschat 
2010: 24–27). France is the second most active country, currently with more than 40 treaties 
worldwide. The US does not sign agreements or treaties, partly because of its dominant status 
in the film industry but also because the US has resisted the efforts of other countries to 
acknowledge the cultural significance of film in coproduction treaties. The US has tended to 
view such treaties as compromising the multinational free trade agenda that the US has 
pursued through international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation. Based on 
this, we can see how Hollywood’s activity in China is an exception to its usual international 
strategy, while the Chinese government are using the rules to deploy soft power when dealing 
with US. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Six.  
Despite US opposition, coproductions were exempted from the General Agreement on Trade 
and Services (GATS, signed in 1994) in order to benefit the signatory countries. Dymond and 
Hart (2001 cited in Baltruschat 2010:24–25) note that the main reason was to prevent US 
access to the advantages of coproduction because the US does not sign any treaties or 
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agreements with other countries. Nevertheless, Acheson and Maule observed as early as 1994 
that many benefits of treaty coproduction extended to projects with non-treaty partners 
(Acheson and Maule 1994 cited in Baltruschat 2010:25). US producers can team up with a 
treaty country producer in order to benefit from specific sources of funding for films to be 
produced in the country of the counterpart treaty (Cones 2008: 244–255) 
International coproduction was very common in Europe between the 1950s and the 1970s, 
especially between Italian, Spanish and French production companies. France and Italy 
signed the first European agreement in 1949. 711 films were coproduced between the two 
nations between 1949 and 1964 (Bergfelder 2005: 55). Coproduction was enshrined in post-
1960 Europe as a method of film financing and production. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
coproductions were particularly dominant across Europe, and are still a vital means of 
gaining additional finance and distribution support beyond the national system (Finney 
2010:75). The EU nations exerted collaborative efforts to create a pan-European industry to 
combat Hollywood’s proliferation and its continuing domination, although the resulting films 
were often described as ‘Euro-puddings’ for their lack of a distinctive (national) cultural 
flavour (Finney 1996, Liz 2014).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, international film coproduction became more common due to 
increased competition for content, principally among new television services, as it provided a 
way to generate more financial backing for film and TV shows (Selznick 2005:158-162). 
Benjamin J. Bates (1998: 237) believes that competition drives video producers to attract 
larger audiences, which tends to push production costs higher. The desire to amortise high 
production costs in additional markets has led to a greater interest in international 
coproductions and the creation of narratives with international values and interest. In the 
beginning stage, international coproduction was used by European and smaller US producers 
to compete with the dominance of the US; currently, even large media companies in the US 
are joining international coproductions to benefit from shared finance and creativity (Selznick: 
2005: 158–162).  
Marcus Breen (2005: 77) also points out that financial considerations drive globalisation 
imperatives for coproduction film, and the financial differentials, including public policy and 
private contracts, ‘work to generate a special set of conditions that have been characterized as 
the New International Division of Cultural Labour (NICL)’. According to Miller et al 
(2005:127), ‘production is the most important site of all for Hollywood’s use of the NICL’. 
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The concept is used by Miller and his colleagues to argue that big Hollywood corporations 
are engineering a new international distribution of labour force and production activity to 
outsource work globally, reduce costs and to attract talent from other countries to work for 
them (Miller 2005:126-140). Greg Elmer and Mike Gasher (2005) refer to ‘runaway 
production’ to describe the phenomenon of Hollywood shooting most of its film in other 
countries to take advantage of cost savings and tax concessions. NICL describes the situation 
of runaway production, or low-cost production, which in China falls into the categories of 
assisted production or entrusted production. The main goals of international coproduction are 
to create economic advantages and to share economic risk, and also to gain preferential 
access to international markets. As a result, the content tends to focus on stories with 
transnational appeal rather than stories that are specific to a particular culture. Baltruschat’s 
study based on Canada’s treaty coproduction activity revealed that ‘the signing of 
coproduction treaties with countries worldwide without fostering diverse filmmakers and 
producers within local contexts is indicative of the lack of commitment to production sectors 
that are representative of the cultural fabric of today’s societies’. She further points out that 
the future of treaty coproduction is likely to exemplify cultural production. Due to the 
economic imperatives and pressures from international partners to create programming for 
global markets, more flexible measures apply (Baltruschat 2010:22-49). 
International coproductions possess both advantages and disadvantages. The classical account 
from Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (1997:104) is still highly relevant for identifying costs 
and benefits. The benefits include the ability to pool financial resources as well as a range of 
access advantages; access to the partner government's incentives and subsidies; access to the 
partner's market or to a third market; access to a particular project initiated by the partner; 
access to a desired foreign location with or without a coproduction official treaty; access to 
cheaper inputs in the partner’s country, usually though a service agreement.  There are 
industry development benefits; for instance, the opportunity to learn from the partner if the 
partner has superior knowledge in program development or marketing, the production process 
or general management. In addition, cultural goals were included by Hoskins, McFadyen and 
Finn (1997:104) as one of the benefits, as ‘television programs and feature films are cultural 
goods, and their products may well have non-pecuniary goals’. Writing about television 
drama, Dong-Hoo Lee (2007:194) summarises these advantages as supporting an 
internationalising strategy, a cost-effective strategy, access opportunities and mutual learning 
effects.  
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Usually, financial pooling and improved access to the partner’s market are important 
advantages. However, ‘Different benefits may accrue to the various partners, since the 
rationale for the coproduction may be a pooling of complementary resources with each 
partner contributing a comparative advantage in a particular area’ (Hoskins, McFadyen and 
Finn (1997:103). Michael Curtin (2007: 283) believes that joint ventures and coproductions 
with China help to break out of the constraints of government censorship and a lack of 
investment capital, thus contributing to a better film or television work. Ting Wang (in Miller 
et al 2005:184) observes that foreign film coproduction in China can ‘introduce the world’s 
advanced filmmaking technology and management expertise’ to China, ‘boost the image of 
local films and film artists in the NICL’ and ‘stimulate the domestic film market’.  The 
advantages of coproduction with China and the benefits that drive China to look for 
coproductions will be further examined in the following chapters.  
The disadvantages of international coproduction identified by Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn 
(1997:104–112) are increased costs, including negotiation costs, coordination and shooting 
costs and related administrative costs in both countries, as well as loss of control and cultural 
specificity. Finney (2010:75) also notes, based on European coproduction research, the 
difficulty of upholding ‘the tenets of cultural specificity, national identity and creative 
integrity’ given a project’s financing demands and the different needs of the various partners. 
This issue will be further discussed in the US and Australia case studies. An increased cost in 
dealing with government is another disadvantage, especially in treaty coproductions. Extra 
costs for government fees and a heavy paperwork burden are imposed on the producers when 
they seek to comply with the treaty requirements. This situation will be detailed in the Sino-
Australia treaty coproduction case study below. Opportunistic behaviour by foreign partners 
also can raise concerns. There are possibilities that the partner might “cheat”, such as in 
under-allocating resources or providing the wrong information about cost sharing or revenue 
splitting. The chance of cheating on a deal is higher in non-treaty coproduction.  Creating a 
more formidable competitor is a potential disadvantage. There is a great chance that the 
partner today could be a formidable competitor tomorrow by mutual learning during the 
process of coproduction. This may well be an accurate description of precisely the ultimate 
soft power strategy behind China’s enthusiastic embrace of film coproductions. Usually, as 
Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (1997) note, the cost of coordination, loss of control and 
cultural specificity tend to be major problems. 
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John W. Cones (2008: 254-255) outlines the disadvantages from the perspective of US 
producers and financers. In addition to difficulties of finding capable and solvent partners, he 
notes ‘genre bias’; international coproductions prefer certain genres, such as science fiction 
and adventure films, and are biased against comedies, as humour does not easily travel across 
cultures. Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (1997) also observe that coproduction adds 
complexity, particularly in terms of film finance. The expertise of an international attorney is 
usually required. In addition, the process of making all of the essential arrangements for an 
international coproduction can be a nightmare, even for an ongoing production company. 
‘Whether a film production company’s cash flow is up or down (or non-existent), foreign 
costs can increase as the U.S. dollar falls in relative value. Subsidy laws are also constantly 
changing, and the transactions take a great deal of time to close. Altogether, this combination 
often results in tighter budgets, fewer films, higher risks and increased frustration’ (Cones 
2008: 254-55). The fluctuation of currency exchange rates during the course of coproduction 
can be a big challenge, as it adheres to budgets set out in the beginning stage (Screen 
Australia 2013a: 5). This can particularly affect treaty coproductions where the period from 
development stage to releasing a film is relatively long, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, 
The treaty criteria normally requires the contribution of finance to equal the contribution of 
creativity.  
With the tremendous growth of the Chinese box office in the past several years, the numbers 
of coproductions with China are increasing because they provide privileged access to Chinese 
markets and bypass the restrictive quotas of the Chinese government. Keane (2012) states 
that cooperation, in many cases, benefits both parties; however, in film and television drama 
production, it is common that China is downgraded to a technical or production capacity. The 
foreign party plays the role of creative producer. However, with the development of the 
Chinese film industry, this situation may be changing. In some areas Chinese partners have 
more creative input than before, as will be discussed in the following section, although there 
are obvious problems associated with censorship.  As I show in subsequent chapters, when 
confronted with a competent partner like the US, there are tensions about creativity and 
financial contribution. The following section deals with the history of film coproduction in 
China.  
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3.3 The history of film coproduction in the People’s Republic of China  
After the establishment of the PRC, The Chinese Kite (fengzheng 1958) was the first 
coproduced film between China and the Garance studio in France. It was a children’s film 
that expressed China-France friendship though the children’s friendship. The director and 
script writer were Wang Jiayi and Roger Pigaut. It was noteworthy that this film won awards 
at the first Karlovy Vary International Film Festival and the 19th Venice Film Festival 
(baike.com).  
 
The Chinese Kite 
The Great Leap Forward (dayuejin) from 1958, an economic failure launched by Mao 
Zedong (Ralph and Thaxton 2008), and the Cultural Revolution, a political disaster from 
1966–1976, prevented China’s development politically, economically and socially (Tsou 
1986). In relation to film, this meant that there were no coproductions between China and any 
other country from 1958 until 1980. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping came to power and pursued a 
major reform agenda. On 7th August 1979, the China Film Coproduction Corporation (CFCC) 
was founded and became responsible for the management of film coproductions. The 
objective of the CFCC was to assist or coproduce films with overseas producers so as to 
enhance the strategic aims of the united front and propaganda. China Film Group Corporation 
(CFGC), Beijing Film Studio (BFS) and seven other state-owned agencies were the first 
Chinese domestic producers allowed to take part in film coproduction (F. Wang 2012:11). 
Due to the increasing number of applications from overseas for film coproduction, the 
Ministry of Radio, Film, TV (MRFT)8 occasionally approved extra quotas to satisfy the 
expanding demand. 
                                                            
8 The MRFT changed its name to State Administration of Radio, Film, TV (SARFT) in the institutional reform 
of the State Council in 1998. The SARFT incorporated with The General Administration of Press and 
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Cooperation in the 1980s was mainly realised through assisted coproduction, which means 
that the Chinese partner would normally supply non-cash services, such as location, 
equipment and labour, and did not take part in the creative development or with direct 
investment. Fourteen coproduced films were accomplished during the early 1980s – one with 
Japan and the rest with Hong Kong.  The salaries and benefits for the Chinese staff were 
significantly lower than their foreign peers, and language obstacles impaired the future 
deeper cooperation between the parties. In 1982, the CFCC and BFS (Beijing Film Studio) 
coproduced a landmark film The Go Masters (yipan meiyou xiawan de qi 1983) with the 
Japanese parties Daiei Studios, Miko No Taikyoku Production Committee and Tokyo 
Tokuma Corporation to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the diplomatic normalisation 
of Sino-Japanese relations (F. Wang 2012:11). It was the first full coproduction or joint 
production between China and Japan. According to the contract, each party covered their own 
production expenses and the cost of equipment, and cast and crew. 
On 25 September 1985, MRFT passed a new regulation that emphasised the optimal 
management of project submission and review, as well as content selection of the coproduced 
films. On 11 December 1985, the Ministry of Culture issued another notice, which outlined 
and reiterated the detailed procedures of coproduction submissions. On 7 March 1986, the 
Ministry of Broadcasting, Film and Television (MRFT) announced a new regulation that 
required strict compliance. It stipulated that all coproduced films would initially have to go 
through the China Film Coproduction Corporation (CFCC) before being submitted to the 
Film Bureau for approval. It had been brought to the government’s attention that the 
protection of copyright was an important issue and that it should be dealt with early in 
coproduction work. This regulation has been recognised as being a great advance in the 
history of film coproduction, as it effectively helped to avoid possible future international 
disputes (Weng 2012: 63) 
From 1986 to 1990, both the number and scale of coproduced films increased; fifty-nine were 
produced during this period. The Silk Road (dunhuang 1988) was coproduced with Japan; 
The King of Sulu and the Emperor of China (sulu guowang yu zhongguo huangdi 1987) was 
completed with the Philippines; Singapore contributed to Rickshaw Boy (luotuo xiangzi 1986); 
Canada played a part in the Stamp Traveller (youpiao lvxing ji 1988) and Norman Bethune 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Publication in 2013. The name also has been changed to State Administration of Press and Publication, Radio, 
Film, TV (SAPPRFT). In this thesis, I will still mainly use SARFT.  
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(baiqiuen daifu 1990). The Last Emperor (modai huangdi 1987), which was coproduced with 
Italy, won nine Academy Awards, including Best Picture and Best Director (F. Wang  
2012:11). 
During these years, most coproduced films were assisted coproductions, whereby the Chinese 
partner assisted the foreign partners to produce films in China with their equipment, 
apparatus, sites, and services without investing in the production. However, Chinese partners 
started to participate in the creative process and obtain domestic distribution rights and 
revenue in a few films. For example, the war-themed film The Silk Road (dunhuang), which 
was coproduced with Japan, required an initial investment of $20 million that was beyond the 
budget of either CFCC or August First Film Studio. After negotiation, an agreement was 
reached that the Japanese would bear 100 per cent of the production cost (F. Wang 2012: 12). 
However, the Chinese side were entitled to copyright and revenue in China. The film’s 
location, Dunhuang, became a popular tourist destination as a result of the coproduction. The 
Sino-Canadian film Norman Bethune was the first that China actively participated in script 
creativity and writing. The original script was initially offered by the Canadians. However, it 
was believed by the Chinese that it didn’t depict a sufficiently heroic image of the soldier of 
internationalism. After several rounds of negotiation, the Canadians were finally convinced, 
and amended the script. This coproduction indicates that since the late 1980s, China started to 
have some creative contribution in the film coproduction process.  
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Chinese economy in the early 1990s, as well as the film 
industry, had gradually shifted from a planned economy towards a market-demand economy.  
A series of regulations introduced then further detailed the rules for coproductions. On 5 July 
1991, the Ministry of Broadcasting, Film and Television introduced a new regulation 
specifically for the coproduction film management: the Administration of Sino-foreign 
Cooperation in the film production  (guanyu zhongwai hezuo shezhi dianying de guanli 
guiding), which gave a basic guide for cooperative film projects in China.  After that, a series 
of legal documents were implemented about film management, including: Rules of the 
constitution of creator in domestic feature film and coproduced film (guanyu guochan gushi 
pian hepai pian zhuchuang renyuan goucheng de guiding) and Temporary rules of 
management about film base (guanyu dianying diyang pian guanli de zanxing guiding), as 
well as standards of using proper language, proper English subtitles and length of films. 
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These documents further detail the rules for coproduction in China that have made the 
industry more regulated through better management (Weng 2012:64). 
Chinese producers started to invest in coproduction under these arrangements. Both numbers 
and scale of coproductions increased. 168 films were produced between 1991 and 1995, with 
the annual number of coproductions increasing from fourteen in 1991 to forty-one in 1995. 
Apart from the majority that were coproduced with Hong Kong, Mandala (mantuoluo 1991), 
Yang Guifei (1992) and Ju Dou (1992) were coproduced with Japan; The Tragic Tale of 
Grassland (damo enchou ji 1992) was made with Mongolia; On the Beat (minjin gushi 1995) 
was in partnership with the UK; Beauty and the Sloppy (nuhai weilong 1995) with the 
Philippines, and Panda Jimmy (xiongmao jimi 1992) with the US (Wang.F 2012:12).  Some 
of these coproductions, as mentioned above, were well-received by audiences. Most of them 
were assisted coproductions.  
In 1995, a new regulation, Provisions of reform of filming management about feature film 
(guanyu gaige gushi pian shezhi guanli gongzuo de guiding), was introduced. It granted 
provincial level film studios the rights to coproduce. This policy expanded the space for 
future cooperation, as more domestic organisations participated in coproducing under the 
policy. Tianjin Film Studio and four other studios were permitted to enter into this industry 
for the first time (F. Wang  2012:12). An issue raised during this period concerned conflicts 
between overseas demand and local quotas. A few smaller studios with some quota to 
coproduce, but without a project, sold their quota for US$20k–50k each to overseas 
producers, mostly to Hong Kong producers. This phenomena was called mai chang biao in 
Chinese (mai means sell, chang here means the film company, biao means quota). Usually, 
Hong Kong producers who had a project but could not access the quota would buy one from 
the studios. When the film was produced fully by a Hong Kong producer, it would be 
released as a ‘coproduction’ in the mainland market. Although to some extent this alleviated 
the excessive demand from overseas, the short-sighted action caused mismanagement and 
lack of supervision during the film production stage. In 1997, with the reduction of traditional 
overseas market demand in Hong Kong (which will be further looked at in Chapter Five) and 
the increase of domestic studios and quotas, the business of selling quotas finally came to an 
end. In the meantime, the Provisions of reform of filming management about feature film 
prescribed that any organisation that invested seventy per cent or more in a production were 
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entitled to use the words “coproduced by” with the producer. This enabled private companies 
to enter the film industry. 
In 1998, director Li An (Ang Lee) and producer Jiang Zhiqiang proposed the coproduction of 
Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (wohu canglong 2000) with Chinese studios. The Chinese 
were entitled to the domestic copyright and revenue. This film integrated creative ideas from 
overseas, with direct investment from various Chinese domestic organisations, as well as staff 
from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Hollywood. It won more than 40 international 
awards and earned more than $128m at the international box office. Crouching Tiger Hidden 
Dragon inaugurated a new era in Chinese film coproduction. This film is also the last one 
that CFCC directly invested in. The role of CFCC changed then. Whereas prior to 2000, the 
CFCC invested in coproduced films, now its role became solely administrative. After the 
reform, CFCC was affiliated to the China Film Group by its company constitution, and 
SARFT took charge of its daily operations. CFCC was then no longer an investment entity. 
Its main focus was the management, coordination and provision of service to coproductions 
(Weng 2012:64). 
China became a World Trade Organization (WTO) member in 2001. This was also an 
important year for the Chinese film industry, in that a comprehensive reform was initiated. 
SARFT introduced Advices about Further Reformation of the Film Industry (guanyu jinyibu 
shenhua dianying ye gaige de ruogan yijian) to establish film groups and proposed the 
establishment of film companies that are limited by shares. Interim Provisions on the Access 
of Operational Qualifications for Movie Production Distribution and Screening (dianying 
zhipian, faxing, faying jingying zige zhunru zanxing guiding) and Administration of Sino-
foreign Cooperation in Film Production (zhongwai hezuo shezhi dianying pian guanli guiding) 
were introduced and became effective from 1 December 2003. Both regulations endowed 
private companies with legal rights as an independent party in the coproduction. The 
proportion of Chinese actors required decreased from 50 per cent to 33 per cent, and the 
requirement for a domestic production team was reduced to 50 per cent from “dominant 
position”. This gave more flexibility to coproductions that required overseas creators and 
actors. In 2004, Advices for the Promotion of the Film Industry (guanyu jiakuai dianying 
chanye fazhan de ruogan yijian) expressly confirmed that film was an industry and that 
private companies were entitled to produce and distribute. On 10 November 2004, Interim 
Provisions on the Access of Film Company Business (dianying qiye jingying zige zhunru 
91 
 
zanxing guiding) was introduced by SARFT and State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC). These provisions allowed foreign companies to produce, distribute and 
cast Chinese domestic films. They effectively helped to expand the sources of investment and 
financing, and to boost film coproduction at large. In 2003, the Mainland and Hong Kong 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) was signed, and Sino-Hong Kong 
coproductions were automatically recognised as domestic Chinese films. With higher 
sensitivity to markets and flexible operations, private companies gradually shifted the power 
of decision making from overseas to Chinese domestic players in coproduction. State-owned 
organisations actively involved in coproduction are the China Film Group and Shanghai Film 
Group. Private companies include Shanghai Yongle Entertainment Group, Huayi Brothers 
&Taihe Entertainment Co. Ltd and Beijing New Pictures Co. Ltd (Wang.F 2012: 12). Two 
modes of operation coexist in the coproduction, namely foreign dominated and domestic 
dominated models. The former has the following features: the project is proposed by, and 
investment is borne by, and scriptwriters and directors are sourced by, the foreign party. The 
actors are employed from different Chinese-speaking countries / regions, to meet the demand 
of different markets. All content is related to China. The overseas partners are responsible for 
distribution in areas other than mainland China, while the Chinese party distributes within 
China. Revenues are distributed to each party separately. In the domestic dominated mode, 
projects are initiated by domestic producers. Private companies can join the state-owned 
agencies to coproduce as domestic producers, and investments are shared between the 
Chinese and overseas partners. Both the scriptwriters and directors are to be Chinese 
nationals, and the content mainly focuses on the social lives of Chinese people.  
During 2004-2010, sixteen films were coproduced with the US, fourteen with the UK, twelve 
with Japan, six with South Korea, four with Germany and Singapore, three with Canada, two 
with the Netherlands, Malaysia and Australia, and one each with North Korea, France, 
Poland, Finland, Denmark and Vietnam (F. Wang 2012: 13). As noted in Chapter Two, in the 
international market, almost all Chinese films that have earned high revenue are coproduced. 
From 2004 to 2009, a number of private companies obtained experience in joining the state-
owned agencies in film coproduction. In addition, due to the rapid development of the 
Chinese film industry and higher revenue every year, both the overseas producers and 
distributors have started to put more emphasis on China. As I will discuss in the ensuing 
chapters, more films than ever before are being proposed by overseas partners, with the 
Chinese mainly responsible for directing and sourcing the staff. The film content is associated 
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with China, which attracts domestic audiences. Most of the films are fully coproduced and 
counted as domestic films in China. For example, Huayi Brothers Media Corporation has 
fully coproduced Dawan (dawan 2001), Warriors of Heaven and Earth (tiandi yingxiong 
2004), Cell phone (shouji 2003) and Kekexili: Mountain Patrol (keke xili 2004) with 
Columbia Pictures. After the successful trial of The Painted Veil (miansha 2006) and The 
Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon Emperor (munaiyi 3 2008), Hollywood has started to use more 
Chinese resources such as venue, script and actors to win the Chinese market, the prime 
example being X-Men, using the celebrated actress Fan Bingbing. In the meantime, the theme 
of films is also being partly changed, from those depicting stereotypes of the old China, to 
reflecting contemporary social lives (eg. Hot Summer Days [quancheng relian 2010] by the 
US, UK and China, F. Wang  2012: 13). 
The mode of cooperation has also shifted from bilateral to multilateral. The domestic partners 
still consist of state-owned and private institutions, whereas the overseas bodies can comprise 
more than one country. For example, the officially approved coproduction Red Cliff (chibi 
2009) was produced by eleven domestic institutions and four overseas partners from the US, 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This was a landmark film as more countries than ever before 
joined the coproduction. The Secret of the Magic Gourd (baohulu de mimi 2007) was 
officially coproduced by China, US and Hong Kong, and it became a very profitable film due 
to its perfect integration of Chinese traditional fairy tales and modern techniques from Disney 
(F. Wang 2012: 13). The main reasons for going multilateral are risk aversion and market 
expansion. Although the majority of coproduced films are still with Hong Kong, the 
proportion has decreased to 60 per cent, from 80 per cent. The overseas partners are more 
diverse, while cooperation with the US is becoming more frequent and is likely to dominate 
Chinese coproduction in the future. 
The share of joint productions in the overall revenue of Chinese films sold overseas increased 
from 58.8 per cent in 2006 to 99.9 per cent in 2010, which means that almost all Chinese 
films’ export earnings were from coproduction. This demonstrates the status of coproduction 
in contributing to China’s film ‘going out’, which will be further discussed in the following 
section. Joint productions are receiving more and more emphasis and encouragement from 
the government. In recent years, an increasing number of joint productions have been made 
by Chinese and foreign parties. As the CEO of Shanghai Film Group, Ren Zhonglun, 
observes, Sino-Foreign coproduction has already experienced three stages: the earliest stage 
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is assisted production, purely labour export. For example, when Spielberg came to Shanghai 
for Empire of the Sun (1987), the Chinese partner only provided location and production 
services. The cooperation was enhanced when Hollywood came to China for The Mummy 3 
(2008). Now, the situation has changed again. China has a more dominant role in initiating a 
project and inviting foreigners to co-create. Ren believes this means that Sino-Foreign film 
coproductions are now entering the deep cooperation stage (Ren cited in Zhou: 2011). 
3.4 The status of coproduction in China  
With the introduction of the regulations directly related to coproduction, such as the Sino-
foreign Cooperation in Film regulations and the signing of the Mainland and Hong Kong 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA 29th June 2013), Sea-Strait Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA 29th June 2010), joint production between the 
mainland and overseas producers, especially Hong Kong, increased rapidly and had a 
profound impact on the Chinese film industry. The period from 2002–2010 was appraised by 
many domestic filmmakers as ‘Gold ten years coproducing with Hong-Kong’. These gold ten 
years greatly contributed to the development and transition of the mainland film industry, 
which I will discuss in the Sino-Hong Kong coproduction chapter. From Table 3.2 below, we 
can see that Sino-Hong Kong coproduction plays a dominant role from the point view of 
coproduction volume from 2002 to 2012. 
Table 3.2: 2002–2012 Country/region and percentage of coproduction 
Country/Region Production Volume Percentage 
Hong Kong  293 68.5% 
Taiwan  50 11.7% 
United States  37 8.6% 
Japan  21 4.9% 
Britain  18 4.2% 
South Korea  11 2.6% 
Germany  7 1.63% 
Singapore  6 1.4% 
Australia  5 1.2% 
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The ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) was signed between mainland 
China and Taiwan. It removed the quota restriction for films produced in Taiwan. In regard to 
joint production with foreign countries, the Interim Provisions on The Access of Operational 
Qualifications for Movie Production and Distribution (dianying zhipian faxing fangying 
jinging zige zhunru zanxing guiding) was issued in 2003, allowing overseas capital to create 
joint production companies with state-run film companies. But it required the Chinese parties 
to hold at least 51 per cent of the total share. The Interim Provisions on the Access of 
Operational Qualifications for Movie Production, Distribution and Projection, issued in 2004, 
further allowed overseas companies to establish joint ventures with privately owned 
companies in China.  After these new regulations took effect, joint ventures such as Warner 
China Film HG Corporation and Hualong Film Digital Production were set up successively. 
But, on 4 August 2005, Several Opinions on Canvassing Foreign Investment into the Cultural 
Sector (guanyu wenhua lingyu yinjin waizi de ruogan yijian) defined the area of the cultural 
industry in which foreign capital involvement was permitted; and forbade foreign companies 
from content production in film and TV. This policy considerably suppressed the increase of 
collaborations with foreign parties. 
Between 2004 and 2012, the number of Sino-US collaborations was between four to six per 
annum, which is far less than the number of joint productions with Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, China and the United States signed a MOU that further opened 
up the Chinese film market to American films. The loosening of policy restrictions greatly 
encouraged the development of Sino-US joint ventures. Oriental DreamWorks, established in 
August 2012, is a joint venture backed by China Media Capital (CMC), Shanghai Media 
Group (SMG), Shanghai Alliance Investment Limited (SAIL), and Hollywood's 
DreamWorks Animation SKG. It will codevelop films full of Chinese elements, such as Kung 
Fu Panda 3. Oriental DreamWorks is also the first Sino-US joint venture to be created since 
new regulations putting business off-limits to foreign investors in 2005 were implemented. 
As partly mentioned in Chapter Two, Cameron Pace Group (CPG), which specialises in 
providing 3D technology, services and consulting to other producers, launched a new joint 
venture in China with the state-owned Tianjin North Film Group, and Tianjin High-tech 
Holding Group in the same year. Earlier than that, News Corp acquired nearly a 19.9 per cent 
stake in Bona Film Group, one of China's largest film distributors, in a bid to help the US 
company gain a stronger foothold in China's booming film market. These deals indicate that 
the government has moderately changed its policy. It is predicted that Chinese films will 
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increasingly merge with the global film industry and the boundary between Chinese and 
foreign capital will gradually fade away. This will eventually lead to the further adjustment of 
coproduction policies in China.  
SARFT has emphasised the diversity of coproductions. As mentioned before, since 2005, 
China has signed agreements about film coproduction with Italy, Australia, Canada, France, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Belgium. Agreements with Russia, India and South Korea are in 
the final stage of discussion. In April 2014, a treaty with the UK was signed (Zhan 2012: 42) 
According to the agreements, coproduction films would enjoy the same rights and benefits as 
domestic films. These agreements have already taken effect. For example, 11 Flowers (wo 
shiyi 2012), directed by Wang Xiaoshuai, was produced followed the agreement with France. 
It was the first Sino-French coproduction since the agreement was signed. The agreements 
with Singapore and Italy required that the investment from China should not fall below 20 
per cent of the total. But this restriction was later removed for Italy, which made 
coproduction easier.  
According to data provided by China Film Coproduction Corporation (CFCC), 428 films 
were made with foreign partners between 2002 and 2012 (cited in Zhan 2012:39). Table 3.3 
below shows that relevant policies and reform implemented around 2003 significantly 
influenced collaborative activity, with that year’s volume being substantially larger than 2002. 
In addition, the table shows the great influence of joint productions on the market. All of the 
top ten domestic film box office hits in 2008 and 2009 were joint productions. In total, joint 
productions made up 75 per cent of films listed on the annual domestic film top ten box 
office from 2002 to 2012.   
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Table 3.3: 2002–2012 Joint production volume and numbers of domestic film box office 
top ten9  
Year Volume 
Numbers in the domestic 
film box office Top 10 
Year Volume
Numbers in the domestic 
film box office Top 10 
2012  40  6  2006 37  9  
2011  58  5  2005 38  7  
2010  42  9  2004 39  6  
2009  29  10  2003 45  7  
2008  46  10  2002 16  5  
2007  38  9 Total 428  75%  
Undoubtedly, joint productions have become dominant in the Chinese film market. In general, 
they only account for –10 to 20 per cent in China’s annual production volume. However, they 
normally create 50 to 80 per cent of the domestic film box office, as shown in Table 3.4 
below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 Annual data is provided by the China Film Coproduction Company. The production volume in this table only 
refers to those films that were approved as joint productions by SARFT/SAPPRFT, gained a screening license, 
and were screened the same year. 
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Table 3.4: 2002–2012 Joint production volume and the proportion of domestic box 
office earned by joint production films10  
Year 
Production Volume 
Joint 
Productions  
as a 
proportion of 
domestic 
films 
Box Office Revenue 
(Billion) 
Joint 
productions’ 
box office as a 
proportion of 
domestic films’ 
box office  
Joint 
Productions  
Domestic 
Films 
Coproduction 
Films  
Domestic 
Films  
2012 58 653 8.9% 3.77 8.27 45.6% 
2011 62 558 11.1% 2.96 7.0 42.3% 
2010 51 500 10.2% 3.75 5.73 65.4% 
2009 35 450 7.8% 2.61 3.51 74.4% 
2008 47 406 11.6% 2.06 2.69 76.6% 
2007 40 402 11.6% 0.92 1.8 51.1% 
2006 40 330 10% 0.98 1.44 68.1% 
2005 41 260 15.8% 0.61 1.23 50% 
2004 43 212 20.3% 0.59 0.83 71.1% 
2003 45 140 32.1% 0.26 0.4 65% 
2002 18 100 18% 0.35 0.387 90.4% 
Joint production also has become the major means for Chinese films to access international 
markets. As mentioned in Chapters One and Two, nearly all the export film earnings in China 
are from joint productions, as shown in table 3.5 below. Between 2006 and 2010, foreign 
sales revenue of joint productions also increased dramatically. In 2010, forty-six out of forty-
seven exported films were joint productions. In 2011, although the total foreign sales revenue 
decreased, joint productions (50) were still dominant in the export market (52 in total). By 
June 2012, the number of joint productions numbered fifteen out of the twenty-one exported 
films (Zhan 2012:40). 
 
                                                            
10 Includes: films that gained approval to be screened in that year but  had not yet been screened, as well as films 
that were cofinanced and coproduced by Chinese and foreign partners, but had not yet applied for coproduction 
status, and were  screened in China. 
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Table 3.5: 2006-2010 Foreign sales revenue of joint productions 
Year 
Foreign Sales Revenue 
of Chinese Films 
(Billion RMB) 
Foreign Sales Revenue of 
Joint Productions (Billion 
RMB) 
Foreign Sales Revenue of Joint 
Productions as a Proportion of  
Chinese films 
2010  3.517  3.516  99.97%  
2009  2.759  2.677  97%  
2008  2.528  2.402  95.10%  
2007 2.02  1.94  96%  
2006  1.91  1.124  58.80%  
3.5 Coproduction Model 
(1) Primarily invested and produced by mainland China. Partially invested, and partial to no 
creativity and production contribution made by overseas (including Hong Kong). 
Examples are Hero (ying xiong 2002)，House of Flying Daggers (shimian maifu2004)，
Curse of the Golden Flower (mancheng jindai huangjin jia 2006)，Kekexili: Mountain 
Patrol (keke xili 2004), Aftershock  (tangshan dadi zhen 2010), The Assembly (jijie hao 
2007), If You Are the One (feicheng wurao 2008),  Let The Bullets Fly (rang zidan fei 
2010)，Painted Skin  (huapi 2 2012)，The Last Supper (wang de shengyan 2012)，Back 
to 1942 (yijiu sier 2012). 
(2)  Primarily invested, and partial to no creativity and production contribution made by 
mainland China. Primarily produced by overseas. Examples are: Flying Swords of 
Dragon Gate (longmen feijia 2011), A Simple Life (taojie 2011), A Battle of Wits 
(mogong 2006), Perhaps Love (ruguo ai 2005),  The Warlords (touming zhuang 2007), 
Bodyguards and Assassins (shiyue weicheng2009), Dragon (wuxia 2011), The Guillotines 
(xue dizi2012), Ip Man 2 (yewen 2 2010). 
(3) Primarily invested in by overseas company. Primarily created and produced by mainland 
China. Examples are: Warriors of Heaven and Earth (tiandi yingxiong 2003), Crazy 
Stone (fengkuang de shitou2006), Desires of the Heart (taohua yun 2008), Disney High 
School Musical: China (gewu qingchun2010) 
(4) Primarily invested in and created by overseas company. Partially invested and produced 
by mainland China. Examples are: Love in The Buff (chunjiao yu zhiming 2012), The 
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Bullet Vanishes (xiaoshi de zidan 2012), The Viral Factor (nizhan 2012), Rob-B-Hood 
(baobei jihua 2006), Kung Fu Hustle (gongfu 2004), Karate Kid (gongfu meng2012),  
The Forbidden Kingdom (gongfu zhiwang2008), The Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon 
Emperor (munaiyi 3 2008),  The Children of Huang Shi or The Children on the Silk Road 
(huangshi de haizi 2008), Snow Flower and the Secret Fan (xuehua mishan 2011), Man 
of Tai Chi (taiji xia 2013) 
(5) Large scale hybrid production. 
This model usually includes capital from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
overseas. Also the production of the film is contributed to by several parties. The 
formation of this model is mainly caused by a market factor. For example, the production 
of Red Cliff (chibi 2009), which cost 85 million USD, was invested in by 16 parties, from 
domestic and overseas. Even for some films with strong political propaganda, such as The 
Founding of a Republic (jianguo daye 2009) and The Founding of a Party (jiandang 
weiye 2011), which were primarily a result of domestic funding, the number of 
coproducers, including both domestic and overseas, was over 10 and 40 respectively.  
Some investors have established solid and stable partnerships over many years of cooperation, 
have become the major contributor to joint productions. Examples are partnerships between 
Beijing New Pictures and Edko Film Limited, between Huayi Brothers and Media Asia 
Group, Universe, Emperor Motion Pictures, Columbia Pictures Film Production Asia, 
between BONA Film Group and Media Asia Group, Emperor Motion Pictures, Focus Films, 
Film Workshop, between SMI Corporation and Morgan Chen Pictures, Applause Pictures 
(Zhan 2012) 
 In Chapter Two, I discussed how the booming Chinese film market, import quota restriction 
and revenue sharing mechanism fostered foreign partners to hunt for more production 
opportunities. In this chapter ,by looking at Chinese coproduction history and the status of 
coproduction in China, we can see that joint production is a viable way for China to promote 
its film industry and to develop, or from the point of film ‘going out’, the government’s soft 
power deployment. Cooperation is a way to learn about the market and to acquire skills. By 
collaboration or joint production, China’s film industry has moved away from low cost low 
value production to a high value chain by learning and sharing knowledge, as Keane 
(2013:80) points out, in China’s cultural innovation timeline model.   
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Chapter 4 Coproducing with China 
This chapter examines the structure, systems and incentives developed in China to enact and 
facilitate coproductions. I begin by showing why coproductions are favoured as a means of 
industry development. In the next section I describe how they are approved, and examine the 
roles and powers of the various official bodies. The chapter concludes by balancing the 
advantages of coproduction with the challenges for Chinese and foreign parties, and for the 
Chinese government. In particular, I discuss film censorship policy in China and the 
challenges it sets for coproduction. In this section I return to the themes of cultural proximity 
and soft power competition that frame my thesis. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, international coproduction is the preferred form of 
collaboration in film, TV and animation industries for both the Chinese government and 
Chinese filmmakers because it offers the chance for China to learn how to break out of its 
domestic market. Knowledge transfer and market success go hand in hand, but they are by no 
means guaranteed. The cultural and strategic goals of the Chinese government and the 
privileged access to the Chinese market that coproductions provide to foreign parties are the 
two sides of the coproduction coin. But the different interests and objectives that are at stake 
bring with them the high likelihood of compromises, cultural misunderstandings and failure. 
The desire for producers to gain larger audiences fuelled the growth of coproductions in the 
region from the early 2000s (Chua 2012). The general manager of Warner Village had an 
optimistic outlook for Chinese film industry development. He said that ‘the future is bright 
for coproductions that tap global financing and creative resources from Asia’ (interviewed by 
Michael Curtin: 2007). Others have made similar comments in recent years. Mike Walsh, a 
film scholar says, ‘International coproduction is a theme on everybody’s lips when they talk 
of Chinese cinema’ (Walsh 2012: 310).  
Thanks to the Chinese government’s desire to compete in regional ‘soft power competition’ 
(Chua 2012), policies for coproductions and media industry joint ventures have become more 
flexible. Big players from all over the world, such as Hong Kong’s Media Asia and Edko 
Film, News Corp, Warner Bros and Columbia-Asia, all have joint ventures in mainland China 
(Chua 2012, Yeh 2010). This list keeps growing, with the involvement of major Japanese and 
South Korean screen players. According to Yeh (2010: 198) ‘pan-Asian cinema is now 
fulfilled via partnerships with state-sanctioned Chinese companies’. This has been made 
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possible because of the apparent alignment of the Chinese government’s desire to advance 
Chinese cultural soft power and the desire of foreign parties to gain greater access to the 
Chinese market. The door to China is opening wider for foreign media, but success is still not 
guaranteed. 
4.1 The incentives for Chinese involvement in coproduction 
For Chinese filmmakers, gaining access to the partner’s market is an important incentive, 
especially in Sino-US coventures. The US is the biggest market in the world and China not 
only wants to gain market access but also benefit from the US’s global distribution system. 
However, nowadays, financial pooling, which Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn (1997) argue is 
one of the most important advantages of coproduction, is no longer the dominant attraction 
for Chinese partners. As the Chief Representative of the China Office for the Motion Picture 
Association (MPA) William Feng stated at the APSA MPA Film Financing Forum in 
Brisbane in December 2013:  
If you talked about cofinancing movies five years ago in China, people would come to 
you and say 'we need money, we need investors’. But if you talk to the real players in 
China these days, the story will be 'we don't need money, we need good projects'; the 
need for money always goes after the need for good project and the transfer of skills 
and expertise (Feng 2013).  
Feng said that some producers go to the US to obtain funding because they can not find local 
partners. But Feng clearly indicated that this is the wrong approach now. Feng said that if a 
project could not find Chinese partners or investors, he doubted its ability to succeed at the 
box office. The CEO of Huayi Brothers, Wang Zhongjun, agrees, commenting at a Sino-
Europe film coproduction forum that the Chinese film industry does not lack money. He says, 
‘If it is a good story, money will be there in a minute’. The issue, Wang said, is rather the 
‘desperate need for talent’ (Wang: 2011). 
In addition, learning from partners is a very important motivation for Chinese companies to 
look for production opportunities. Chinese companies anticipate learning from Hollywood 
and other filmmakers about creativity and what makes a good screen story, as well as film 
production, marketing and general management skills and financial and legal best practices. 
One of the advantages of coproduction – cultural goals – is taken seriously by the Chinese 
government and Chinese companies. As I outlined in Chapter One, coproduction is a strategy 
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employed by the Chinese government to promote Chinese culture going out, to increase 
China’s cultural presence globally and, eventually, to enhance China’s soft power and build a 
better national image. 
Foreign parties’ production of film and television dramas is encouraged by the Chinese 
government, but all foreign entities must seek an approved Chinese partner. The importance 
of finding a good local partner was emphasised by William Feng in the Film Financing 
Forum on December, 2013: 
Mostly, those coproductions that can have certain degree of success in the 
Chinese market are those movies targeting Chinese audiences. In that regard, it is 
very important for those either cofinancing or coproducing a movie to look for 
partners in China. People tell you that you can come to China, get into the market 
and then you will be the expert in that market, which I don't think is the case. If 
you want to really succeed in the market, then really look at the Chinese market 
as a source of returning your investment of your project. You need to find good 
partners… [P]artners can really help you to navigate through the market, and go 
through Chinese government censorship; [they can] help you with marketing and 
distribution. Most of the successful coproduction movies are those made between 
China and Hong Kong. The reason is because Hong Kong filmmakers were in 
China early and are very close with the mainland producers and the market. (Feng 
2013) 
As Feng points out, a foreign filmmaker entering the Chinese market must rely on their 
Chinese partner’s local knowledge in order to successfully navigate the complicated 
procedures from applying for joint production status to gaining final approval and, ultimately, 
screening in Chinese cinemas. Finding a good partner and developing relationships (guanxi) 
in China are very important. It takes lots of effort, time and money to develop guanxi. 
Although in this digital age, internet meeting is very convenient, face-to-face meeting is still 
the most effective way to build trust and relationships, particularly in China. Because of this, 
most joint productions today are based on functional networks built in the past, as I will 
illustrate in the case study chapters (Chapters Five, Six and Seven).  
There are currently twenty state-owned film studios designated as qualified film production 
entities with permanent Film Production Permits. Private entities have been tightly regulated 
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in this area. In June 2003, the SARFT gave two private film producers Coproduction Permits 
and allowed them to directly participate in Chinese-foreign film production, namely the 
Beijing New Picture Film Co. and Beijing Huayi Brothers & Taihe Film Investment Co. Ltd. 
If other private film production companies in China wish to coproduce, they have to apply for 
a temporary Film Production Permit (single film) from the SARFT and then obtain a Sino-
Foreign Cooperative Film Production Permit. All activities are overseen by the CFCC and 
must be approved by the SARFT. The production contract is signed by the parties and the 
CFCC (Chang, Wan and Qu 2003:158-161). On paper, any Chinese company with a film 
production licence has the right to take part in production with foreign companies. In reality, 
except for those state-owned and large private film companies, due diligence is required for 
foreigners to decide whether their partner is qualified.  
4.2 Regulating coproductions in China   
In China, the authorities directly responsible for regulating international collaborations are 
the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) and the China Film 
Coproduction Corporation (CFCC). SARFT, incorporated within The General Administration 
of Press and Publication in 2013, now called State Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT). SARFT, under the guidance of the Department of 
Publicity (DoP) of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), is mainly responsible for film 
production, distribution and export, and also for implementing policies formulated by the 
CCP. The CFCC is authorised by SARFT and is responsible for the administration of Sino-
foreign cooperative films and for providing coordination and other services. (Chang, Wan 
and Qu 2003:157). Despite all the changes, the institutional nature and its purpose have not 
altered.  
In the whole process, the CFCC will intervene twice, approving the script before production 
and making sure that the finished film has adhered to the script. As Walsh (2012: 306) points 
out: ‘this can cause a lack of certainty among film-makers as their realization of the script 
may draw in problematic elements’. CFCC mainly reviews the script (Chinese translation), 
the financial status of the foreign coproducer and the basic structure of the project (the ratio 
of personnel crew and the ratio of investment and the location for production work) 
(Alderson 2011a). The script is also reviewed by CFCC and SARFT for compliance with 
China’s complex censorship rules. In most cases, changes to the shooting script are required 
before pre-production. SARFT has the right of final approval and final cut. If the filmmakers 
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refuse to make any required changes in the final stage, it cannot be released and distributed 
either in China or anywhere else in the world (Andreacchio 2013:13). Understanding and 
adhering to what has been approved previously is very important. If the final work does not 
adhere to what has been approved, films cannot be counted and screened as domestic releases 
in China.  
Given the complexity of the whole process, well-connected and experienced local Chinese 
partners are essential. There may be millions of dollars revenue difference between an 
approved joint production and an imported quota film, or, at worst, a film may be denied 
distribution in China entirely. Figure 4.1 below shows the whole cooperation process.  
Figure 4.1: Sino-Foreign film coproduction process 
Source: Hylandslaw (2014: 5) 
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4.3 Why coproduce in China?  
The introduction of positive policies for film coproduction in recent years has seen an 
increase in this mode of production. The most important rationale for foreign parties to 
coproduce with China is financial. As Jon Landau, a producer of Avatar, said, ‘we need a 
financial reason to come. We don’t need pandas or the Great Wall’. For him, it was clear that 
the attraction of China was financial rather than cultural (Shackleton 2012 cited in Walsh 
2012). Privileged access to the huge Chinese market is the basic motivation for foreigners. 
Joint productions bypass the import quota and earn the foreign party a greater revenue 
sharing percentage.  
The other notable reason to coproduce with China is that, besides the import quota, there are 
many market access barriers set by Chinese regulators. For Hollywood (whose films 
dominate the import quota), though the booming Chinese market offers an ‘extraordinarily 
attractive and lucrative opportunity’, it also possesses ‘numerous cultural and political 
challenges that are far more exacting than other territories, making it perhaps the most 
demanding marketing environment that Hollywood has ever faced’ (Curtin, Jacks and Li 
forthcoming).  
The government film import system and distribution monopoly discussed in Chapter Two is 
the first hurdle. About 200 films are produced by the major Hollywood studios annually, but 
only a small number of them can access the Chinese market. CFG controls the release dates 
and length of theatrical runs of foreign films, which can impede the ability of the US 
producer to exploit the full value of the film (MPAA 2012:18). The Chinese government 
requires that more than two-thirds of the total annual screen time in China should be reserved 
for domestic films, and at least 50 per cent of total box office revenue should be earned by 
domestic films. CFG runs an opaque process of overseeing release dates for all foreign films, 
controlling their theatrical runs to maintain the required balance between domestic and 
foreign films. During peak seasons, blackout periods, or Domestic Film Protection Month 
(guochan dianying baohu yue) are imposed to advantage domestic films. In these periods, no 
foreign films can be screened. The timing of these periods is not fixed, lasting from several 
weeks to several months, normally in the most profitable summer months. Although officials 
have never admitted that such a measure exists, no revenue sharing films have been released 
in mainland cinema during the protection month. An MPAA report (2012:18) indicated that 
‘the Chinese government has historically decreed “black-out periods” during which no new 
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revenue-sharing foreign films may be released, to prevent competition against Chinese films 
released during the same period’.  
In 2012, the domestic film box office in the first half of the year only accounted for 35 per 
cent of gross revenue (Cremin 2012) due to the increase in the import quota following the 
signing of the Sino-US MOU. A long late summer blackout period was imposed in that year 
to balance the box office and to achieve the unwritten government goal of 50 per cent; this 
left very limited time for releasing all the remaining import quota films after the blackout 
period (Curtin, Jacks and Li forthcoming). In 2012, two Hollywood blockbusters, The 
Amazing Spider-Man (chaofan zhizhu xia 2012) and The Dark Knight Rises (bianfu xia heian 
qishi jueqi 2012), were released in China on the same day, August 27th (M, Li: 2012). In 
June 2013, the releases of Jurassic Park 3D (zhuluoji gongyuan 2013) and Fast and Furious 
6 (sudu yu jiqing 6 2013) were postponed to make way for the homemade blockbuster Switch 
(tianji fuchun shan jutu 2013). The release of the popular American 3D animation movie was 
suddenly interrupted due to contractual reasons, while domestic animations Kuiba (2013) and 
The Adventures of Sinbad (xinbada lixianji 2013) began their theatrical release. These 
developments further increase the attractiveness of joint productions for foreign parties. Since 
joint productions are treated as domestic films, they can be screened during Domestic Film 
Protection Month and will not be removed from cinemas like Hollywood blockbusters were.  
Joint productions can also benefit from the range of mechanisms used by Chinese authorities 
to support domestic films. The Chinese government has funded dozens of film corporations, 
such as the national China Film Group, the provincial Shanghai Film Group, and Beijing 
Film Group. The National Film Development Funds (NFDF) or China Film Special Funds 
were set up in 1991 to support film industry development by collecting five per cent from 
every film’s theatrical gross income as special funds for supporting local film production and 
theatre construction (Cain 2012b). In the first eight years of the fund’s establishment, the 
NFDF (National Film Development Funds) financed 202 films directly.  
As briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, NFDF has introduced several notices to encourage 
theatres to screen domestic films. The more domestic films’ box office revenues constitute of 
the total annual gross of a theatre chain, the more money will be reimbursed by the fund 
committee to the theatre. 
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Table 4.1: NFDF policy 
The domestic films' box office revenues /the total annual 
gross of a theatre chain 
Money reimbursed by the fund 
committee 
>=50% 100% 
45%-50% 80% 
<45% (if domestic films revenue more than last year's) 50% 
 
Table 4.2: NFDF policy 
Domestic Film Box office Gross (million) Reward(million) 
IMAX 25-100 
1 
3D 50-100 
IMAX or 3D 
100-300 2 
300-500 5 
>500 10 
In terms of tax incentives, foreign producers are required to pay twenty per cent income tax 
of revenue gained from the Chinese market. For joint productions, the Chinese Tax Authority 
will cover ten per cent of the total income tax so that they pay only ten per cent. In addition, 
joint productions are free from custom duties. Also, joint productions are allowed to compete 
for the Chinese Movie Award (huabiao jiang), which is the only government award in China 
and which has a cash prize of nearly 1million RMB. In 2009, SARFT implemented measures 
for rewarding domestic films that are exported. A joint production counted as a domestic film 
can also receive a proportion of that reward based on its overseas revenue. And, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, China has also signed many treaties or agreements with other countries that 
provide privileged access to the Chinese market. 
4.4 Balancing the challenges of coproduction in China  
The challenges of coproducing in China take two forms. First there are challenges raised by 
the process of production itself, such as ensuring suitable content and obtaining Chinese 
finance. Second, there are issues arising from the particularities of the Chinese film industry, 
such as lack of completion guarantors and collection agents and government censorship.  
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Content 
One of the concerns about international joint ventures is that they end up being made to 
appease each party (Hoskins McFadyen and Fin 1997:100). How have filmmakers and, in 
particular, producers learned to avoid the traps of ‘Euro-puddings’ (Finney 2010: 75)? This is 
the question that Chinese and foreign parties need to consider. Some collaborations are East-
West puddings, trying to appease audiences from different markets but actually appealing to 
neither. Failure can be seen everywhere. Shanghai (diehai fengyun 2010), an American 
mystery or thriller film directed by Mikael Håfström, starring John Cusack, Gong Li and 
Chow Yun-Fat, flopped in both China and the US despite featuring major stars popular in 
both markets. Up to the present day, there are few films that have been successful in both 
Western and Chinese markets. The film Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (wohu canglong 
2002) was the highest-grossing foreign-language film ever in the US; however, it was not 
well received in China, being perceived as a cultural chop suey catering to Western audiences 
(Miller 2005:322). Rosen (2010:52) points out that ‘films such as Crouching Tiger were not 
seen as authentically Chinese by local audiences – it is striking that China, Japan, and Hong 
Kong accounted for only three per cent of Crouching Tiger’s global sale’.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, a local, authentic Chinese story is usually not widely accessible 
for international audiences. There are three kinds of audiences for Chinese films: first, the 
domestic audience, which understands themes and references naturally; second, the diasporic 
or overseas Chinese audiences, who are geographically distant but may still be emotionally 
attached to the content; and third, Western audiences, who may not have the cultural 
understanding to appreciate Chinese content, especially local comedy like Feng Xiaogang’s 
films or Chinese historic epics.  
As William Feng (2013) observed at the APSA MPA Film Financing Forum in Brisbane, 
there are two types of Chinese-foreign joint ventures: one that takes the Chinese market as its 
primary market; and another that looks to both the Chinese and international markets. ‘So far,’ 
Feng said, ‘we have seen very little success in the second type.’ Most Sino-Hong Kong films 
have been successful in the Chinese market, not only because of cultural proximity and 
earlier access to the Chinese market, but also because Hong Kong producers target the 
mainland market and try to produce local films that meet local tastes. For Sino-US and Sino-
Australia coproduction, it is easier to go to the latter type and mix the cultural ingredients 
together to appeal to audiences from both sides. It is not merely because of the desire of the 
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producer to earn more money, but also because of the criteria of China’s official 
coproduction or treaty conditions. At the Shanghai International Film Festival in 2011 the 
director, He Ping, and the CEO of DMG Entertainment Group, Dan Mintz, suggested doing 
away with the concept of coproduction and letting filmmakers have more freedom to create 
(Zhou 2011). In the following case study chapters, especially in Sino-US and Sino-Australia 
coproduction, we will see how Chinese rules and, in the Sino-Australia case, treaty rules from 
both sides, constrained creativity and generated challenges for filmmakers. However, the 
rules represent the will of the government. When the Chinese government seeks to project 
soft power through film, it is highly unlikely to allow full freedom to filmmakers to pursue 
their own interests.  
The theories of cultural proximity and cultural discount can be used to further explain this 
phenomenon. Cultural proximity, as mentioned in Chapter Two, is a term used by Joseph 
Straubhaar (1991) to argue that audiences generally prefer films, TV and content that are 
culturally familiar. Therefore, local producers enjoy more competitive advantages through 
‘having a greater degree of cultural proximity to their audiences than the producers of “global” 
media content have in such local and regional markets’ (Straubhaar 1991 in Flew 2007:126). 
Tracey (1985), in his critique of US products dominating global television, argues that local 
audiences generally prefer local content. This can probably explain why Chinese films can 
still survive in fierce competition with Hollywood imports and why Sino-Hong Kong joint 
productions have had a long history of success. As CEO of Le Vision Picture Zhang Zhao has 
remarked, ‘there are two kind of content that Hollywood can’t compete with. One is local 
comedy; the other is the “social hot topic” unique to China’ (Zhang 2012). Film scholar Zhu 
Ying (2010: 206) puts this more formally:  
The consensus was that the national/regional film industry was able to maintain 
its market only by concentrating on the production of films with unique 
national/regional characteristics, including certain genres traditionally 
associated with it. As such, only films of Chinese characteristics/identity, 
which Hollywood would not be capable of making, could compete with 
Hollywood for a domestic market share. The issue of Chinese cultural identity 
was revisited, albeit from an economic perspective. What counted as Chinese 
cultural identity remained vague; but traces of Chinese tradition, Chinese ways 
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of thinking, and/or Chinese aesthetics were suggested to be essential in 
determining such an identity. 
Cultural discount, which I mentioned in Chapter Two also, refers to the problems of 
translating movies and audio-visual works when they cross borders. Some elements that 
make sense to one audience do not make sense to another. This is why Lost in Thailand can 
make a box office splash (RMB1.2 billion) in China but achieve only $60,000 in the US 
market. The same example is The Hangover. Although it is popular with Western audiences, 
it has unfamiliar cultural elements for the Chinese market. Hence, blockbusters from 
Hollywood and films aimed at global markets tend to choose content with more general value.  
International coproductions, especially official coproductions, unavoidably involve 
compromises in order to coordinate the ratio of creative and financial input for both parties 
and to navigate the complex system of regulation. It is already difficult to uphold cultural 
specificity, national identity and creative integrity when compromises may have to be made 
to assure joint financing. The situation becomes more complex when the screenplay confronts 
China’s strict content censorship processes and simultaneously tries to cater to the different 
tastes of Western and Eastern viewers.  
Finance and underdeveloped industry mechanism 
‘There are two compelling economic drivers that related directly to coproduction: the hard 
costs of making and delivering a film; and the issues of recoupment of all costs’ (Finney 
2010:75). There are many ways to raise a budget for film production in China and these  have 
been discussed in Chapter Two.  
China does not lack ways to raise finance. As the Chief Representative of the China Office 
for the Motion Picture Association (MPA), William Feng, states above, real players in China 
do not lack money to pursue film projects, what they need is good projects. The challenge for 
foreigners is that they cannot access financial resources in China directly, only through its 
Chinese partner. As the producer and president of the Film and Television Academy at 
Shanghai Theatre Academy, Sherwood Hu (Hu Xuehua), says of his own experience about 
raising money in APSA MPA Film Financing Forum in Brisbane in 2013: 
the script including the whole package of the project is the most important 
thing for financing in China. Good script and package will be very appealing to 
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investors. The second thing is ‘communication’. Communicating with investors 
and establishing a good relationship always plays a crucial role in negotiating a 
successful business in China. If you would like to make a film and get money 
from people in China, the first thing to do is eating and drinking together. If 
you could drink, the possibility of getting money increased. The third thing is 
to understand China’s censorship system and know how to make your film 
work in China (Hu 2013).  
Finally, even when the film appears in China, it is still not a time for celebration. Collecting 
and exporting revenue remains problematic for several reasons. There are no trusted 
intermediaries for film in China, such as collection agents, escrow account holders or trustees. 
The foundations of international film finance are not well-developed. Completion guarantors 
are a relatively new concept in China. This situation means that foreign parties have to rely 
on Chinese parties to collect revenue; however, the trust problem persists. In addition, tax 
complexity is a serious issue. Even in developed countries, taxation of international film is 
difficult. In China, this problem has been magnified because of a new tax code, a non-
convertible currency and SAFE (State Administration of Foreign Exchange) involvement. 
The foreign party has to rely on their Chinese partner to pay them after income tax has been 
paid on gross receipts to Chinese tax authorities.  
CFCC is responsible for dealing with approvals in the production process, content and 
censorship, but is not involved in any taxation and distribution issues. The participation of 
completion guarantors, distributors, sub-distributors and collection agents in projects is not 
prohibited, but ignored. A bank account is opened and controlled by both parties jointly. In 
essence, ‘the coproduction partnership is its own collection agent manager’, Mathew 
Alderson (2011b) observes that it is better for foreign producers to let Chinese coproducers 
take Chinese distribution rights ‘in return for an up-front payment because the back-end of 
the receipts is usually just a mirage’. However, alongside the tremendous growth of the 
Chinese market, more and more productions are specifically targeting the Chinese market in 
order for foreign producers to earn a greater share of revenue from the Chinese market.  
China’s film censorship policy  
Although the commercialization of Chinese film and media industries is happening rapidly, 
‘power relations between the political, social and economic spheres’ are changing much more 
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slowly (Hemelryk and Keane 2002:3). As discussed in Chapter One, the ideological control 
of cinema in China is still most obvious in strict film policies and censorship. Censorship 
presents challenges not only to foreign coproducers, but to all filmmakers working in China. 
The key point of working in China film industry is the need to work inside a system that 
expects those industry people especially filmmakers to work and create not only in 
accordance to the market needs, but also in accordance to the state’s need to retain 
ideological and political control. 
 
According to Xiao (2014:110-119) and Pang (2011:209), film censorship has a long history 
in China dating back to the late Qing period (the early 1900s). The first film regulations 
introduced by the CCP were the ‘Five Temporary Methods of Administrating the Film 
Industry from the Ministry of Culture’ in 1950 (Pang 2011:212). Heavy political pressure was 
placed on the film sector during the Maoist era. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms brought change, 
and saw the adoption of a new discourse of media industry policy binding media to the 
economy. The transformation of film from solely a propaganda tool to a form of 
entertainment has been facilitated by the government. However, political concerns still exist, 
as Pang (2011:216) points out: 
The state continues to exercise a direct centralized control on film, preventing any 
seeds of political destabilization from sprouting while maintaining a puritanical 
culture that minimizes the depiction of such ‘debauched’ cultural phenomena as 
pornography, violence and corruption.  
 
As discussed above, the major censorship of film happens twice: first during the preshooting 
review, and second before approval is granted by the major censorship body SARFT for films 
to be screened. But many other administrative units, such as the Ministry of State Security, 
the Ministry of Public Security, the Central Propaganda Department (the Ministry of Central 
Publicity), the Ministry of Information Industry as well as the General Administration of 
Customs, can also intervene, especially when films deal with topics including state security, 
military, diplomacy, ethnicity, religion, legislature or historical celebrity (Pang 2011:216-
217).  
 
The censorship policy can make film production in China full of uncertainty. The uncertainty 
not only come from the intervention of authorities as discussed above, but also from the 
vague criteria. There is no consistent standard; content that is approved in one work may be 
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censored in others. Further, even if a film is granted a screening licence, it is not guaranteed 
to reach Chinese cinemas, as the Rules (1997) state that ‘in special circumstances, the 
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television may make a decision to cease the screening of, or to 
cut, films that have already been issued the Film Public Screening Permit’. Most of the time, 
this is because scenes in the film or the name of the film have been changed without 
resubmitting for censorship after the screen permit has been granted. For example, the Silver 
Ornaments (yinshi 2005) was banned after its theatrical opening due to the accidental 
screening of an uncut version containing nudity. The vagueness and uncertainty of China’s 
censorship regulations still creates considerable risk for coproductions. In a country where 
the completion guarantor system is not fully established, these kinds of risks bring more 
concern for foreign producers looking to work in China.  
 
Several types of film genre including horror and ghost film, sci-fi film, are subject to much 
stricter review than others. These genres were suppressed during Mao’s Cultural Revolution 
and afterward. As Pang (2011:208) observes, although Chinese people love ghost stories, the 
state just not allowed ghost films to be made because ‘anti-superstition is still a prominent 
film policy’. He argues that an anti-superstition film policy is ‘idiosyncratically Chinese…In 
contrast to discourses on violence and pornography, where a direct connection to society is 
often assumed, these genres do not provoke the same moral panic or recourse to 
censorship…The idea of ‘media effect’ is not applied to ghost films’ (2011:208). However, 
ghost films and some sci-fi films are regarded as superstition in China. The code of ghost or 
sci-fi figure or content, as viewed by the state, can be highly allegorical, and thus harder to 
control. These genres ‘precipitate a variety of conflicting discourses in CCP governance’ 
(Pang 2011: 208). For coproducers aiming to attract a global audience, sci-fi, as well as 
horror films, are two of the most important types of genre in terms of films’ international 
tradability. But Chinese film censorship policy narrows down the choice of genre type for 
coproduction. At least when it comes to these two genres, more caution should be expected 
by filmmakers. But despite such strict media censorship, some filmmakers will continue to 
push the limits of approved practice.  
 
In Chapter Three, I examined the various types of coproduction as a viable way forward and 
as a way to upgrade the industry value chain through knowledge and skills transfer. This 
chapter further shows that for Chinese filmmakers the main attraction is learning how to 
compete and produce outside China. For non-Chinese, it is access to the Chinese market that 
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is the principal motivation. Then there are the Chinese government’s cultural goals, such as 
increasing international and domestic soft power. This is the rationale for government 
assistance, but it is a sword that cuts both ways; it allows foreigners access to China while 
assisting Chinese to ‘go out’. In this trade off there are compromises, cultural 
misunderstandings and many failures, and these will be discussed in the case studies in the 
following three chapters. 
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Chapter 5 China-Hong Kong Coproduction 
Media scholar Chua Beng-Huat (2012) argues that joint production between mainland China 
and Hong Kong is a win-win situation for both parties. For Hong Kong, it releases the 
financial resource pressure, especially in the production of blockbusters. For China, it 
introduces creativity and vitality into its production of pop culture, which ‘had hitherto been 
laden with staid and unrealistic themes of socialist selflessness in the interest of the masses 
and the nation’ (Chua 2012:139). But this win-win situation is fraught and complex. I argue 
in this chapter that Sino-Hong Kong joint production contributes to the development of Hong 
Kong film industry while accelerating the demise of the cultural identity of Hong Kong film. 
This argument is evaluated from the perspective of Chinese film industry and the perspective 
of large Hong Kong film companies. However, independent filmmakers, local talents 
working in Hong Kong’s creative industries (in particular film industry) and Hong Kong film 
audiences may argue the opposite.  
This chapter will address the background of the Hong Kong film industry to see why it needs 
to coproduce with China. Then I investigate the relative advantages of collaboration with 
Hong Kong. I will mostly focus on the period after the introduction of Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which is a broad economic partnership arrangement 
between the mainland and Hong Kong, with the film industry a small part of it. In order to do 
so, I look at the development of the Hong Kong-China coproduction relationship, which is 
the longest and richest, historically, between China and any other territory. Finally, the 
chapter looks at how Hong Kong cooperates with China, through an analysis of Peter Chan’s 
and Johnnie To’s experience of working in China.  
As previously discussed, the huge Chinese market is attracting media producers from all over 
the world to take advantage of the rising market opportunities. Hong Kong production 
companies made a very early entry by producing television dramas specifically for mainland 
viewers and increasing the number of jointly produced films with Chinese media entities 
since the 1980s (Ma 2006). Moreover, Hong Kong has the status of Special Administration 
Region (SAR) of China, which, coupled with its geo-cultural proximity with the mainland, 
provides privileged access to the Chinese market for Hong Kong filmmakers.  
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Hong Kong enjoys a privileged position due to the 2003 Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) that granted Hong Kong products and services easier access to the 
mainland China market (Yeh 2010:193). After the introduction of this agreement Hong Kong 
films were reclassified from imported to domestic films, and many Hong Kong film 
producers ventured to the mainland, mostly to Beijing. In 2004, the Chinese media reported 
the phenomena as the ‘moving north group’ (jiti beishang) (Dong 2012:185).  
5.1 Hong Kong film industry background 
As a former British colony, Hong Kong has had more political and economic freedom than 
the mainland and Taiwan to develop its film industry. The cinema of Hong Kong in its 
heyday was iconic and produced many stars (Chan and Fung 2011: 77). During the 1980s and 
early 1990s, Hong Kong film dominated Sinophone cinema in the Asia-Pacific region. It not 
only fully occupied the local market, but also drew substantial profits from traditional 
overseas markets such as Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan 
(Leung and Chan 1997; Wong and Lee 2009; Wong 2003). It reached even further 
internationally, especially through action cinema. This built up a strong cult following and 
created a unique cultural identity that was widely embraced and imitated.  
Hong Kong film production reached a peak in the early 1990s (see table below). Over the 
next decade the industry underwent a decline, the lowest point being 1997, the year that the 
colony was handed back to China. However, the seeds of decline were sown in the 1980s, the 
period considered as Hong Kong films’ golden era. According to Teo, the boom times led to 
overproduction, which was attended by a drop in quality control and an exhaustion of 
overused formulas (Teo 2008:341-342; see also Yang, 2003). In 1997, the Asian financial 
crisis decimated regional markets and the situation went from bad to worse (Curtin 1999). At 
the same time, other external factors, such as Hollywood studios’ aggressive push into Asian 
markets and the rise of other Asian film industries such as Korea, Japan and Taiwan, 
heightened the challenge to Hong Kong’s regional supremacy (Wong and Lee 2009; Wong 
2003). Rampant video piracy through East Asia and China at that time was a major 
contributor to the decline of the Hong Kong film industry in the 1990s (Teo 2008:343), while 
internal developments, such as shrinking investment capital, an exodus of talent and 
continuous decline in box office revenues (Chan and Fung 2011: 77-78), also contributed to 
the fading glamour of “Hollywood East”.  
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Figure 5.1: Hong Kong film production 1980–2005 
 
Sources: Film Biweekly/City Entertainment, HKTDC 
Curtin (2003: 202–205) proposes the concept of media capital –‘powerful geographic centres 
that tap human, creative, and financial resources within their spheres of circulation in order to 
fashion products that serve the distinctive needs of their audiences’. He highlighted the 
significant role of Hong Kong as a media capital ‘where things come together and, 
consequently, where the generation and circulation of new mass culture forms become 
possible’.  
The impact of Hong Kong’s handover to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 on the film industry 
was profound (Curtin 2011: 6-10). Anxieties concerning the Chinese government’s strict 
scrutiny of media content and restrictions on genre led some creative talent to seek work 
abroad. As figure 5.1 shows, the industry subsequently entered into ‘a cycle of 
hyperproduction’, with production volume peaking in 1999 at 150. But these low quality 
products alienated loyal audiences both at home and overseas. Curtin (2011: 6–7) indicates 
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that this also caused piracy problems, as consumers were increasingly reluctant to spend 
money on films of unknown quality at the box office or on DVD and sought out pirated 
versions instead. In addition, the unclear censorship policy of the Beijing government 
fostered ‘a culture of self-censorship’ among many producers that further alienated audiences, 
especially those in Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia.  
A major turning point for many in the Hong Kong industry was reached when they engaged 
in a rejuvenating strategy of Pan-Asian production, which considered the growing Chinese 
market as the panacea for the industry rather than as a threat (Szeto and Chen 2012:118; Teo 
2008:343 ). The trend was to target and further expand into the mainland market by 
coproduction.  This led to ‘fundamental changes in the structure and organization of Hong 
Kong cultural production’ (Chan and Fung 2011: 77-78). This need for what Chan and Fung 
call ‘hybridization with Mainland Chinese culture’ (2011: 87) is an irreversible trend. It is 
particularly acute at the current historical juncture because Hong Kong’s audio-visual 
industry is in decline; its small domestic market means that it has to explore markets beyond 
its territories. Greater China, as a proven market, definitely is the largest potential partner. 
Curtin (2011:8-9) has pointed out that the PRC government also has ‘deftly wielded the 
carrot and the stick in order to tame the industry and bring it into the fold of nationally-
sanctioned media institutions’. Accordingly the Hong Kong film industry has gone through a 
systematic process of resinicization since the 1990s.   
5.2 Coproduction History before CEPA   
Coproduction is not a new solution for the Hong Kong film industry. Hong Kong has a long 
history of cooperation with the Mainland even before the 1990s. In the 1960s, film 
production companies in mainland China such as Pearl River Film Company, Beijing Film 
Studio, and Tianma Film Studio collaborated with left-wing cinema11 organisations in Hong 
Kong, including Great Wall Movie Enterprises Ltd, Fenghuang Motion Picture Company, 
Sun Luen Film Company. They coproduced traditional operas such as Teochew opera (gao 
                                                            
11 The origin of Chinese left-wing cinema began in the 1930s when an overwhelming number of left-wing films 
first appeared, politicized by Mao Zedong during the Yan’an period in the 1940s, peaked in the creation of the 
‘model operas’ during the Cultural Revolution from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, and concluded in the 
middle and late 1980s when the ‘fifth generation’ directors started to criticize the Chinese Communist party in 
their films (Shen 2013). During 1930s, a group of film makers (left-wing filmmakers) such as Cai Chusheng, 
Xiayan shared some common understandings about the social mission of the film medium and visions of 
modernity and nationhood, which resulted in a body of films that was coloured by a leftist orientation or 
patriotic reaction towards national disaster) (Pang 2002).  
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qinfu 1957) Dream of the Red Chamber (honglou meng 1959), and A Happy Match is Fixed 
by Heaven (hongye tishi 1959). The collaboration was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution 
(from 1966 to 1976). When the reform and opening-up policy was established in 1979, 
mainland China was eager to repair relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, and rebuild the 
nation’s image through cooperation with the outside world. Film, along with sport, was 
quickly identified as a means to achieve these ends. The China Film Coproduction 
Corporation (CFCC) was established in 1979. Later in 1981, Measures for Control over 
Imported Films (jinkou dianying guanli banfa) were issued. From that time, coproduction 
between mainland China and Hong Kong officially started (Yin and He 2009).  
Coproduction with Hong Kong after the Cultural Revolution and before the CEPA can be 
divided into three stages: the beginning stage in the early 1980s, the developing stage from 
1984–1996, and the further developing stage from 1996–2003. At the very beginning, the 
left-wing film companies in Hong Kong initiated cooperation with the mainland under the 
support and policy encouragement of the central government. In 1980, Fenghuang (Phoenix) 
Motion Picture produced Enigmatic Case (bishui hanshan duomin jin 1979), which was also 
the debut of the famous Hong Kong director Johnnie To.  It was also the first Hong Kong 
film that involved location shooting on the mainland. Also, Yun nan qi qu lu (1979) and The 
Bride with White Hair (baifa monv zhuan 1980li) were produced by Great Wall Movie 
Enterprises. In 1982, Chengzhi Liao, the vice chairman of the National People's Congress 
proposed to produce the Shaolin Temple (Shaolin si 1982) (Zhang 2012:60). The film was 
directed by Zhang Xinyan and produced by Great Wall Movie Enterprises and Sun Luen Film 
Company. These two organizations had mainland China backgrounds and engaged in the 
production of the film under the name of Chung Yuen Motion Picture. The production gained 
strong support from government agencies such as the General Administration of Sport which 
sent eighteen kung-fu professionals to work on the film. The film was very successful in the 
greater China area. In November 1982, Great Wall Movie Enterprises, Feng Huang Motion 
Picture and Sun Luen Film Company decided to merge as Sil-Metropole Organisation Ltd, a 
company still active today, based in Hong Kong (Meng Weidi 2013 in Wei Junzi 2013:69). 
At the same time, non-left wing film companies started collaborations in China. Reign behind 
a Curtain (chuilian tingzheng 1983) and Burning of the Imperial Palace (huoshao yuanming 
yuan 1983) directed by Li Han-Hsiang were regarded as the first two coproductions between 
the mainland and Hong Kong after the implementation of reform and the open policy (Zhao 
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2012). Li Han-Hsiang is regarded as the first non-left-wing producer to produce a film on the 
mainland. However, Zhao Weifang (2012:87) believes that Real Kung Fu of Shaolin (renwu 
keren 1980) which was coproduced by Hai Hua Cinema Company and Fujian Film Studio 
was the first coproduction between mainland China and a non-left wing film company in 
Hong Kong after the establishment of PR China. In addition, mainland China also assisted 
Hong Kong with the production of Boat People (touben nuhai 1982), and the Disciple Of The 
Shaolin Temple (Shaolinsi dizi 1983), Homecoming (sishui liunian 1984). The total number 
of coproductions in the 1980s reached thirty-one (Zhao 2012). 
The 1980s can be considered to be the first stage of mainland China- Hong Kong 
coproduction. Zhang Fu (2000:200) argues that at that time China generally treated this kind 
of collaboration as a political mission, so political influence was more significant than 
economic returns. Zhao (2012:87) further argues that the real purpose of the government in 
supporting coproduction can be demonstrated by the first coproduced film with a non-left-
wing film company, Real Kung Fu of Shaolin (1980). Although its director, Chi-Shao Yang, 
and leading actor, Gary Siu, were not popular in Hong Kong, the film was strongly supported 
by Liao Chengzhi, the highest level administrator at the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office (HKMAO) of the State Council. Liao not only gave full support in the administrative 
process but also restored the status of Fujian Film Studio, which had been cancelled in 1962 
due to economic difficulties. His effort smoothed the production process.  
By doing this, clear messages were sent from mainland China to the rest of the world: China 
was not going to close itself off anymore and was willing to collaborate with people or 
classes who it had never cooperated with before. Real Kung Fu of Shaolin was not as 
successful as expected. However, Zhao believes that the release of this film led to Li Han-
hsiang coproducing Burning of Imperial Palace (1983) and Reign behind a Curtain (1983) 
with mainland China. These two films turned out to be great successes in Hong Kong and 
overseas and also promoted the opening-up policy of the Chinese government as well as 
encouraging further coproductions. 
During this period, Hong Kong parties usually took the leading role in the coproduction and 
were responsible for investment and creation. On the other hand, mainland China provided 
assistance in personnel, equipment and space, and showed no ambition in relation to business. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong parties controlled distribution of the film. The 1980s was a 
prosperous period for the Hong Kong film industry. The main overseas markets for Hong 
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Kong film were in Southeast Asia during this time. Although there were some collaborations 
with mainland China, their main purpose was location shooting and to use cheap labour, and 
also to prepare the market for the future. Most of the highest profile Hong Kong film 
luminaries, such as Jackie Chan, Sammo Hung, Karl Maka, Dean Shek, Sam Hui and Sylvia 
Chang, kept their distance from coproduction films, though some major directors were 
involved. 
In 1984, the Chinese central government started to reform the economic system. The film 
industry was expected to conduct business accounting independently and to assume full 
responsibility for their profits and losses. However, at the same time, nearly all of the film 
studios in China experienced economic difficulty because of the popularity of television and 
their poor adaptive capability in the market (Ni 1994: 47). In contrast to the recession in 
China, Hong Kong’s film industry experienced its most prosperous period. From the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s the film industry contributed hundreds of millions of HK dollars per 
year (Chung  2004: 27-28). 
In such a context, Hong Kong sought to take advantage of the scenery and cheap labour of 
the mainland. The mainland began to rely on Hong Kong to produce better films; cooperation 
between Hong Kong and the mainland was therefore enhanced. Since 1989, coproduction has 
become more frequent. The number reached 50 in 1993, or one third of the total volume of 
film production in Hong Kong in that year. In the same year, coproduced films became 
dominant at the box office in China. Of the top ten grossing films in Shanghai in 1993, nine 
were coproductions: Farewell My Concubine (bawang bieji 1993), Flirting Scholar 
(tangbohu dianqiuxiang 1993), New Dragon Gate Inn (xinlongmen kezhan 1992), Once Upon 
a Time in China III (shiwang zhengba 1993), Mary from Beijing (mengxing shifen 1992), 
Raise the Red Lantern (dahong denglong gaogao gua 1991), Sword Stained with Royal Blood  
(xin bixue jian 1993), and Fist from Shaolin (shaolin haoxia zhuan 1993). 
In the 1990s, the most successful genres of coproduced films were commercial action, such 
as Once Upon a Time in China (huang feihong 1991) directed by Tsui Hark and starring Jet 
Li, and New Dragon Gate Inn (xin longmen kezhan 1992) directed by Tsui Hark. Also, there 
were some costume dramas such as The Great Conqueror's Concubine (xichu bawang 1994) 
and Temptation of a Monk (youseng 1993), as well as historical films describing early 
modern times such as Lord of East China Sea (suiyue fengyun 1993) and The Soong Sisters 
(songshi sanjie mei 1997). However, this type of film was more problematic than some other 
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genres due to the different views of history from the two sides, and due to censorship in 
China. Some gangster films also achieved good sales. For example, in The Bodyguard from 
Beijing (zhong nanhai baobiao 1994) Jet Li played a policeman from mainland China. The 
Trail (xialu yinghao 1993) directed by Zhou Xiaowen and Manfred Wong is another typical 
example. Some Chinese art films during this time won a good reputation globally, for 
example, Ashes of Time (dongxie xidu 1994), The Blue Kite (lan fengzheng 1993), Farewell 
My Concubine (bawang bieji 1993), Painting Soul (huahun 1994), In A Distant Land (zaina 
yaoyuan de defang 1993), Red Firecracker, Green Firecracker (paoda shuangdeng 1994), 
and The Wooden Man's Bride (wukui 1994). These films helped Chinese directors such as 
Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, and Wong Kar-wai gain international recognition.  
Investment in coproductions in this period still mainly came from Hong Kong parties, 
including Golden Harvest Ltd and Sil-Metropole Organisation Ltd. Some mainland film 
companies such as Shanghai Film Company and the Beijing Film Company started to invest a 
small amount of money into production. According to Yin and He (2009) Taiwanese ‘hot 
money12’ entered the industry through Hong Kong. For example, Tomson Films Co., Ltd. in 
Taiwan, using the name of Hong Kong Tomson Films, coproduced Farewell My Concubine 
(bawang bieji 1993) with mainland China. The Taiwan Scholar Film Company hired Wong 
Kar-wai to produce Ashes of Time (dongxie xidu 1994). Taiwan Scholar invested in sixteen 
films in Beijing and Hong Kong in 1994 (Yin and He: 32–33).  
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, mainland China was placed in an inferior position with 
the production experience coming from Hong Kong and investment from Taiwan. Many 
state-owned film companies engaged in coproductions by only selling the company’s name. 
This phenomenon is called ‘fake coproduction’ by Ng Seeyuen (2008) as mentioned in 
Chapter Three. Fake coproduction means investment in the coproduction came completely 
from Hong Kong, but the name of a mainland film company was still used in the film. This 
was a win-win game at that time. As many film companies on the mainland were close to 
bankruptcy when China instituted the market economy, selling their names to Hong Kong 
film companies helped them survive (Ng 2008: 80–81).  Many such fake coproductions were 
of very low quality, which inevitably had a negative influence on the reputation of 
coproductions. Overall, coproduction provided a larger market for Hong Kong films, but it 
did not change the unprofitable situation of the mainland film industry during that time. 
                                                            
12  Money from outside film industry.  
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On 25 August 1996, the Administration of Film tightened the existing policy and insisted on 
the principle that joint venture films be led by the mainland. China was attempting to assert 
control in the media sector in the face of foreign incursions. The popularity of television, 
video recorder and video tape had allowed Hollywood films to infiltrate the mainland market. 
As mentioned above, instability caused by the handover of the territory from the United 
Kingdom to the People’s Republic of China and the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
significantly disturbed the economy of Hong Kong and its film industry. Before 1997, Hong 
Kong films had already lost market share in South Korea and Taiwan. The financial crisis 
further impacted on such markets as Singapore and Malaysia. The Hong Kong film industry 
entered a depressed period. The wave of immigration in the late 1990s due to the anxiety 
about the upcoming handover led many Hong Kong film industry talents to consider 
Hollywood; for instance, John Woo and Yun-Fat Chow, who have become well-known 
because of A Better Tomorrow (yingxiong bense 1986), as well as Tsui Hark, Jackie Chan, 
Sammo Hung, Jet Li, and Yuen Woo-ping.  
‘People who could emigrate would do so’, recalled Peter Ho-Sun Chan (Curtin 2011). Hong 
Kong media claimed that Hong Kong film was dead. The number of joint productions 
reduced sharply from 57 in 1993 to 29 in 1996, 25 in 1997 and only 7 in 1998. Few joint 
production films achieved success in China during the depression period between 1997 and 
2001; for example, The Storm Riders (fengyun xiongba tianxia 1998), Roots and Branches 
(wode xiongdi jiemei 2001) (Yin and He: 33）.  
Later, the film market started recovering along with the mainland’s film industrialisation. At 
the height of the depression period, some film workers such as Ng See-Yuen fully recognised 
the importance of the mainland market. Some of the most prominent film production 
companies in Hong Kong, including Golden Harvest Company, Seasonal Film Corporation, 
and Film Workshop Co., Ltd, started emphasising collaboration with mainland China. A-list 
directors such as Tsui Hark, Ng See-Yuen, Wong Kar-wai, and Peter Chan, and A-list actors 
such as Maggie Cheung, Leslie Cheung, Leung Chiu Wai, and Andy Lau began to feature 
regularly in coproduced films.  
5.3 The Advantages of working in the PRC 
In 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While it was 
gradually liberalising its market, tight censorship and protective measures still existed to 
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protect the market and the national interest, leading some scholars to describe this unique 
situation as ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’ (Harvey 2005: 120–151; Szeto and 
Chen 2011). The media industry was protected at that time in what was called the 
‘selective/controlled market liberalization’ process (Wang 2004). Thanks to the CEPA, 
preferential market liberalisation policies were extended to Hong Kong businesses, but not to 
other foreign countries. Originally, the film industry was not included in the CEPA. Ng See-
yuen, the chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Filmmakers, mentioned that his 
friendship with Tung Chee Hwa, first Chief Executive of Hong Kong, helped to add the film 
industry into CEPA during negotiations, two weeks before it was officially signed (Ng See-
yuen 2012:65).  The identity of Hong Kong film thus changed from foreign film into 
domestic film, which privileged Hong Kong films by removing quota restrictions, increasing 
their potential box office share (30–40%), and the waiving of import tax and other 
distribution rights then levied on foreign films. As May and Ma (2014:45) suggest, Hong 
Kong did not receive many of the benefits of being a territory of China until signing the 
CEPA, when the mainland audio-visual area was opened up. The opening up went further 
with the introduction of CEPA I and CEPA II (Further Trade Liberalisation) and III 
(Supplement II to CEPA). Given the importance of the CEPA in the history of Sino-Hong 
Kong joint production, it is appropriate to quote extensively the essence of the agreement.  
CEPA Main Text and Six Annexes (signed on 29 June 2003 and 29 September 2003 
respectively)  
Chinese 
language 
motion pictures 
and motion 
pictures jointly 
produced 
 Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong may 
be imported for distribution in the mainland on a quota-free 
basis, after vetting and approval by the relevant mainland 
authority. 
 Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong 
refer to those motion pictures made by production companies 
which are set up or established in accordance with the relevant 
laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and 
which own more than 75% of the copyright of the motion 
pictures concerned. Hong Kong residents should comprise 
more than 50% of the total principal personnel in the motion 
pictures concerned. 
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 Motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the 
mainland are treated as mainland motion pictures for the 
purpose of distribution in the mainland. Translated versions of 
the motion pictures in languages of other Chinese ethnic groups 
and Chinese dialects, which are based on the Putonghua 
version, are allowed to be distributed in the Mainland. 
 For motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the 
mainland, there is no restriction on the percentage of principal 
creative personnel from Hong Kong, but at least one-third of 
the leading artistes must be from the mainland; there is no 
restriction on where the story takes place, but the plots or the 
leading characters must be related to the mainland. 
Cinema theatre 
services 
 To allow Hong Kong service suppliers to construct, renovate 
and operate cinema theatres on an equity joint venture or 
contractual joint venture basis. 
 To allow majority shareholding, not exceeding 75%, for Hong 
Kong service suppliers. 
Supplement to CEPA (signed on 27 October 2004) (CEPA II)  
Chinese language 
motion pictures 
and motion  
pictures jointly 
produced  
 To allow motion pictures coproduced by Hong Kong and the 
Mainland to be processed outside the Mainland after 
obtaining the approval of the relevant authorities in the 
Mainland.  
 To allow Hong Kong service suppliers to establish wholly 
owned companies in the Mainland on a pilot basis to engage 
in the distribution of Mainland produced motion pictures 
after obtaining the approval of the relevant authorities in the 
Mainland.  
Cinema theatre 
services  
 To allow Hong Kong service suppliers to construct or 
renovate cinema theatres for the operation of film screening 
business on a wholly-owned basis.  
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Supplement II to CEPA (signed on 18 October 2005)  
Chinese language 
motion pictures 
and motion 
pictures jointly 
produced 
 The Cantonese version of motion pictures coproduced by 
Hong Kong and the mainland is permitted to be distributed 
and screened in Guangdong Province, after obtaining the 
approval of the relevant authorities in the mainland; the 
Cantonese version of motion pictures produced by Hong 
Kong and solely imported by the Film Import and Export 
Corporation of the China Film Group Corporation is 
permitted to be distributed and screened in Guangdong 
Province, after being examined by and obtaining the approval 
of the relevant authorities in the mainland.  
 The import of Chinese language motion pictures made by 
production companies which are set up in accordance with 
the relevant laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and which own more than 50% of the copyright of 
the motion pictures concerned1is exempted from quota 
restrictions for distribution in the mainland, after being 
examined by and obtaining the approval of the relevant 
authorities in the mainland.  
Cinema theatre 
services  
 Hong Kong service suppliers are permitted to establish 
wholly-owned companies in the mainland, each of which 
may construct or renovate more than one cinema theatre at 
more than one location for the operation of film screening 
business. 
(Cited in Trade and Industry Department The Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region: Specific Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Services) 
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After the enactment of CEPA in 2003, collaboration in film developed rapidly. On one hand, 
investment, experience, talent and platforms from Hong Kong improved the performance of 
Chinese film in both the domestic and global markets. On the other hand, mainland China 
provided more space for the development of Hong Kong film because of its market and 
resource. More and more film companies in Hong Kong, such as China Star Entertainment 
Group, Media Asia Entertainment Group, Universe Films, and Xinghao Entertainment Co. 
Ltd, started doing business in mainland China. Film workers such as Jackie Chan, Tsui Hark, 
John Woo, Wong Jing, and Pang Ho-Cheung now began to spend more time working or even 
living on the mainland.    
As mentioned in Chapter four, the total number of coproductions between mainland China 
and other countries or areas reached 428 between 2002 and 14 December 2012. 293 of these 
were Sino-Hong Kong joint productions, or 68.5 per cent of the total.  Sino-Hong Kong joint 
productions dominated at the box office from 2002 to 2012. The portion of the total box 
office commanded by Sino-Hong Kong joint productions reached over 90% in seven of these 
eleven years during this period, with lower totals only recorded in 2003 (50%), 2005 (70.5%), 
2008 (85.4%) and 2012 (87.5%). In 2004 and 2007, the number even reached 98.3% and 98.9% 
respectively (Zhan 2012: 42-43). From these data we can see the importance of Sino-Hong 
Kong joint productions to the Chinese film industry.  
After CEPA, Hong Kong companies did not always play the leading role in joint production. 
The coproduction modes with Hong Kong became more diverse. Some films, such as House 
of Flying Daggers (shimian maifu 2004), The Banquet (yeyan 2006), and The Sun Also Rises 
(taiyang zhaochang shengqi 2007), adopted the mode “produced by mainland/investment 
from Hong Kong”. Other films employed the mode of “produced by Hong Kong /investment 
from mainland”, for example, The Warlords (touming zhuang 2007), Perhaps Love (ruguo· ai 
2005), and A Battle of Wits (mogong 2006). More adopted the mode of mixed 
production/investment, such as Curse of the Golden Flower (mancheng jindai huangjin jia 
2006), and Red Cliff (chibi 2008). Cross-regional finance, production, distribution and 
screenings became a trend for coproductions during this period. From the perspective of 
companies, more and more coinvested enterprises were established. Chengtian Entertainment 
Group International Co. Ltd from the mainland became the largest sole shareholder of Orange 
Sky Golden Harvest from Hong Kong. This was the first time in history that a company from 
the mainland had become the major shareholder of a Hong Kong-listed film company. Based 
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on Zhan’s analysis of Sino-Hong Kong joint productions between 2002 and 2012 (Zhan 2012: 
42–43), action films, including wuxia, kung-fu and gangster, took the largest portion (41.3%), 
followed by comedy (20%), romance (17.7%) and adventure (13.8%). Thriller was the least 
popular with only 5.8% because of restrictions on the mainland. Traditional Hong Kong 
horror films completely disappeared from theatres, as the Chinese state opposed films 
featuring ghosts (Pang 2013: 208–227).  
5.4 Peter Chan: from Hong Kong filmmaker to Greater China filmmaker   
The joint productions mentioned above and the Hong Kong films which qualified through the 
CEPA are defined as a CEPA Film by Hong Kong film industry people and movie critics (Lie 
2014: 18). It might be assumed that Hong Kong film workers could easily adopt the 
collaboration model due to geo-cultural similarity. However, because of the hundred years of 
British rule, the political system and social culture of Hong Kong and Mainland China have 
become very different. Before 1997, many Hong Kongers had never been to the Chinese 
mainland. To many Hong Kong filmmakers, the mainland market should be familiar due to 
similarities, but it also unfamiliar for reasons above. How were they expected to deal with 
such a familiar but strange film market? ‘For Hong Kong directors, their level of success in 
the North is determined by whether they can display their professionalism to its fullest and 
successfully render genre films under the current regulatory environment. At the moment, 
these are precisely what Mainland China needs the most and they happen to represent a niche 
that Hong Kong directors can fill’ (Lee 2012: 191). A focus on the different career strategies 
and trajectories of Hong Kong directors Peter Chan and Johnnie To will illuminate the 
complex challenges of Sino-Hong Kong collaboration. 
The evolution of Peter Ho-Sun Chan can be summarised as follows: from a Hong Kong 
filmmaker to an Asian filmmaker to a greater China filmmaker. However he was not the first 
to respond to the mainland market and to choose to venture up north. Following Hong Kong's 
handover to PRC in 1997 and the downturn in Hong Kong's film industry, Chan firstly 
pursued his Hollywood dream with The Love Letter (1999), giving him a taste of American 
mega-corporate culture, but he could not get used to Hollywood corporate protocols (Curtin 
2011: 2). This experience affected his later choice of taking the route north. He thought ‘since 
I couldn't work with the constraints in Hollywood, how I would be able to shoot in the 
Mainland?' (cited in Li, C 2012: 69). Chan avoided entering the mainland for as long as he 
could. After he went back to Hong Kong from Hollywood, he established Applause Pictures 
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in 2000, fostering ties with pan-Asian filmmakers with the films such as Jan Dara (wanniang 
2001), One Fine Spring Day (chunshi 2001), The Eye (jiangui2 2004). 'While other local 
filmmakers were entering into coproductions with their Mainland counterparts, Chan chose to 
remain ardently identifiable with Hong Kong first and foremost' (Li, C 2012: 11). 
In 2005, Peter Chan finally made his first step north with the musical extravaganza Perhaps 
Love (ruguo ai 2005) entering the burgeoning mainland market. Actually, Chan tested the 
water in 2001 with his movie script Waiting (dengdai), but it did not receive the requisite 
approvals. He said: 'That was my first encounter with the incomprehensible happenings in the 
Mainland. I didn't feel waiting (dengdai) was sensitive materials, but this was due to my 
ignorance towards the censorship standards -- some issues mentioned in the original 
screenplay, such as military marriages, were indeed sensitive' (cited in Li, C 2012: 101). At 
that time, Chan was still naive about the rules that existed on the mainland and tried to avoid 
the inevitability of going there.  
Later, the success of Zhang Yimou's Hero (yingxiong 2002) motivated him to venture north 
to make a true Hong Kong-China coproduction. 'There were many fake coproductions 
between Hong Kong and China – they simply cast a couple of Mainland film stars and 
tweaked the ending somewhat'. He observed that 'real coproductions must have an organic 
mixture of elements from both the Mainland and Hong Kong' (cited in Li, C 2012: 101). His 
first coproduction, Perhaps Love (ruguo ai 2005), was not that successful in box office terms. 
He realised at that time that Hong Kong filmmakers knew as little about the Chinese market 
as any other non-Chinese person, noting that they had to 'grope our way in the dark. Any 
experience we had acquired elsewhere was completely irrelevant there' (cited in Li, C 2012: 
102). At that point, Chan and other Hong Kong directors were trying to understand more 
about the mainland market and its rules. After the experience of Perhaps Love, his next film 
The Warlords (Touming Zhuang 2007) synched with the mainland market. The cooperation 
with the China Film Group made it an epic period blockbuster with a big budget. 
After earning 200 million RMB from The Warlords (touming zhuang 2007), Chan decided to 
move his office to Beijing. He became the first Hong Kong director to reach over 100 Million 
RMB in box office takings. During that time, it was a popularly believed that the Hong Kong 
film was dead, and given that Hong Kong films and Cantonese pop culture were recognised 
as two very important elements of Hong Kong identity this decline led to a sense of identity 
crisis (Zhong 2010: 129). After the production of The Warlords Chan reflected: 
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We cannot defend the status of Hong Kong film forever because it is out of date. 
The spirit of Hong Konger and Hong Kong film is fully displayed by The 
Warlords as major contributors of this film are Hong Kongers. The production of 
this film exactly followed the Hong Kong style. Although people call it Chinese 
film or coproduction, it does not matter as the film represents the real Hong Kong 
film spirit (cited in Luo 2008: 65).  
In 2009, Chan moved further into his coproduction journey. He established Renren Film Co. 
Ltd with Polybona Films. Before this move, the cooperation strategy between Hong Kong 
and the mainland was quite short-sighted, usually only aimed at one single film. After this 
alliance was formed, cooperation became more stable and coproductions were planned from a 
long-term perspective. Other alliances were formed between Hong Kong and mainland 
companies. For example, Shanghai Film Media Asia was founded by Media Asia Group, 
Shanghai Film Group Corporation and Beijing Guoli Changsheng Entertainment Co. Ltd.   
Renren Film delivered a historical action film Bodyguards and Assassins (Shiyue weicheng 
2009) directed by Teddy Chan featuring an all-star cast. Peter Chan worked as a producer on 
that film.  
There were instances of maladjustments among the Hong Kong directors when 
they first entered the Mainland Chinese system … Hong Kong directors have to 
get used to a different type of working environment. Once they become adjusted, 
however, they will become more mature. This will bring about a whole new 
dimension for Chinese films – once-glorious Hong Kong cinema will come to 
influence the future of Chinese films in an indirect way (Lee 2012: 193).  
After ten years of exploration, Chan has matured and it seems that he has found a 
comfortable position for himself, where he can make the films he is truly good at and which 
are welcomed by audiences. The box office of his recent realistic theme work – a medium-
scale production – American Dreams in China (Zhongguo hehuo ren 2013), grossed more 
than half a billion RMB in China, but only five million RMB in Hong Kong. The film was set 
on the mainland and was not related to Hong Kong at all. American Dreams in China (2013) 
enabled him to reach another peak in his career. The film earned RMB538 million and took 
out the best director trophy and the best dramatic film award at China’s Golden Rooster and 
Hundred Flowers Film Awards. He was the first Hong Kong director to win this award and is 
the only director who has garnered Best Director awards from China’s Golden Rooster, 
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Huabiao Awards, Hong Kong Film Awards and Taiwan’s Golden Horse. The Golden Rooster 
Film Awards are China's highest professional film awards, chosen by film artists and critics. 
Wining the awards indicates that Peter Chan’s contribution has been recognised by the 
Chinese government, as the awards are supported by the Propaganda Department of the CPC 
Central Committee. It also means that Peter Chan may enjoy more political privilege and 
blessings from the state authorities for future coproductions. 
Lee (2012: 187) pointed out that  
[A]s soon as Chan became a Mainland Chinese director, he could not help but give up 
on his emphasis on the diaspora theme and contemporary realism. Instead, he needed to 
turn his attention to a type of grand narrative that readily resonates with the 
masses …When he arrived in Mainland China, he could not help but adopt a more 
macro approach. This could well be a decision that all Hong Kong directors have to 
make in order to develop their careers in the Mainland. From local, craftsman-like 
auteurs, they have to undergo a transformation to become directors of slick 
blockbusters. Peter Chan’s transformation helps shed light on the challenges and 
possibilities that the Mainland film market presents to Hong Kong directors.  
Compared to his earlier works, such as Perhaps Love (2005) and The Warlords (2007), which 
were created to cater to the mainland market at that time, Chan’s recent works, such as 
American Dreams in China (Zhongguo hehuoren 2013) and Dearest (Qinaide 2014), indicate 
that Chan has finally returned to contemporary realism stories. He says: 
Looking back the eight years I spent in Mainland making films, at the beginning, 
I felt that I have lost my sentiments and intent. Making contemporary realism is 
easy to me. But I had to produce epic period blockbuster before, it is like I lost 
my intent in making film. By directing American Dreams in China (Zhongguo 
hehuoren 2013), my intent come back. Nothing has lost now. (Nai 2013)  
Chan has incorporated his Hong Kong sensibility within mainland protocols. His latest film, 
Dearest (2014), which is about child kidnapping in China, set up another milestone for Sino-
Hong Kong film collaboration. The story is about a band of parents who set out to find the 
children who were taken from them. Previous Sino-Hong Kong joint productions have tended 
to draw on genres such as action film wuxia, kung fu and gangster, comedy and romance. 
These topics are less politically sensitive and can easily obtain approval from the government 
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for screening. Dearest impresses with its ugly vision of child abduction in contemporary 
China, and also touches slightly on the problem of China’s judicial system. Chan’s 
experience reflects how Hong Kong directors have adjusted themselves for the mainland 
market. The change in genre and content of Chan’s works also shows the development of 
collaborations between Hong Kong and the mainland. As Szeto and Chen put it (2012: 119), 
‘although the CEPA policy deregulates the film market to allow the flexible flow of capital 
between Hong Kong and China, it continues to regulate the flow of ideas and of labour’. Lam 
(2012: 165) says that the mainland is only interested in importing Hong Kong film techniques, 
not the ideology. Most of the Hong Kong directors who became Chinese directors in the first 
few years of coproduction after CEPA were confused, and struggled as a result. On the one 
hand they lost the creative freedom that had supported them in Hong Kong in the 1990s, and 
on the other they were not mature enough to comfortably manage the demands of mainland 
censorship and the different market expectations. Most famous Hong Kong directors have 
their own strong personal styles and their favourite film genres. After moving up north, Hong 
Kong filmmakers had to cater to the local market and investors, and most of the time ended 
up with an unfamiliar or an adopted genre.  
The sentiments that they frequently embedded into their films had also lost their 
magic … Peter Chan will be hard pressed to come out with films along the lines 
of He Ain’t heavy, He’s My Father, … Almost a Love Story, not due to 
incompetence, but because his sentiments won’t be able to find a home in the 
north. What he and other Hong Kong directors can do under new circumstances is 
to skim over sentiments and intent, but tell grand narratives that are readily 
accessible to the larger Chinese audience. Perhaps from that point on, there will 
only be Peter Chan the Chinese Director (Lee 2012: 191).  
After several years’ exploration and adaption, some Hong Kong directors are now able to 
dance well with the shackles. Chan indicates that he could finally be himself when making 
American Dreams in China and Dearest. However, the compromises he made can clearly be 
seen. The artistic intent, which is a kind of personal intent, was replaced by a national intent. 
Chan’s brave attempt to deal with contemporary social issues in China not only indicates a 
more versatile and mature filmmaker, but the success of the films also indicates a more 
mature domestic market; The question now is whether the Hong Kong filmmakers can assist 
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the Chinese film industry to gain international popularity and, in the process, help the 
Chinese government to achieve its aims of soft power.  
5.5 Johnnie To: Compromise and Consistency 
Johnnie To represents those filmmakers who express a greater concern about their Hong 
Kong identity. Now in his 60s, he is still not that reconciled to the new reality and said that ‘if 
possible, he wishes he could only make films in Hong Kong’ (quoted in Nai 2013). However, 
To had to bow to the reality after fifteen years’ insistence on trying to rely exclusively on the 
poor Hong Kong film market. He officially debuted on the mainland with Don't Go Breaking 
My Heart (Danshen nannv 2011) after CEPA. 
To’s debut as a film director, The Enigmatic Case (Bishui hanshan duomingjin 1979), was 
also a joint production with the mainland. Later, he continued his career in producing 
television series and founded Milkyway Image. Now, he has become a symbol of post-1997 
Hong Kong film. In 2013, Johnnie To returned to his favourite genre and made a gangster 
movie, Drug War (Duzhan 2013), which earned a total of 147.54 million RMB. It was his 
first gangster film produced on the mainland. Unlike romance film, it is difficult to find 
similar gangster films emanating from the mainland. Censorship, as always, was a 
consideration. ‘We are not familiar with restrictions in film production in Mainland. We have 
discussed every scene in the film with different parties. Actually, the results are better than 
we expected. Modifications required from the government are just a few’, says To (quoted in 
Nai 2013.). Looking back at the box office returns on his Hong Kong films in recent years, 
Sparrow (Wenque 2008) made 5.59 million HKD, Vengeance (Fuchou 2009) 1.62 million 
HKD, Accident (Yiwai 2009) 5.23 million HKD.  Johnnie To’s final choice is coproduce 
work on the mainland. ‘I feel like I am back to the starting point’ (quoted in Nai 2013). Hong 
Kong film will continue merging with the mainland market, an inevitable trend into the future. 
It does not necessarily mean that Hong Kong will not have its own film industry; instead, 
Hong Kong film will maintain a position as a local film in the Great Chinese film industry. 
5.6 Discussion 
Most of the time audiences cannot determine the difference between a Sino-Hong Kong joint 
production and a pure domestic film (Yin and He 2008). A leading Chinese film scholar, Yin 
(2008), suggested using Chinese film to define rather than to simply identify a domestic film 
or a Hong Kong film. In terms of the advantage and disadvantage of China-Hong Kong film 
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joint production for both sides, some scholars have shown strong resistance to Hong Kong 
films’ assimilation into the mainland. They argue that the Sinicization of Hong Kong film 
loses elements of itself due to the need to satisfy the domestic market (Liu 2014). Some, like 
Curtin (2011:9), take a strong critical position on what is lost from Hong Kong creativity. He 
argues that Sinicization ‘has undermined Hong Kong’s status as a transnational and relatively 
independent centre of creative endeavour’. He further notes that Hong Kong is ‘less a global 
media capital than it is a service centre for a renationalized film industry that is orchestrated 
by the Communist Party leadership in Beijing. No longer a peer to Hollywood or Mumbai, it 
has become an appendage to a state system that benefits from a vast and putatively captive 
domestic market’ (Curtin 2011: 9).  
Some commentators tend to a more pragmatic position. Chan and Fung (2011: 87) say that 
coproduction is ‘mutually beneficial to both sides’ and helps to extend the life of Hong Kong 
media industries while ‘pursuing a place in an emerging integrated Greater China market’. 
They believe coproduction is an effective tool for helping Hong Kong to overcome 
ideological constraints, as purely Hong Kong products may be vulnerable to China’s 
protectionist measures. Through coproduction, China and Hong Kong can complement each 
other, while ‘China is known for its cheap labour supply, availability of scenic sites and 
studio facilities, and a large domestic market, Hong Kong owes its edge to ready access to 
capital, availability of world-known performers, and better knowledge of global marketing 
(Chan and Fung 2011: 87)’. However, most scholars believe that coproduction centred in 
China has actually saved the Hong Kong film industry from a crisis and brought it back to 
pan-Asian audiences though China-Hong Kong blockbusters (Chung forthcoming). May and 
Ma (2014: 43–50), in contrast to Curtin’s argument, claim that Hong Kong has achieved a 
new status as a media capital. It is growing even more as a global film capital and is 
becoming an even more important juncture for overseas investors in the Chinese film 
industry due to new ties to the mainland film industry rather than seeing the demise of the 
film industry, as was feared with the handover and the Asian economic crisis. ‘The two film 
economies are becoming more integrated into a supra-Chinese media and entertainment 
industry’ under the CEPA, though they also agree that the cost of this change is ‘dilution of 
the sense of Cantonese identity in Hong Kong films’ (May and Ma 2014:50). 
Szeto and Chen (2012: 119-120) take a different view, stating that the Hong Kong-China 
model or the ‘neo-liberal restructuring with China characteristics’, argued by some as a way 
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out for the crumbling film industry, ‘actually intensifies structural dangers’. They believe that 
‘the Hong Kong film industry is facing painful dilemmas and questionable sustainability’. 
The coproduction dynamic creates a winner-take-all phenomenon. As they point out, the 
established and above-the-line creative Hong Kong talent and investors can ‘make it big 
beyond Hong Kong, often faring even better in China’ through joint productions, and ‘their 
survival and success actually depends on the sacrifice of Hong Kong junior and entrance 
level practitioners and technicians as jobs migrate to mainland China’. As their research 
shows, most below-the-line crew members have to ‘take pay cuts, accept exploitation and 
travel north to compete, or they have to leave the industry all together, making such careers 
unsustainable’. They believe that the Hong Kong film industry is exposed to a severe lack of 
younger talents and clear succession problems. In addition, coproduction and quota 
restrictions are generally believed to contribute to resisting the domination of Hollywood. But 
Hong Kong scholars Szeto and Chen (2012: 120) are sceptical, noting that ‘coproduction 
cannot resist Hollywood; it only takes over the market share of local films and seduces 
investors away from local films attentive only to local cultural sensitivities and concerns, 
driving Hong Kong film towards disappearing visibility and ontological crisis’. Furthermore, 
the mainlandisation of Hong Kong filmmaking, which Szeto and Chen refers to as the 
tailoring of creative content to satisfy SARFT’s taste, ‘tend to find the more liberal Hong 
Kong and South East Asian markets harder to penetrate’. It seems that in all Sinophone 
markets, ‘China or the rest’ is now layered upon ‘Hollywood or the rest’ as dual hegemonies. 
‘The facing off of Mainlandization and Hollywoodization threatens Hong Kong film with 
ontological crisis’ (Szeto and Chen 2012: 117).  
Laikwan Pang (2010: 140–143) indicates that ‘Hong Kong film industry’s difficulties since 
the 1990s can be characterized by Hong Kong cinema’s painstaking attempts to come to 
terms with China’. While most Hong Kong filmmakers choose to make big budget Mandarin 
language coproductions for the Chinese market, increasingly more studios, filmmakers, crews 
and talent are being based in Beijing, and many of the actual productions are conducted on 
the mainland because of lower costs and cultural proximity to potential viewers. The Hong 
Kong domestic market is becoming more and more marginalised, and Hong Kong cinema as 
a cultural industry is possibly coming to an end. As Pang (2010: 142) points out, Hong Kong 
films that ‘circulated in China during the last two decades are marked not only by the strong 
cultural identity of a (post) colonial city but also by its strong linguistic identity’. Apart from 
Putonghua, Cantonese could be the most understood dialect in China, a linguistically diverse 
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country, which partly contributes to the popularity of Hong Kong media content. The CEPA 
V (implemented in 2008) allows the distribution and screening of Cantonese versions of 
Hong Kong films in Guangdong province (its dialect is also Cantonese), which means an 
expansion of the domestic audience for Hong Kong movies from the city’s 7 million citizens 
to the 86.42 million residents of Guangdong Province. Pang (2010: 140–143) argues that 
making regional films for Cantonese speakers in southern China and the rest of the world (an 
estimated global audience of almost 100 million) might imply a new cultural identity for this 
regional cinema; while much attention has focused on the trans-border coproduction trend, 
the Hong Kong film industry ‘will be given a chance to maintain its own cultural and 
linguistic identity. 
From my point of view, Sino-Hong Kong joint productions definitely contribute to the 
development of the Hong Kong film industry while accelerating the demise of Hong Kong 
film’s cultural identity. However, what we should realise is that the precondition for such a 
Hong Kong cultural identity is the survival of the industry. Szeto and Chen (2012: 121) admit 
that other Asian national cinemas with bigger local audiences, like Japan and Korea, can still 
‘rely on the nationalization of cultural sensibilities to survive’, Hong Kong has to contend 
with the compromises forced on it by the Chinese government as its small population ‘forces 
it to make films of a wider appeal to survive’. It has to tailor its film to cater to not only 
SARFT but also to the cultural preferences and differences of mainland audiences. Although 
the CEPA V policy supports the development of pure local Hong Kong film, it cannot change 
the fact that it has become a niche taste and can’t go back to a golden age. In addition, most 
studios and their talent have already moved to, or are based in, Beijing. From this point of 
view, we might see the decline of Hong Kong as a ‘media capital’ (Curtin 2003). However, to 
some extent, we could say that the Hong Kong film industry can still attract pan-Asian 
audiences and, further, global audiences, through joint ventures with China. It is hard to name 
a ‘big Chinese blockbuster without Hong Kong people in significant roles’ (Szeto and Chen 
2012: 119) in the past ten years.  
Before the mainland fully opened its market, especially the audio-visual market, Hong Kong 
was an irreplaceable destination for people trying to get into the Chinese market. Viewed 
from this perspective, Hong Kong as a media capital, or service centre, from Curtin’s 
perspective, is still flourishing. But how long can it maintain its status? Along with the 
foreign investor comes easier access to the Chinese market. With an increasingly stronger 
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mainland film industry and more frequent cooperation with the US, Hong Kong is gradually 
losing its advantage. It is more likely to be incorporated into the larger Chinese film industry 
and grow with it to become a component of an audiovisual super power in the future.  
The ten years after CEPA are recognised as the golden ten years of Hong Kong-China 
coproduction. In these ten years the mainland film industry grew rapidly from a just opened-
up industry to a more mature commercial industry. This was due to substantial transfers of 
capital, especially human capital, knowledge and skills from Hong Kong. Although Hong 
Kong-China joint production has not always successfully promoted the Chinese film industry 
“going out” or increased China’s international cultural influence and soft power dramatically, 
it has laid the foundation for further collaboration with the US and thus future Chinese soft 
power enhancement.  
Before 2000, Chinese films were known by the world through a few art films. Since 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (wohu canglong 2000), Chinese commercial films have 
entered overseas markets through major film distribution companies. Moreover, those films 
have tended to be coproductions including Hong Kong partner. For example, Hero 
(yingxiong 2002), House of Flying Daggers (shimian maifu 2004), Fearless (huoyuanjia 
2006), Kung Fu Hustle (gongfu 2004), The Banquet (yeyan 2006), Curse of the Golden 
Flower (mancheng jindai huajinjia 2006) were screened in major movie theatre chains in 
Europe and the United States. This helped some directors and actors attain world reputations, 
for instance Ang Lee (Li An), Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, John Woo, Feng Xiaogang, Wong 
Kar-wai, Stephen Chow, and Peter Chan, and artists such as Jet Li, Zhang Ziyi, Gong Li, 
Jackie Chan, Chow Yun-Fat, Andy Lau, and Chiu Wai. But the amount of Sino-Hong Kong 
joint productions which earned significant revenue or exercised influence in Western markets 
is still very limited. The exercise of soft power by Sino-Hong Kong joint production is less 
effective in comparison to the strong cult following created by pure Hong Kong film which is 
arguably a part of the cultural mainstream being widely available and imitated. 
Ford (2007: 62) notes that the Hong Kong films were greatly affected by Hollywood and 
‘connected with US history, culture and identity … Hong Kong films exercise a form of “soft 
power” in their ability to cajole movie-going Americans into taking a look at themselves in a 
different light. As these films address American people, places, modes of exceptionalism, 
culture, and history, they offer important albeit often marginalised perspectives that merit 
closer and more sustained consideration’. This kind of soft power influence is exactly what 
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the Chinese government is seeking to attain. However, as Lee (2012: 192) suggests, if the 
goal of the Chinese film industry is to match Hollywood, it needs a more reliable production 
protocol, one that operates in accordance with international legal and commercial frameworks, 
free from artificial and policy reference. This call for a transparent film reviews mechanism, a 
sophisticated distribution network and a fair competitive environment implies deregulation. 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, deregulation is currently a very unlikely approach for 
the Chinese government to take. 
As pointed out by Chan and Fung (2011: 86–87), structural hybridisation in audiovisual 
coproductions happens in production sites, space and capital and involves the crossing of 
boundaries at different levels, ranging from local, municipal and regional to the transnational 
and international. As they suggested: ‘these administrative levels are crisscrossed by 
functional networks of corporations, governmental organizations as well as professionals’. 
The key for the success of Hong Kong-China joint productions is securing appropriate 
functional networks among Hong Kong and mainland producers (Chan and Fung 2011: 86–
87). However, this key element is what US and Australian partners have found hard to access 
and which they needed to build in the first steps in coproducing with China. These issues are 
addressed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 6 China-US Coproduction  
The interdependency of Hong Kong and the PRC, and their cultural proximity, have enabled 
China to progress its soft power ambitions through coproduction. In this chapter, I show that 
China’s soft power strategies through film are tested to their limit in dealings with the US. 
Unlike the vast majority of countries in the world that coproduce film, the US has not entered 
into official coproductions; that is, it does not enter into any legal binding coproduction 
agreements or equal relationships with other producing nations. It does not need to. With that 
background in mind I will show that its relationship with China is complicated and 
challenging. 
Many Chinese filmmakers see international coproduction as an opportunity to learn how to 
make films that will be released and widely seen outside China. This follows the learning 
model that China has used with foreign investment in the last thirty years. However, one of 
the fundamental arguments of this thesis is that the model of joint venturing with foreign 
investments that worked so well for China in its low-cost manufacturing strategy is very hard 
to replicate in film, which is one of the most advanced service industries in the world. It 
requires a deeper understanding of nuances, cultural complexity and entertainment values.  
In this chapter, I present a history of the challenge for China in using film both as a learning 
model and to achieve soft power goals. Key to understanding this challenge is the idea of soft 
power competition as discussed in Chapter One, a term coined by the Singaporean scholar 
Chua Ben Huat (2012) to refer to the intense competition within East Asia for pop culture 
dominance, and to describe how East Asian countries are using pop culture exports to 
positively influence opinions and attitudes of transnational audiences. Chua’s augument has 
turned Nye’s original diplomatic concept into a regional index of pop culture success. Chua 
(2012) argues that pop culture engenders ‘culture presence’ which offers China a strategy to 
become more competitive. However, China’s pop culture presence outside its borders is quite 
weak compared to other East Asian countries, and in particular compared to the U.S. This is 
well recognised now by many people in China. 
The Chinese government has publicly stated its ambitions to use film coproductions as a way 
to enhance soft power capability through transfer of knowledge capital (skills and know-how). 
While Chinese filmmakers are learning how to work with US partners, the US is conceding 
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some ground to achieve its market ambitions. The key here is that Hollywood and the US 
need access to China’s growing consumer market in order to continue their own growth. 
Michael Curtin (forthcoming) writes that  several levels of complexity underpin how the 
China Film Group (CFG) operates to protect domestic players. In Chapter Two and Four, we 
discussed how, on one hand, American film companies are trying to partner with China to 
facilitate imports and distribution in China, while  on the other, Hollywood is motivated to 
make joint productions work in China. We can understand the US’s approach as trying to find 
the right key to unlock the doors of the Chinese market. I summarise the history of China-US 
coproduction in three stages:  assisted, fake and real coproduction, although these three kinds 
of production overlap. This chapter will, first, examine Sino-US coproduction history before 
2012, and then take a deeper look at the new trends and explore fake coproduction since 2012, 
with further analysis of the challenges existing in real coproduction. 
6.1 Sino-US Coproduction History 
The first movie studio in China was established by an American in Shanghai in 1909 (Ye 
2003:13). In 1926, the American-Oriental Picture Company was founded to make films by 
utilising cheap Chinese labour, fascinating scenery and a history of drama for sale in China 
and US. However, production was shut down from 1927 due to the second Chinese civil war 
and the war against Fascism in China. According to Ye, at the time, Hollywood saw China as 
an export country (Ye 2003:13). After the People’s Republic of China was established in 
1949, intense hostility towards capitalist society lasted over two decades. In addition to 
ideological issues, the Chinese authorities insisted on a flat fee model rather than revenue 
sharing for international films to be distributed in China, which for a long time hampered 
Hollywood distribution in China. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
reacted by refusing to distribute in China from the 1950s to the late 1980s; only some 
independent films were imported to China (Miller 2005:319-320). Miller and others 
(2015:319) take it as another tiresome example of ‘the US tendency to walk away from any 
environment that it does not control, and engage in censorship by monopoly capital’. In 
contrast, currently we see the US trying different tactics. On 1 January 1979, China and the 
US officially opened diplomatic relationships. In the same year, the China Film Coproduction 
Corporation was set up (CFCC) to establish film trade relationships with other countries, to  
manage coproductions and to help with location filming in mainland China. From 1981 to the 
early 1990s, Sino-American coventures were almost all assisted productions,which meant 
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China only assisting American partners with the equipment, apparatus, sites and services in 
production without taking part in creativity and investment, as discussed in Chapter Three.  
In 1981, China assisted Jack Ford, the son of former US president Gerald Ford, to produce a 
documentary Wild Pandas (yesheng xiongmao) and then assisted Disney in shooting China 
Miracle (zhongguo qiguan). The actual nature of assistance in those days was unspecified in 
policy. In 1987, the first major Hollywood studio production, Empire of the Sun (taiyang 
diguo 1987), was shot in China by Steven Spielberg for Warner Bros with the assistance of 
Shanghai Film production studio and CFCC. The negotiation for this cooperation was based 
on a policy document introduced in 1985.13 A variety of forms of assistance were provided to 
the filmmakers. Not only were part of the streets of Shanghai blocked and 5000 extras 
provided, but soldiers from the Chinese army were supplied to play the Japanese soldiers. 
The assisted production format remained throughout the 1990s. In 1991 and 1992, Warner 
Bros. produced two small feature films with CFCC and Beijing Film Studio assistance: a 
family movie The Amazing Panda Adventure (xiongmao lixian ji 1995) and a romantic drama 
film M. Butterfly (mi hudie 1993) (Miller 2005:149-151). From 1991 to 2000, the legal 
system for coproduction was further improved, as discussed in Chapter Three. In the early 
1990s, the domestic box office dropped to a very low point; annual attendance dropped from 
21 billion in 1982 to just under 4.5 billion in 1991 (Rosen 2003: 94). There are multiple 
reasons for this, such as low film productivity and the shortage of production capital from the 
mid-1980s, as well as the competition from commercial television programs. Su (2011: 188) 
believes that the post-198914 environment and the large-scale production and distribution of 
government-sponsored propaganda movies failed to attract audiences and further worsened 
the situation. In 1994, the government opened up the film industry by allowing ten revenue 
sharing films to be imported in order to stimulate the film market. At the same time, it 
introduced rules to protect the domestic film industry and encourage international 
collaboration. Before Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (wohu canglong 2000) nearly all 
Sino-US productions were assisted coproductions. Sony Pictures Tristar became the first 
studio to discover the potential of the Chinese market and established Columbia Pictures Film 
Production Asia (Columbia Asia) in Hong Kong in 1998 as part of its long term localisation 
                                                            
13 ‘Some provisions about strengthening coproduction and TV management from the Propaganda Department’ 
14  In 1989, the Tiananmen Square Protests happened. The year 1989 in China marked the defeat of a group of 
reformists in the Communist Party leadership and shattered widespread expectations of continuing broad 
liberalization. 
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strategy to produce Chinese film for global distribution, particularly considering Chinese and 
culturally proximate audiences (Welkos 1999 cited in Miller 2005:150). It coproduced The 
Road Home (wo de fuqin muqin 1999) with Beijing New Pictures and Guangxi Film studio, 
and cofinanced and coproduced Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (2000) with Huayi Brothers 
and Taihe Film Investment Co. as well with the UK’s United China Vision. The international 
success of Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon encouraged Columbia Asia to look for other 
Chinese partners.  
After China joined the WTO in 2001, the threat of ‘wolf (Hollywood) coming’ reverberated 
within the Chinese film industry. ‘Dancing with wolves’ or ‘protecting domestic film 
industry’ has been heatedly debated by industry people and researchers. While the threat of 
cultural imperialism and calls for protection prevailed before 2000 (Zheng 1994:8; Yu 1995:1; 
Chen 1998), the mainstream tone began to change to ‘dancing with wolves’ after joining the 
WTO (Su 2011:102). The introduction and release of several sets of film regulations directly 
facilitated the transnational film corporations. According to Su (2011:197), ‘there was an 
increasingly blurred boundary between “domestic films” and “foreign films”; a new term of 
“transnational cinema” is gradually emerging’. The concept of ‘transnational cinema’ and 
‘Greater China’ cinema began to be used (Yin 2002/2004). Some use the word coopetition 
(cooperation within competition) to describe the nature of US-Sino production and predict 
that Chinawood will ultimately challenge Hollywood (Li 2006: 14-19). Kraus and Wan (2002: 
49) describe Hollywood and China as adversaries and allies. After 2003, the cultural system 
reform, refering to the evolution of the cultural market,  pushed the audio-visual industries 
further into the market and more private companies were allowed to enter into the film 
industry. More details were released about the legal system for coproduction. Later in 2007, 
the concept of soft power was borrowed by the Chinese government, as mentioned in Chapter 
One, to emphasise the significance of Chinese culture industries and to express the 
government’s hope to enhance China’s cultural influence and global presence. Industry 
commentators and scholars toed the policy line by advocating compromise and to yield to 
Hollywood producers to achieve more national benefit (Yin & Tang 2008).  
The release of policy in the early 2000s, which allowed private companies to enter the film 
industry, led to more collaborations between US and Chinese private firms. American film 
scholar Stanley Rosen (2003: 98) observed that the ‘Chinese national film industry is 
becoming increasingly transnational’. Columbia Asia hired director He Ping to become their 
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Chinese representative. After the success of Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon, Columbia Asia 
chose Huayi Brothers to coproduce two projects. One was a black comedy directed by Feng 
Xiaogang entitled Big Shot’s Funeral (dawan 2001). It had a budget of around US$3.5 
million and starred Canadian actor Donald Sutherland and Chinese leading man Ge You. 
Feng admitted that ‘Columbia Tristar influenced some artistic decisions in an effort to crack 
the U.S and global markets’ (cited in Rosen 2003:98). The film broke Chinese commercial 
box-office records by grossing over US $4million in less than one month, yet Western 
audiences’ unfamiliarity with comic depictions of modern China prevented it from taking off 
overseas. Another  project, directed by He Ping, Warriors of Heaven and Earth (tiandi 
yingxiong 2003), with a budget of around US$10 million, a much higher than average cost for 
a Chinese film, was a mix of epic, kung-fu, suspense and romance, that tried to appeal both 
Chinese and Western viewers but failed in both markets, probably because it was seen to 
imitate Hero (yingxiong 2002), but also because the outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) at this time had a significant impact on cinema attendance.   
From 1999 to 2004, Columbia Asia produced nine films with mainland Chinese and Hong 
Kong companies, covering a wide range of genres, including kung-fu, art, thriller and 
comedy. They were widely welcomed by the market, as these films respected local culture 
and taste, and considered commercial and artistic factors at the same time. Columbia Asia 
was the most active company in Sino-Foreign coventures during that time. Big Shot’s 
Funeral was the first film to adopt the mode of global revenue sharing. Columbia Asia then 
produced Double Vision with Taiwanese partners in 2002, and produced Warriors of Heaven 
and Earth, Cell Phone, Kung Fu Hustle and Kekexili: Mountain Patrol with mainland 
Chinese and Hong Kong partners in 2003 and 2004. All of the productions with mainland 
China and Hong Kong reached the top of the box office, except for the art film Kekexili: 
Mountain Patrol (Zhan 2012). 
Sony Pictures Tristar, through its subsidiary Columbia Asia, was not the only multinational 
media conglomerate working in China. Universal Studio also coproduced Pavilion of Women 
(tingyuan lide nvren 2001), directed by Ho Yim, starring Willem Dafoe (US) and Luo Yam 
(China). The Beijing Film Studio. Warner Bros. also coproduced ten 90 minute made-for-TV 
films entitled Swordsmen of the Passes (guanzhong daoke zhi qicunzi 2001) with a Chinese 
film company affiliated to the China Film Group and Salon Films of Hong Kong (Miller 
2005: 183–184). 
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When Big Shot’s Funeral made thirty-eight million RMB (around $6million) at the domestic 
box office, it indicated that Sino-US productions might enter a new era by applying a model 
the CEO of Huayi BrothersWang Zhongjun called “packaging”, under which several films 
were produced as a package. The cooperation led many China filmmakers to realise that film 
coproduction improves not only the local film quality but also increases revenue. In fact, 
before the production of Kung Fu Hustle (gongfu 2004), both sides had already obtained 
promising results. For example, Huayi solved the problems related to the scale of the film and 
the management of several films running at the same time. Columbia Asia had a better 
understanding of the growing Chinese film market, as well as how to make money in an 
overseas market by using Chinese elements, through Huayi Brothers, who knew the Chinese 
market very well (Weng 2012). However, the story did not have a happy ending. After four 
years of cooperation, the relationship ended. The reason being that the DVD copyright of He 
Ping’s Warriors of Heaven and Earth was sold ahead of schedule and thus greatly affecting 
its box office. For the US partner, their understanding about the market was based on mutual 
trust. The Chinese company’s behavior undermined the foundation of the cooperation. The 
problem of budget management worsened the relationship and, finally, it resulted in the 
failure of the cooperation.  
Compared with Sino-US collaboration in the 1990s, coventures in the first 10 years of the 21st 
century were characterised by more involvement in funding and talent from the Chinese side. 
During this period, Beijing New Pictures, which relied on Zhang Yimou, produced films such 
as Hero, House of Flying Daggers and Curse of the Golden Flower. The company utilised the 
distribution channel developed by Jiang Zhijiang, who is a film producer most famous for 
coproducing the wuxia film Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon in the U.S and who cooperated 
with American partners in a model which dealt with each film as a separate unit rather than 
the packaging model adopted by Huayi and Columbia Asia (Weng 2012). Hero, the first 
commercial blockbuster in the Chinese film industry, became a flagship of that era. Miramax 
marketed Hero as a second Crouching Tiger (Rosen 2003: 96). In addition, some state owned 
film companies, such as China Film Group  and Shanghai Film Group,  were actively 
exploring the opportunities of Sino-US coventures. Films like Red Cliff, Lust Caution, The 
Karate Kid, Fearless and Kung Fu Hustle were successful at the box office. Although 
disagreements still exist in many areas of the China-US relationship, accumulated experience 
has established a good foundation for future collaborations. 
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In August, 2005, a new policy document from the Ministry of Culture, State Administration 
of Radio, Film and Television, General Administration of Press and Publication, National 
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce called Several 
Opinions on Canvassing Foreign Investment into the Cultural Sector (guanyu wenhua lingyu 
yinjin waizi de ruogan yijian) defined the areas in the cultural industries in which foreign 
capital investment was permitted. It forbid foreign capital engaging in film and television. 
This policy considerably suppressed the increase of coproductions with foreign countries. 
Even though Columbia Asia was developing very quickly at that time, all their business in 
China stopped, as the future was not clear. After 2005, independent film companies became 
more involved in coventures with China, after big Hollywood companies retreated from the 
Chinese market. Representative films include The Promise (wuji 2005) from Moon Rock 
Entertainment, The Painted Veil (miansha 2006) from Luxious Veil Production, Lust, 
Caution (se.jie 2007) from Mr Yi Film Production and Blood Brothers (jianghu 2004) from 
Lion Mountain Production. The average production each year was about four to six films 
between 2005–2007 (Zhan 2012).  
Major Hollywood companies gradually returned to the Chinese market after several years’ 
observation. Columbia Asia joined in the production of CJ7 (changjiang 7hao 2008) and 
Jump (tiao chuqu 2009). The Karate Kid (gongfu zhimeng 2010), coproduced by Columbia 
Asia and China Film Group Corporation, was a huge success, especially in the US, with a 
box office take of US$360 million. The box office for The Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon 
Emperor, made by Universal Studios and Shanghai Film Group Corporation, then achieved 
US$400 million. On the other hand, Touch of the Panda (xiongmao huijia lu 2009) and 
Disney High School Musical: China (gewu qingchun 2010), produced with Disney, had an 
average performance in the market. Love In Space (quanqiu relian 2010), Hot Summer Days 
(quancheng relian 2011), and The Butcher, the Chef, and the Swordsman (daojianxiao 2011), 
which were funded by Fox International Productions and produced in mainland China, had 
much smaller marketing budget compared to those blockbusters but were still popular in 
China. Some independent companies, such as Lion Mountain Production and Casey Silver 
Productions, also achieved some success with coventure films, such as Red Cliff (2008) and 
The Forbidden Kingdom (2008). In addition, the China Media Fund, a subsidiary company of 
the American International Data Group (IDG), invested in such films as Hutong Days 
(hutongli de yangguang 2007),  Examination 1997 (gaokao 1997 2009), Under the Hawthorn 
Tree (shanzha shu zhilian 2010), Future X-Cops (weilai jingcha 2010) and Snow Flower and 
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the Secret Fan (xuehua mishan 2011). The number of annual productions remained between 
five and seven between 2008–2011 (Zhan 2012). 
All in all, Sino-US collaboration developed slowly from 2002 to 2012 as a result of various 
policy restrictions. Films that were mainly, or partially, invested in by US companies, but 
produced by Chinese companies, usually focused on the Chinese market. The production of 
other films that were successful overseas, such as The Karate Kid and The Mummy: Tomb of 
the Dragon Emperor, were dominated by American companies, while Chinese companies 
only invested and assisted the production by sharing the copyright in China. Although the 
quantity of Sino-US coventures was very small in those years, they had already made giant 
leaps compared to the years before the film industrialisation reform. Also, the types of film 
became more diverse. Drama and action were dominant in quantity (40.5 per cent and 35.7 
per cent respectively). Romance contributed 9.5 per cent. Comedy, cartoon, thriller and 
musical altogether account for 14.3 per cent of the total (Zhan 2012). Although drama films 
represented the largest portion, action films like The Karate Kid, The Mummy: Tomb of the 
Dragon Emperor, Red Cliff  were more successful at the box office. 
The signing of the Sino-US MOU in 2012 as mentioned in Chapter Two, saw the Chinese 
government make the following concessions: China would permit fourteen premium format 
films (IMAX, 3D) to be exempt from the twenty film import quota, which remained in place; 
the box office share US studios could earn under the master contract increased to twenty-five 
per cent from thirteen per cent. This further softening of policy greatly encouraged U.S 
filmmakers. By this time, box office revenue in China had surpassed Japan, making it the 
second biggest market in the world. Hollywood realised that film screens were increasing and 
it was time to enter the Chinese market. In the same year the huge success  of Avatar (RMB 
1.32 billion), Transformer 3D and Titanic 3D in the Chinese market surprised Hollywood. 
Additionally, the policy for Sino-Foreign film joint venture was relaxed further, which 
provided hope for Hollywood companies wanting to enter the Chinese market. The 
establishment of Oriental DreamWorks in Shanghai, Cameron-Pace Group China headquarter 
in Tianjin, and News Corp’s shares in Bona Film, showed that Sino-US collaboration was 
entering a new stage. The door was begining to open. 
However, it was far from completely unlocked. Collaboration with China was a way to get 
around the quota. Adding some Chinese elements was a means to pass the government’s 
review, if not to appease the China Film Group and have the film included in the quota. This 
147 
 
was a different key. In 2012, more blockbusters started to add Chinese elements and 
announce themselves as coproduction films. They began to “stick on” Chinese elements and 
recast roles in films such as Looper, The Expendables 2 and Iron Man 3 which led to the 
phenomenon of fake coproduction, as will be discussed below.  
From China’s perspective, Zhou Tiedong (2012), the ex-manager of China Film Promotion 
International (CFPI), believed China’s overseas film market had almost been supported by 
coproduction films, especially coventures with the American big players. The strong 
distribution system and marketing channels of Hollywood assisted in the market success of 
Mummy 3 and the Karate Kid. In 2010, 47 films, including 46 coproductions, were exported 
and the total revenue reached a peak of RMB 3.517 billion; however, the bulk of this revenue 
was earned by one feature film. The Karate Kid earned RMB 2.4 billion outside China. In 
2011, 52 films, including 50 coproductions, were exported. Without a blockbuster 
collaboration with Hollywood, export revenue declined to RMB 2.024 billion. China clearly 
needed Hollywood. For China, working with the most successful film producing country in 
the world definitely offers a chance to upgrade its film industry, promote its films going out 
into the world and to enhance its cultural influence, thus to achieve its soft power ambitions. 
Zhang Xun (2013), the ex-manager of CFCC, also stated that more and more films emphasise 
collaboration from the beginning to the end, in the last two years, which means Chinese 
partners took part in the project from script development to distribution. This model is an 
advantage for the integration of different production styles and the promotion of Chinese 
culture. US filmmakers are trying to use the coproduction key to open the Chinese market, 
while China is attempting to use this key to open the global market. However, the huge 
differences in film industry markets, business culture and language still pose great challenges 
for the Western film giant and Eastern rising power to collaborate successfully. Joe Aguilar 
from Oriental Dreamworks said at the 2014 17th Shanghai International Film Festival that it 
would take a long time for Hollywood and China to get on the same page.  
While there has been a great deal of discussion about Hollywood-China collaboration since 
2012, ‘real’ US-China coproductions have been rare. The following section will discuss the 
challenges and the heated debates on the subject since 2012, including references to The 
Cursed Piano (mozhou gangqing) by Shanghai Film Group Corporation, Looper (huangxing 
shizhe 2012) and Iron Man 3 (gangtie xia3 2013) by DMG, Wolf Totem (langtu teng 2015) 
and Man of Tai Chi (taiji xia 2013) by China Film Group Corporation, Cloud Atlas (yuntu 
148 
 
2012) by Dreams of the Dragon pictures, The Expendables 2 (gansi dui2 2012) by Le Vision 
Pictures, and Annihilator (chaoneng xia forthcoming) by China National Film Capital. Most 
of these films had been released at the time of writing, but some were still in the production 
process. 
6.2 Fake coproductions? 
DMG CEO Dan Mintz said, ‘there are many obstacles to overcome for Sino-US coproduction. 
The process of Sino-US coproduction is tough for Chinese film makers. The contradiction of 
interest and culture cannot be avoided’ (cited in Yang 2012:38). Some of the challenges 
discussed below are common in other cases of international coproductions, but some are 
unique to the Sino-US case. Before going into the details, I will firstly look at how the 
phenomenon of fake coproduction happened. 
Although, revenue sharing had been raised to twenty-five per cent for imported films due to 
the MOU, ticket receipts for approved joint productions is forty-three per cent,  and 
circumventing the quota remained attractive. Xu Yuan,the associate editor of Mtime.com, 
who has interviewed many experienced professionals in coproduction, divided Sino-US 
collaborations into two types: ‘fake’ coproduction and ‘real’ coproduction.The first one is 
pure Hollywood, but with some Chinese investment. This type of production incorporates 
some Chinese elements, or actors/actresses, in order to meet the requirements of government 
rules. The second type is more like a Chinese film, but directly utilises the personnel, filming 
techniques and marketing of Hollywood, particularly special effects technology and the 
experience in the development of film related products. Xu believes that the first type of 
coventure is not good for China from the perspective of cultural protection. The motivation is 
to be certified as a domestic film in order to avoid the import quota and enjoy a higher 
portion of revenue sharing. ‘This is actually a kind of trade dumping’, according to Xu (cited 
in Yang 2012:41). But, from the business point of view, Ji Erwei, an experienced filmmaker 
who frequently travels between Hollywood and mainland China, believes that it is not a bad 
idea for China to act as an investor. As long as the film makes money, it doesn’t matter who 
plays the leading role. He further argues that it is good to include Chinese elements in the 
film production, but it is unnecessary to emphasise it too much. Although the films made by 
Americans represent American values, most blockbusters promote universal values. On the 
other hand, Ji Erwei had to admit that the stories of Cloud Atlas and Iron Man 3 have nothing 
to do with China. Some of the scenes were shot in China, but this was only to meet the 
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regulations rather than demonstrating Chinese culture. He also supports the proposal that the 
government add more requirements for these types of films, otherwise it is unfair for 
domestic films, since coproduced films could easily escape restrictions by simply adding 
some Chinese elements (cited in Yang 2012:41).  
In 2012, more blockbusters announced themselves as joint productions. They included some 
Chinese elements and recast roles in order to achieve market success. Typical examples are 
Looper, The Expendables 2 and Iron Man 3. Dan Mintz, the CEO of the DMG China, who 
can speak fluent Mandarin and who is recognised as ‘Hollywood’s Mr China’, brought two 
blockbusters, Looper and Iron Man 3 to China (Montlake 2012). In Looper, a time-travel 
thriller from Endgame Entertainment, many scenarios were originally set in Paris, but were 
changed to Shanghai after DMG invested in the film. As well as some shooting in Shanghai, 
a well-known Chinese actress, Xu Qing, was invited to act as the wife of the hero, Joe (Bruce 
Willis); although she only had several minutes of scenes script and few lines, the producers 
argued the role of Xu Qing was very important to the whole film. Looper’s director Rian 
Johnson’s time-travel epic had two versions, with the Chinese cut including a much longer 
montage of Joseph Gordan-Levitt’s time in Shanghai. Compared to Looper, the Chinese 
elements in Iron Man 3 (coproduced by DMG and Marvel Pictures) were even more 
contrived and insubstantial. Iron Man 3 was split into two different versions. One was for 
Chinese audiences, with Chinese characters Wang Xueqi and Fan Bingbing as well as 
Chinese sequences. The official international version did not contain these sequences. Even 
in the Chinese version, Wang’s role seems very unnecessary and was described by 
microbloggers on weibo (China’s twitter) as ‘the walk-on of all walk-ons’. In the 
international version, Wang appeared for only ten seconds in the opening scene, plus a 
fleeting glimpse towards the end of the film where his face can not be seen clearly. Wang is a 
very respected and experienced actor in China. He told Hollywood Reporter that his character 
was described as a major figure and the role as very challenging when he was persuaded to 
accept the role (Brooks 2013). Fan Bingbing only appeared in the Chinese version.  
This result was not what DMG CEO Dan Mintz intended, according to Montlake (2012). 
Mintz was ‘betting on getting lucrative distribution rights in China to Iron Man 3 and using it 
as a calling card to court other studios circling China’ (Montlake 2012). Although the film 
producers required some scenes to be shot in China, the director, Shane Black, said that 
neither he nor any of the film stars would visit China. ‘Basically we are setting aspects of the 
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film in China, but we won’t be filming in China’ (Montlake 2012). Mintz tried very hard to 
use his Chinese networks (guanxi) to balance the government requirements and Hollywood’s 
insistence. He intended to make the Chinese element fit into the Hollywood style blockbuster, 
and appreciated by the whole world (Mintz 2012 cited in Brzeski 2012). The film was not 
appreciated by the Chinese government and also prompted condemnation from bloggers and 
critics in China for the two versions and for ‘not containing enough bespoke Chinese content’ 
(Brooks 2013). Media suspicion abounded in anticipation of whether this film would be 
approved as a domestic film for screening. It was reported that the film was registered as a 
joint production for shooting, but failed to aquire the official approval for screening. 
According to the Manager of CFCC, Miao Xiaotian (interview July 2014), it was actually 
registered as an assisted production at the very beginning. Associate Manager of CFCC, Xu, 
said that she received many calls and emails asking about the real status of these films (Xu 
2014 interviewed July 2014). We do not know what happened then. There is a possibility that 
the film was registered as a joint production, but SARFT cancelled its qualification after 
seeing that the final work was not the same as what had been approved.  
In the wake of the perception that Hollywood might be cynically taking advantage of the 
booming market, the coproduction film review policy was tightened. Zhang Pimin, the 
deputy director of SARFT, announced at a CCTV Movie Channel Workshop in August 2012 
that coproductions would be reviewed strictly to see if they were ‘real’ or ‘fake’ (Zhang 2012; 
Tsui 2013a; Coonan 2013).  He especially mentioned Iron Man 3 and Looper as examples, 
and said that ‘Some so-called coproduction movies just make superficial changes, with little 
investment from China and use very few Chinese elements, and call themselves 
coproductions. These coproductions get around the quota system, and take domestic 
investment away and threaten Chinese indigenous movies’ (Zhang 2012, Goldstein 2012) 
Iron Man 3 and Looper tested the regulations by adding superficial Chinese content. The 
Chinese government responded by tightening film policy in 2012. But sensing a gold rush, 
Hollywood continued to try to make China an integral part of a movie’s storyline in order to 
qualify as a joint production, not just to increase its appeal to Chinese audiences, but also to 
garner favour with the China Film Group (CFG), which controls the import of foreign titles, 
to pass the review of the CFCC and ultimately to be certified as a domestic film thus allowing 
the filmmakers to receive a larger share of the film’s revenue in China. Examples include The 
Amazing Spider-Man 2, X-Men: Days of Future Past (2014), Godzilla (2014) as well as 
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Transformers 4 (2014). Transformers 4 built a box office milestone; it was the first film to 
exceed $300m in box office revenue in China, a figure that was even higher than the film’s 
earnings in North America (McClintock 2014). It is easy to see how hard Michael Bay’s 
Transformers: Age of Extinction tried to feature a China-inflected story and to add Chinese 
elements in order to meet the standard of joint production. A joint venture between 
Paramount Pictures, the state-owned China Movie Channel15 (CMC) and its distribution 
partner Jiaflix Entertainment was established. Paramount connected with CCTV through Sid 
Ganis, former president of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences, who now serves 
as chairman of Jiaflix, which helps export Chinese films to oversees territories and manages 
the production of films in China. As Curtin, Jacks and Li (2015 forthcoming) observe: 
‘CCTV provided Paramount with an influential partner at the epicenter of the country’s 
media infrastructure. Announcing their collaboration in April 2013, they pegged the film’s 
release for on or about 27 June 2014, which was unusual compared to most studios, which 
were struggling to predict release dates even six weeks prior to their PRC premieres’. 
Hollywood has stepped up its efforts since Iron Man 3 partnering with private film 
production and distribution company DMG, to land such partnerships as a way to circumvent 
China’s quota system, discussed in Chapter Four. However, the ambition of Transformers 4 
is bigger than just securing a place on the import quota. As senior editor of Variety Graser 
(April 2013) reported: ‘Studio can file for official coproduction status, granted by the Chinese 
government, at a later time’.  
Chinese actors (such as Li Bingbing) are used not just in walk-on roles any more, though they 
are still not main actors. Many more action sequences (more than half an hour) in 
Transformers 4 were set in Hong Kong and mainland China and feature national landmarks 
such as the Great Wall. The heavily featured Chinese product placement throughout the film 
is obvious, for example, Stanley Tucci’s character drinking a popular Chinese brand of milk –
Yili, Mark Wahlberg’s character using a China Construction Bank ATM – in Texas. The 
film’s star, Mark Wahlberg, and director, Michael Bay, stayed in China for shooting. Unlike 
Iron Man 3, it only has one version. Although the film has been criticised by media and 
scholars for ‘its numerous Chinese product placements, generously featured Chinese 
landmarks, cameos by Chinese pop stars, as well as what is perceived to be a pro-Chinese-
                                                            
15 China Movie Channel [also known as CCTV-6] is under CCTV, a state owned media giant 
under the umbrella of SARFT 
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government message’ (Zhu 2014), it  can also be recognised as further testing of the waters 
by Hollywood. Transformers 4 was released as an imported film due to still having 
insufficient Chinese elements. We can see that Hollywood studios are ‘flipping through their 
Rolodexes to call up anyone they know in the territory’ (Graser 2013), and have tried 
different keys to open the market.  
There is no doubt that China is a big part of the future of movies and the Chinese market is 
very important. However, no matter how important it is, it will be difficult for Hollywood to 
change its one hundred year model to suit the Chinese market. Transformers 4 illustrates ‘the 
delicate balancing game of Hollywood studios trying to work out what the Chinese market 
wants while simultaneously catering to Americans’ (Watt 2014). ‘If such films aren't handled 
properly, they risk alienating both audiences’, said Keane (cited in Watt 2014). The fake 
coproduction can be seem as a template in this transition stage. This template of inserting 
China into existing Hollywood blockbusters has mostly seen success at the Chinese box 
office, although the films failed to achieve real coproduction status. To gain ‘real 
coproduction’ (ie. Joint production) status, positive Chinese elements, a significant Chinese 
cast presence and enough proportion of Chinese investment, are required. In this regard, 
China is using its market power to induce Hollywood’s cooperation, and using Hollywood’s 
global reach to ‘transmit favourable narratives and images about China to the western (and 
westernised) world’ (Homewood 2014). 
Zhu (2014) argues that Transformers 4 has scored big for the US  and, ultimately, sells 
American dreams rather than Chinese in the fight for soft power. This is obviously true, but 
the Chinese government’s intention to take knowledge capital from Hollywood to improve its 
soft power globally is beginning to pay some dividends. The development of Chinese 
international soft power in this field will be a long march; these may be merely the first steps. 
The question is, how far can Hollywood go on the prototype of East-West hybrids? Media 
reports that Avatar 2 may become a real coproduction. According to one commentator, 
China’s leadership is ‘still in the model of centralized and unopposed government control, 
[and] is in a unique position to tell Hollywood bigwigs what to do by using money’ ( Grady 
Smith cited in Turney 2013:46).  
However, if all the criteria for joint production announced by the government in 2012 are 
satisfied, with Chinese parties taking leading roles in investment and cast, if the Transformers 
5 and Iron Man 4 are full of Chinese, will they still appeal to global audiences? After decades, 
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will Hollywood-China hybrids end up like those of China-Hong Kong, that the audiences 
won’t be able to tell if a film is a Hollywood blockbuster, a Chinawood blockbuster or a 
Hollywood-China blockbuster? Or perhaps Hollywood might integrate too much Chinese 
content and gradually lose its global audience in other countries, and even Chinese audiences 
too, because it is no longer pure Hollywood blockbuster. Perhaps audiences will gradually get 
used to the East-West hybrids, and focus more on the film itself rather than the face colour, or 
China may further loosen the quota and Hollywood will just give up trying to achieve joint 
production status. This section raises a lot of questions. The following will look at challenges 
for the real coproduction model. 
6.3 The hurdles of real coproduction  
After 2012, there have been many projects pitched as real coproductions which mean those 
projects involving sufficient Chinese investment and cast required by the SARFT, and a deep 
cooperation from the script development to the end. Most of them are still in progress while 
others have failed at the box office. Keanu Reeves directorial debut, Man of Tai Chi (taiji xia 
2013), coproduced by the state-backed China Film Group, Wanda Group and Village 
Roadshow Pictures, was released in 2013 and only grossed about 23 million RMB in China 
and US$100,000 at the North American box office. The investors lost 140 million RMB (Shi 
2013). It involved a Hollywood A-lister making a film mostly shot in China with a Chinese 
actor (Tiger Chen) in the lead role. China Film Group had high hopes for the film, which was 
seen as a step forward for international collaboration in China (Tsui 2013b).  
The Cursed Piano, is a forthcoming real coproduction, by Shanghai Film Group and Mike 
Medavoy. Mike Medavoy delivered a joint production Diehai Fengyun (shanghai 2010) in 
2010, starring John Cusack and Gong Li, but it lost about US$ 45 million. The Cursed Piano 
tells a romantic story about a Jewish pianist and a Shanghai woman during the Second World 
War. Zhonglun Ren, the Chairman of the Shanghai Film Group Corporation said:  
[E]ven if The Cursed Piano was directed by Barry Levinson, no one can deny that it 
is still a Chinese film. The American team contributed with their material, director 
and market analysis. But we were leading the story. The Shanghai Film Group used to 
participate the production of Hollywood blockbuster Empire of the Sun , the Chinese 
side at that time was only responsible for labor service such as providing filming 
location and organizing extras. I still remember that the Bund was closed for over one 
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month because of the film, and over 1300 air conditioners were taken away from the 
façade of the building. These services are impossible today. (cited in Yang 2012: 41)  
Ren’s memory can tell us how much China is in need of cooperation with Hollywood at that 
time. The Shanghai Film Group Corporation started to take part in the discussion of the script 
at the start of production of The White Countess (bojue furen 2005). Chinese actors/actresses 
and technicians with good communication ability with foreigners joined the production. SMG 
also invested in the film and attended to the copyright. In 2007, Shanghai Film Group 
Corporation joined the production of The Mummy - Tomb of the Dragon Emperor. Ren said, 
‘Although Mummy 3 is counted as a joint production, in reality it is still assisted production. 
An overseas company provided the script, and shot some scenes in China. We were only 
assisting them without playing active role in the collaboration (cited in Yang 2012:41)’. 
Things have changed in the production of The Cursed Piano. The Shanghai Film Group 
Corporation took a leadership role in the preparation of the film, creation of the script, 
selection of the actors/actresses, production and distribution. (Yang 2012:41) The production 
of The Cursed Piano was announced at the 2011 Shanghai International Film Festival. Three 
years have passed and it is still in process, while all the fake coproductions have been 
released. 
Real coproductions possess genuine and legitimate differences in business practices, in 
modes of storytelling, in culture, certainly in language. Bringing together two different ways 
of storytelling is another level of complexity. All these differences obstruct China-US real 
coproduction, not to mention censorship and piracy problems. The following section will 
further look at these obstructions. 
6.3.1 Just language differences?  
Language differences are easy to recognise but are always underestimated in how much of a 
challenge they pose for film production. Misunderstandings arise due to translation, and the 
differences can raise questions about whether the film should be filmed in English or in 
Mandarin. Jianxin Huang, one of the fifth generation of Chinese directors, refused to produce 
a Chinese story in English. He believed that there would be cultural conflict. However, 
American audiences do not appreciate the film fully if it is made in Mandarin. Feng Xiaogang, 
one of the leading directors in China, said, ‘Our films speak Mandarin which is the 
mainstream culture in China, but not in the whole world. Most of the audiences in the world 
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are used to English films. Moreover, American audiences do not like watching the subtitles in 
a film. That is why it is hard for our films to go out. We are dancing with shackles’ (Tang 
2012:58).  
At the fifteenth Shanghai International Film Festival in 2012, National Film Capital 
announced that they would invest US$200 million in ten films. Each film would have a 
maximum investment limit of US$50 million. For example, The Annihilator (chaoneng xia, 
forthcoming) would be characterised as a Chinese story with Hollywood script and director, 
English dialogue, and global sourcing and distribution. The Annihilator has a typical Chinese 
appearance; the main character not only has the superpower to save the world, but also 
demonstrates the kindness and wisdom of the Chinese people to the world. Wang Guowei, 
the CEO of the National Film Capital, said, ‘As 80% of our audience speaks English, why not 
choose English as the first language for this film. We are used to watching English films, 
however, if the film is translated directly from the Chinese, it will be difficult for people from 
other countries to understand’ (cited in Yang 2012:46). Wang Zhonglei, the CEO of Huayi 
Brothers shared the same opinion, “We are more willing to utilize the Hollywood’s standard 
system for the film’s production. In order to be accepted by wider market, we have to use 
English for the film. However, I hope that the core value and story from the film is still 
Chinese. This is our dream’ (cited in Yang 2012:46). It is hard to tell whether a Chinese 
Annihilator will be appreciated by the world like Spiderman or Iron Man.  
Actually, the choice of language for film directly reflects the film’s target market. Ellen R. 
Eliasoph, the CEO of Village Roadshow Entertainment Group, believes that, ‘It is unrealistic 
to produce a film loved by everyone. Chinese directors should focus more on telling a good 
story and directing a good film, rather than meeting the taste for everyone’ (cited in Yang 
2012:46). Terence Chang agrees with Eliasoph: ‘You can only concentrate on one market. It 
is not a wise idea to make compromises for audiences from different countries in the 
coproduction. If it is a film for the American market, then make it more American, and vice 
versa’ (cited in Yang 2012:46). Jean Jacques Annaud, a famous French director with much 
coproduction experience proposed a solution for the language conflict in Sino-US films: 
‘There should be an English edition for a Chinese film if it wants to succeed in the United 
States. However, for a Chinese story, there should be a reasonable explanation if the Chinese 
characters speak English in the film’. Like Annaud’s opinion about Wolf Totem (lang tuteng, 
2015), he said, ‘My thought is to tell a story that happened in the Inner Mongolia, North of 
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China. Of course, I shall use Chinese actors/actresses for this Chinese story. This film is 
made mainly for Chinese audience’ (Yang 2012:46). 
6.3.2 Cultural differences are everywhere 
As Chu (2014) has shown, cultural differences can lead to different expectations among 
audiences. Traditionally, historical dramas on film and television have been most popular in 
China, while more American films are set in the present. The different literary traditions give 
rise to differences in storytelling between the two cultures. Americans mostly use the 
Western European form of storytelling, with an emphasis on conflict. Generally, the main 
character attempts to reach a goal but is confronted with opposition. A series of clashes is 
refined into a three-act or five-act structure. The story may sometimes express moral lessons. 
In China, storytelling is heavily affected by the ethical and philosophical system of 
Confucianism, with an emphasis on moral lessons delivered in subtle or obvious ways that 
can be learned from the story (Nemschoff and Yu: 2014). Neither way is better, but finding 
common ground between the two traditions is not easy. The conflicts usually appear in the 
codevelopment script stage. A Sino-US war film with the working title Moon Flower of 
Flying Tigers (feihu yueliang hua) is set to be produced by Mission: Impossible producer 
Paula Wagner and President of Desen International Media International Media, Ann An. The 
film is a love story between a Chinese nurse and an American pilot in the Second World War 
in China's Yunnan province. An Ann bought the adaptation rights to the original novel in 
2009. She hired five Chinese screenwriters to produce the script, but they had difficulties in 
describing American style of speech, behaviour and emotion. She then looked for cooperation 
with Hollywood, and found the Oscar-nominated screenwriter Naomi Foner (Running on 
Empty) to work on the project. ‘When Foner finished her writing, I still needed Chinese 
screenwriters to edit it, especially for those parts related to China’ (Frater 2014). 
Business culture  
The business cultures of the two sides are also very different. Chinese are used to developing 
‘guanxi’ (relationship) and ‘shengyi’ (business) by drinking and eating. Americans may need 
to sit down with lawyers. In terms of deal-making, Chinese often send subordinates to 
negotiate before the executives sign the contract. This can create conflict as the American 
parties may not understand the Chinese style. For example, one Chinese production company 
proposed to provide most of the financing for a project raised by an established American 
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independent production company. A young bilingual female employee was sent to negotiate 
the first step. The employee arranged for her superiors to come to Los Angeles to meet the 
American partners, sign the contract and have a celebratory meal. The Americans thought 
that they were now finally meeting up with the head of the Chinese company to start the real 
negotiations, and began the meal by saying they would renegotiate the previously agreed 
provisions. The film was never made (Nemschoff and Yu: 2014:12). As Dan Harris and 
Robert Cain (2012a) point out  in their law blog, the contract styles in both countries are very 
different. ‘Chinese companies are uncomfortable with well-written complete contracts that tie 
them down on most or all key issues. They generally prefer vague contractual commitments 
that allow for constant re-negotiating and clarifying of deal points as the transaction 
progresses.’ This is what exactly what the foreign side attempts to prevent (Cain 2012a).  
The challenge for project negotiation can also be demonstrated by the Cloud Atlas case. At 
the beginning of 2011, the president of the Dreams of the Dragon Pictures, Qiu Huashun, met 
the producer of Titanic. He was introduced to a project that required 180 million RMB in 
finance. Qiu did not have a great deal of experience with projects of this size. His lack of 
experience meant that Qiu had to be very cautious at every step. The negotiation began with 
the basic elements of the contract. Seven lawyers were hired. ‘Our company has a copyright 
lawyer and a concept lawyer. At the beginning, we used Chinese to discuss the framework by 
email and telephone. When entered into critical stage of the negotiation, the English 
copyright was used. I had to hire two lawyers from Britain, who charged 1000 and 600 US 
dollar per hour respectively, since the lawyers at my company do not speak English. The 
tough negotiation lasts for half a year. Even so, the contract still forgot to clear the time of 
payment which resulted in the later financial problems of that film making’ (Yang 2012: 42-
43).  
6.3.3 Film system differences 
Hollywood has developed a comprehensive industrial system over the past hundred years, 
and this system is supported by a well-developed legal, financial and accounting system. In 
comparison, China’s system or the infrastructure for making films is still in a relatively early 
stage. ‘There are fundamental differences for China and US film system. We need to make 
these two systems compatible for Sino-US collaboration’ Zhang Zhao (2012), the CEO of Le 
Vision Pictures said.  
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The completion guarantor for film production as applied in the US, Europe and Australia is 
not used in China due to its underdeveloped film mechanism, as was discussed in Chapter 
Four. The accounting systems used in US and Europe do not apply in China, which has its 
own accounting laws and regulations. Even in production management there are differences. 
For example, Chinese crews are used to working twenty-four hours continuously, or even 
longer, in order to catch up with a schedule. However, some American crew have the right to 
work only for eight hours per day, and this is protected by labour laws. As a result, the 
freedom of the director decreases and the cost of the film increases significantly, which 
results in discontent for the producer. If these problems are not solved properly, conflict will 
surely follow.  
Conflict can also be seen in copyright division and revenue sharing. The big studios are 
cautious about copyright. Even if the Chinese side has funded the film, copyright of the work 
is not shared, which leads to discontent from the Chinese partner. In early times, the 
copyright of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Warriors of Heaven and Earth, belonged 
to Hollywood, although Chinese partners invested funds and labour. ‘Even if we take up 30-
40 per cent of the total investment, we are only qualified to share revenue other than the 
copyright. This is actually very unfair. Chinese films belong to America’ (Huang cited in 
Tang 2012:61). Huang Jianxin, ex-president of the China Film Directors Assosiation said, 
‘America knows that it is unfair by law. Our business should be protected by the law in China, 
which defines that each investor enjoys corresponding copyright and the right of sharing 
revenue. If there is no such regulation for both sides, then a supplementary agreement should 
be proposed based on international conventions. We must consider this for long term 
cooperation’ (cited in Tang 2012:61). In recent years as for Cloud Atlas, Dreams of Dragon 
Pictures spent 3 million USD for the rights to distribute in mainland China, and 5 million 
USD on the 9.3 per cent global market share for fifteen years. But, it also meant that they 
could not get any benefit from the copyright after fifteen years. Zhao Zhang, whose company 
had a ten per cent investment input and took part in the production of The Expendables 2 
(Gansi Dui 2, 2012), has a deeper understanding about China’s difficulty in obtaining 
copyright. He said, ‘It does not necessarily mean that the copyright belongs to you if you 
developed the script, since the image of characters and concepts are developed by others. 
China has many good film themes which can be developed as intellectual properties’. The 
copyright issue is a reflection of relative power. In the early 2000s, China’s film industry was 
much less able to compete for copyright. In contrast, as a leading entertainment lawyer, 
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Wang, says, ‘in terms of the Sino-US production he is involved in now, the Chinese side 
basically all have the copyright of the coproduced or cofinanced films’ (Wang 2014).  
Another issue is differences in practices of revenue sharing. Sino-US productions have 
adopted regional revenue sharing as their way of doing business. This means that the Chinese 
party will receive revenue from the Chinese market and foreigners will take revenue from the 
overseas market. He Ping, ex-consultant and producer of Columbia Pictures Film Production 
Asia, established coventures with Huayi Brothers for several films. He said, ‘Chinese 
investors prefer the regional sharing way rather than to do global sharing with America. The 
reason is that the profit obtained by Chinese investors by global sharing is very low, 
sometimes only 10 to 20 thousands USD. American distributors would give you a big bill and 
then charge their agency fee, so the rest of the revenue was only a little’ (He cited in Tang 
2012: 65). He also pointed out the unfairness about the agency fee, ‘We only charge about 
10-15 per cent for the agency fee, but the Big Six charge about 25 per cent. The cost for them 
including traveling, salary etc. is quite high’ (He cited in Tang 2012: 66).  He Ping also gave 
another example. When China invests 20 million RMB for a coproduction and sets eight 
years as the settlement period, the cost of capital is very high. Therefore, He suggested that 
Chinese investors should consider carefully before cooperating with Hollywood. 
The revenue sharing model adopted by The Expendables 2 was also that of region sharing. 
According to Zhao Zhang, the CEO of Le Vision Pictures, he was not confident enough to 
accept a global revenue sharing plan. First, the financial cost for the global revenue sharing 
was too high and could even exceed the film’s projected revenue. Second, many Chinese film 
companies have accounting fraud problems, which may result in lawsuits if they are involved 
in global revenue sharing. The Chinese system is not prepared for international rules in terms 
of accounting and legal issues. Hollywood can do business globally because it has vast 
experience in controlling the rules of the game and  most of the world uses the US dollar as 
its payment currency. Their legal and financial system is well developed and they have rich 
experience in coproduction with regions. It will take decades for China to develop such a 
mature market mechanism as Hollywood has. Zhao Zhang’s purpose in coproducing with 
Hollywood was to become familiar with Hollywood’s system, such as its financial and 
insurance regulations. If Hollywood spends 100 million USD on production, how do they 
spend it and how do they get the money back? (Zhang 2012). 
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6.3.4 Who listens to whom?  
When a coproduction is confronted with these differences, who should listen to whom?  
Americans have not made the best partners in coproductions, and historically their 
industry has not needed help from outside. Americans often try to control all aspects 
of a project and see the other participants as just sources of money or locations, not as 
full and equal partners contributing to every aspect of a production. For Chinese-
American coproduction to succeed in the long run, there needs to be mutual respect 
and a real working relationship between the parties on both a creative and economic 
level (Nemschoff and Yu: 2014:12).  
But when it comes to real interest, respecting each other may end up as just rhetoric. Quite 
often complaints being heard from the Chinese industry are that Hollywood studios are too 
arrogant to cooperate with and the law and regulation involved are too complicated, while the 
independent producers of the US are more understanding and cooperative (Geng Ling 2014). 
Eben Davidson from Paramount Pictures pointed out two problems in the 17th Shanghai 
International Film Festival Forum (SIFFORUM) in 2014: first, the Chineseness of content 
and, second, the process of production is different in China. They say it needs to change, to 
be more like the Hollywood model. This is unlikely to happen. How to build a more 
comprehensive and competitive ecosystem for China film industry is an issue that was 
actively explored by the industry at the 2014 SIFFORUM. Jack Gao, SVP News Corporation, 
supported the idea of learning from Hollywood. Gao’s standpoint has been discussed and 
endorsed by most industry people, although with a different learning emphasis.  
There is no doubt that Chinese filmmakers and investors are enthusiastic about learning from 
Hollywood. In the 2010 SIFFORUM, director Feng Xiaogang argued that Chinese film is like 
Chinese soccer. While the desire and will are strong, the skills and technology are not good 
enough. Feng advocated cooperating with Hollywood to learn skills and technological 
processes and put those into Chinese films (Tang 2012:54-55). Andrew Y. Yan, who is the 
managing partner of SAIF Partners, agreed with Feng, but argued that marketing is the most 
important part. The CEO of Bona Film Group, Yu Dong, worried about how to distribute 
films in the U.S market, while the director He Ping, who used to work for Columbia Asia and 
has considerable experience of coproduction, emphasised content (Tang 2012: 58-59).  The 
CEO of Shanghai Film Group, Ren Zhonglun, appreciated Hollywood’s sophisticated 
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producer system and said that ‘as an investor, I hope that I could meet better producer 
teams’(Ren cited in Tang 2012:64). Director Huang Jianxin observed that the production 
management of Hollywood is the most advanced in the world and he recalled that when the 
team of Kill Bill came to China they (the Chinese side) learned a lot about the budget process. 
In China, the budget design for film is a very basic estimate, but Hollywood’s budget 
preparation is so detailed that it even included how many tissues were needed for the office. 
The budget and execution become very transparent. ‘We need to learn how to have China’s 
film production being managed at an international standard’ (Huang cited in Tang 
2012:61,65). 
BoxOffice editor Phil Contrino pointed out that Chinese filmmakers are getting better at 
making films that connect with Chinese audiences (Turney 2013: 46-47). Contrino’s 
observation can be demonstrated by local films that knocked Hollywood blockbusters from 
the top of box office revenue, such as Lost in Thailand (renzai jiongtu zhi taijiong 2012) and 
Tiny Times (xiao shidai 2013). In the 2014 China-Australia film coproduction forum, when 
the Manager of CFCC, Miao Xiaotian, was asked by director Pang Hong if the government 
could release the policy to let the Chinese film industry have more opportunities to coproduce 
with, and learn from, Hollywood, he disagreed with the idea that Chinese filmmakers did not 
know how to make films and should learn systematically from Hollywood. He said  
China is not that fancy about blockbusters as before, especially since last year. Some 
local films like Finding Mr. Right (Beijing Yushang Xiyatu) and American Dreams in 
China (Zhongguo Hehuoren) achieved a better box office than Hollywood films. 
China’s domestic box office has exceeded the American box office in the past two 
years, this is quite rare in the world, only Korea and India have had similar success. 
Ten years ago, when we asked for cooperation with Hollywood, they would say: you 
fix your piracy problem first. But since last year, the big studios have all come to 
China to look for cooperation opportunities. One of the big studios’ CEO, as I know, 
has come to China six or seven times in half a year. I believe that China’s film 
industry is now an integral part in the global film industry chain. I have confidence in 
China’s film (Miao 2014).  
So now at least China’s filmmakers are not satisfied to just learn from Hollywood but are 
seeking to be equal and willing collaborators.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
At the moment it seems that Hollywood tentpole films are not providing sufficient Chinese 
elements to please the authorities. On the other hand, China-led productions are full of 
Chinese content and are, therefore, granted approval much more readily. However, they are 
harder to distribute globally and rarely achieve strong box office returns overseas. Hollywood 
films now seem to speak louder about Chinese soft power than China’s own film or China-
led productions. As Rosen (2011) has it, ‘Hollywood blockbuster films have in fact been far 
more effective in promoting China’s public diplomacy initiatives than China’s own films’. 
Hollywood blockbusters ‘have a financial interest in making China look good’ as deviations 
from a China-friendly strategy are punished either by the Chinese public at the box office or 
by film authorities through outright bans’ (Rosen 2011).  
In addition to collaborations between Hollywood’s big studios and China’s film giants, there 
are many small or medium scale Chinese film companies exploring opportunities or working 
with independent producers. For example, Soundfirm, a post-production company with an 
Australian background, is currently participating in a coproduction with American 
independent producer Prinson Forest. ‘I would like to work with independent producers’, the 
CEO of Geng Ling said, ‘working with big studios takes much more time; they are quite 
arrogant and always think they know more (Geng 2014)’. Young producers with US film 
studies, or those working in the background, are trying to build bridges. Wan Long, a 
graduate of the University of Southern California, established an American company using 
Chinese investment. His company is currenly operating several coventures, one of which is 
attempting to localise Hangover (Wan 2014).  
No matter how many obstacles or challenges exist for Sino-US collaboration, no matter if the 
infrastructure for international film coproduction in China is ready, Hollywood is setting its 
course for China at full speed. A substantial amount of money has flown into the Chinese 
film market from Hollywood since 2012. The American Securities and Exchange 
Commission is probing the movie studios’ dealings in China to avoid potentially 
inappropriate payments made to Chinese government officials (Nelson 2012). From the 
Chinese side, except for buying Hollywood, as was discussed in Chapters One and Two, 
‘there is a new trend that some Western companies, especially Hollywood Six studios, are 
trying to sign a slate of projects with Chinese film companies. Even for some films that are 
not going to be released in China, the Chinese companies are willing to do some investment 
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in Western film or European film to get some market share outside of China. It is a really 
rapid development of media cooperation and film coproduction in China and outside’.  
(Wang 2014), according to a leading entertainment lawyer Wang Jun. 
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Chapter 7 Treaty coproduction with Australia 
As discussed in previous chapters, international film coproduction is an important part of 
China’s soft power push. China is actively pursuing coproductions all around the world. 
Coproduction agreements or treaties have been signed with many countries, including 
Australia. Chinese coproductions have taken an increasingly commercial turn as leading 
players in the industry aspire to improve the film industry value chain as the government 
pursues its soft power agenda and as foreign parties attempt to gain access to the Chinese 
market. The three case studies in this thesis each represent different examples of 
collaboration between Chinese and foreign parties in film production. The China-Hong Kong 
case study is rooted in the special relationship between the former British colony and 
mainland China, in their cultural proximity and historical ties. The China-US case study 
described the negotiation between Chinese consumer demand and the growing Chinese 
market for cinema, the Chinese film industry’s aspiration to international success and 
domestic development, the Chinese government’s soft power ambitions, and the largest and 
most successful film industry in the world – Hollywood. 
The China-Australia case reflects a slightly different development trajectory. Coproduction 
with Australia represents not only countries with comparatively small film industries 
collaborating with China, but also countries and filmmakers whose work with Chinese 
partners is governed by an official coproduction treaty. ‘Unlike Chinese partnerships with 
bigger film industries in the US, Europe, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
and East Asia, Australia can be considered a junior partner’, as Yue (2014: 187) says. ‘Junior 
partner’ is a term coined in film coproduction studies to ‘describe a new and increasingly 
common type of relationship between marginal and dominant partners’ (Yue 2014: 187, 
Goldsmith et al, 2010). Yue (2014:187) frames Australia’s partnership with China, 
theoretically, as exemplifying ‘minor transnationalism’. The term is used by Lionnet and Shih 
(2005) to refer to ways in which connections are built with minority cultures through routes 
that bypass dominant global forces. As Yue (2008) suggests, the Australian film industry’s 
move towards Asia reflects a minor transnationalism route, as its traditional path has been 
through the flow of creative talent and resources to Hollywood and Europe.  
 
This chapter examines why and how China and Australia are conducting coproduction 
activities, especially under treaty conditions. This chapter will analyse the motivations and 
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challenges for Australia-China treaty coproduction, through analysis of existing research data 
and a substantial amount of first-hand interview data. This is an under-researched area, so this 
chapter relies to a greater extent than other cases on primary source interview data. It will 
first look at the impetus for Australian and Chinese filmmakers to work together, and then 
will detail the rules for treaty coproduction and policy from the Australian side. This will 
provide the context for understanding the challenges of Sino-Australia treaty coproduction 
and why so few treaty films have been made. Finally, I will examine several films made 
under the treaty, looking at how the films themselves carry the traces of the complex and 
doubly bureaucratic official coproduction process.  
7.1 The Australian impetus for Australian-Chinese collaboration  
The Australian film industry has always struggled with market access. In the earliest days of 
the Australian film revival of the 1970s, Australian films were supported by a strong local 
response to the renewal of the industry and its ability to represent Australian stories on the 
big screen. However, there has been an appreciable decline in the viability of the local market 
for Australian films over the last ten to twenty years (Harris 2013; Harris 2007). In part, this 
is attributable to the growth in popularity of Australian television, although there are also a 
variety of structural reasons for Australian films’ relative lack of domestic success. The 
Australian film industry is, in many respects, an industry of start-up directors and other 
creative principals, as many of the leading lights move on to make films elsewhere, 
particularly in the United States. The lack of local success has reached a crisis point over the 
last decade. Its domestic market share often hovers between 2-5 per cent, which causes much 
debate about the viability of the industry. As in so many other countries, the local box office 
is dominated by well-marketed Hollywood products. This problem is addressed in works by 
Lauren Carroll Harris (2013) and Richard Harris (2007) on the distribution crisis – where 
many Australian films do not reach a wide audience. Harris (2013) shows how enterprising 
film and documentary makers in Australia have set up their own distribution channels 
targeted to their market, have kept budgets low and retained control of their films’ profits. 
Harris (2007) points out the promise, and the threat, that the proliferation of digital delivery 
platforms brings to the business of Australian screen content. Today’s film industry depends 
greatly on distribution deals for funding, and for some filmmakers, collaboration with 
Chinese partners offers the prospect of both new sources of production finance and new 
distribution channels.  
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The Australian film industry is boosted by incoming international productions attracted to 
Australia by the incentives available, the highly regarded studio facilities, locations, expert 
support personal and technical expertise (Goldsmith et al 2010). However, Australian-led 
film production is perforce required to find international markets for its ongoing viability. 
Coproductions are one mechanism by which this may be achieved.  
In Australia, coproduction normally refers to an official coproduction: a film approved under 
a coproduction treaty or memorandum of understanding between the Australian government 
and the government of another country (Screen Australia 2013c). Since 1986, Australia has 
signed treaties with Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Israel, Singapore, South Africa 
and the United Kingdom, and Memoranda of Understanding with France and New Zealand. 
Negotiations are underway with the governments of Denmark, India, Malaysia and the 
Republic of Korea (Screen Australia 2013b: 26). As Mike Walsh (2012:303) argues: ‘these 
treaties are part of a larger movement by Australian film institutions away from the 
limitations of cultural nationalism, and towards a recognition of the need for new forms of 
international engagement if local film and television production is to be economically viable 
on a long-term basis’. A report by Screen Australia in 2012 shows that the overwhelming 
majority of Australian coproductions have been with the United Kingdom, France and 
Canada (Screen Australia 2013a). 
Australian feature film production is currently focused on niche genres like art cinema, 
documentary and domestic comedies, with only occasional large-scale mass-market 
commercial films (Walsh 2012: 308). According to Screen Australia (2013a: 12), the budget 
for Australian domestic films tends to be low by international standards. International 
coproductions tend to have a higher budget than domestic productions. Financial pooling 
through coproduction is a very important benefit, which, to some extent, can compensate for 
the disadvantages of a low budget.  
 
 
 
 
 
Country Entry into force date 
No. of 
coproduction 
projects 
Total budgets 
($A) 
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France 15 May 1986 29 $227m 
United Kingdom 27 August 1990 39 $453m 
Canada 26 September 1990 42 $431m 
Italy 12 December 1996 1  
New Zealand 23 December 1994 9 $45m 
Israel 13 January 1998 1  
Ireland 7 September 1998 3 $22m 
Germany 12 September 2001 6 $41m 
China 19 December 2008 3 $45m 
Singapore 16 October 2008 4 $32m 
South Africa 22August 2011 0  
Source: Screen Australia (2013a)  
With the economic rise of Asia, the Australian government is attempting to strengthen 
business relationships in the region through a range of measures. However, trade in cultural 
goods lags behind. In recent years the rapid expansion of Asian screen industries, especially 
the Chinese media industry, has pushed many governments, including Australia’s, to focus on 
Asian media collaborations. In Australia, more treaties and MOUs have been signed or are 
being negotiated with Asian countries. China, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore are seen 
as territories presenting ‘great opportunities’ for Australia according to Screen Australia’s 
Manager Partnerships, Chris Oliver (2014). Thailand, Indonesia, India and Japan also offer 
opportunities, although formal coproduction arrangements are not yet in place with most of 
these countries.  
The Common Ground report, published by Screen Australia in 2013, explored opportunities 
for Australian screen partnerships in Asia. It documents ‘more than eighty Australian 
producers and production companies working with an Asian focus’. 63 per cent of Australian 
producers surveyed had done business with China. 47 per cent of local producers derived 
some revenue from the Chinese market and 43 per cent expected their revenue from China to 
expand, with 27 per cent expecting it to expand significantly (Screen Australia 2013d:13). 
Mario Andreacchio, an Australian specialist in international filmmaking and the producer of 
The Dragon Pearl, the first treaty coproduction between Australia and China, pointed out that 
‘we can’t ignore China anymore because it is already starting to have an impact on our film 
industry. We have got to work out how we handle China because it’s not just a big market, 
but also a big industry’ (Andreacchio 2012: 34). 
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7.2 The Chinese impetus for Australian-Chinese collaboration 
The question people frequently ask when it comes to the topic of Sino-Australia coproduction 
is: why does China want to coproduce with Australia?  If it wants extra international market 
share, is a country with 23 million people the best choice? If it wants world-leading creative 
and technical skills, should the US not be the better teacher? In fact, Australia is the tenth 
largest cinema market in the world, and has produced many highly skilled filmmakers and 
innovative companies.  In an interview with Mario Andreacchio, Walsh (2011: 18 cited in 
Yue 2014:187) summarises the reasons behind Australia-China partnerships: ‘Australians 
have no natural position of superiority in our region and … China will increasingly deal with 
us from a position of strength’.  Australian filmmaker Pauline Chan, the director of the 
second Australia-China treaty coproduction, argues that ‘Australia needs China. China does 
not need Australia’ (Dillon 2012: 96 cited in Yue 2014: 187). So, what is Australia’s 
attractiveness to China’s film industry? From the perspective of Screen Australia (2013d: 4), 
the attributes of Australia are: first, Australia’s shared history with China and the experiences 
of Chinese Australian individuals and communities, which are a rich source of story content 
with the potential to appeal audiences in both countries; second, Australia’s natural beauty 
and the similarity of time zones; third, the variety of government support mechanisms. In 
addition, the report (2013d: 4) regards the attributes of the Australian screen production 
industry as attractive to international partners for the following reasons: the track record of 
creative and technical skills, especially in post, digital and visual effects sector (Yecies, Shim 
and Goldsmith 2011); the professionalism of Australian practitioners and international best 
practice, especially in production management and production accounting; its experience in 
creating successful children’s content for the international market (eg. H2O: Just Add Water, 
Ward and Potter 2009) and strong connections to international distribution networks.  
However, these attributes are not necessarily seen as being that attractive by Chinese 
filmmakers. The shared history is not exactly shared history in the same way as China and 
Hong Kong have a shared history, or even China and Korea. Australia and China are more 
like trade partners looking to develop cultural opportunities. Australia is, essentially, a 
Western, Anglo-Celtic country. The experiences of Chinese Australians have not translated 
very well into film so far, (see later discussion of 33 Postcards). In reality, one of the most 
important attributes of international coproduction for Chinese filmmakers is the global 
distribution pipelines largely controlled by Hollywood majors. Australian companies can 
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offer little in this regard (Walsh 2012:310-311). Australia is, however, a good choice for mid-
range Chinese producers, for whom collaboration with Australians may ‘provide a cheaper 
but also more accessible pathway … to global film-making’ (Walsh 2012:312).  As 
Australian ex-Screen West official and independent filmmaker Defrim Isai says: 
 
We speak English, we understand the international culture. And we are small 
enough to be a good partner, not be a driver but as a passenger. China needs 
Hollywood’s experience, but Hollywood experience can come from the back door, 
which is from Australia and much more controllable… we are the little brother. 
America is the big brother, but maybe we are the favourite brother. We are more 
cooperative in understanding, whereas the American is trying to drive their 
perspective all the time.  China and America are too equal to have good 
cooperation. They both have each other’s advantages: money and market (Isai 
2013).  
 
The largest and most ambitious Chinese producers tend to focus more on production with US 
and Pan-Asian partners. The Australian government’s incentives seem to be too complicated 
and not that useful for Chinese producers. As Tony Zhang, the Vice president of DMG, said 
at the 2014 Australia-China Film Coproduction Forum in Shanghai, Australian film policy is 
too complex. Tax refunds are not processed until the production has been completed, whereas 
in some US states returns begin to flow in 30 days.  
 
The signing of the Sino-Australia coproduction treaty ‘corresponds with an increase in 
support for coproductions from the Chinese government’, and ‘demonstrates a keenness for 
the Chinese film and TV industry to engage with international audiences and producer 
partners’ (Screen Australia 2013b: 5). As part of its foreign policy and soft power strategy, 
the Chinese government has signed treaties with several other countries with small film 
industries in order to share skills, and to compete with Hollywood.  Before the Sino-Australia 
coproduction treaty was signed, only one unofficial coproduction film without any Chinese 
money and with no eye on the Chinese market – Mao’s Last Dancer – was produced and 
released in Australia (Walsh 2009:13). It was banned in China due to its political sensitivity. 
Since the treaty, more Australian film producers have looked for opportunities in China, but 
only a few official coproductions have been produced nearly ten years after the introduction 
of the treaty.  The following section discusses possible reasons for this.  
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7.3 Treaty Coproduction between China and Australia 
In 2007, China and Australia signed a film coproduction treaty. It came into force on 19 
December 2008. Four Sino-Australia film coproduction forums were then held to create more 
opportunities for producers’ cooperation in 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014. Until May 2014, only 
three treaty coproduction films had been produced (including Children of the Silk Road, made 
before the treaty was signed). Children of the Silk Road, made in 2006/07, was a three- way 
coproduction16 with Germany. This was followed by The Dragon Pearl and 33 Postcards in 
2011 (Screen Australia 2013a: 20).  
Table 7.1: Australia/China coproductions 
AUSTRALIA/CHINA COPRODUCTIONS 
PROD 
YR TITLE TYPE 
AUSTRALIAN 
PRODUCER 
FOREIGN 
PRODUCER 
2006/07 The Children of Silk Road1 Feature 
Blue Water 
Pictures 
Ming Productions 
(China) 
Zero Films 
(Germany) 
2009/10 The Dragon Pearl Feature Last Dragon Holdings Pty Ltd 
Zhejiang Hengdian 
Film Production Co., 
Ltd 
2010/11 33 Postcards Feature Portal Pictures Pty Ltd 
Zhejiang Hengdian 
Film Production Co., 
Ltd 
Source: Screen Australia (2013a: 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2: Australia’s coproduction partner-China 
 China 
                                                            
16 According to Screen Australia (2013c), three- way coproduction means a film produced jointly by an 
Australian coproducer, a coproducer from a coproduction country and a third coproducer from a country that has 
a coproduction arrangement with at least one of the coproduction countries. 
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CO-PRODUCTIONS WITH AUSTRALIA 
Type of agreement Treaty 
Date signed 7 Jun 06 
Entry into force 19 Dec 08 
Treaty coverage Film 
Aus contribution level allowable Min: 20% 
Max: 80% 
No. coproductions to date 3 
Average no. coproductions annually 0.8 
OVERALL CO-PRODUCTION ACTIVITY  
Competent authority China Film Co production  
corporation (CFCC) 
No. partner countries n.a. 
ECCC signatory X 
Total no. coproductions per year film n.a. 
Total no. coproductions per year TV n.a. 
GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
Direct funding: national √  
Direct funding: regional X 
Indirect funding (eg tax 
rebates/credits): national 
x 
Indirect funding (eg tax 
rebates/credits): regional 
X 
SOCIETY/INDUSTRY/MARKET 
Language Mandarin 
Cantonese 
Population (m) 1,360 
No. Films produced annually 588(2011) 
Average budget of films €2m 
Total annual cinema admissions (m) 370(2011) 
Domestic share of box office 54%(2011) 
No. TV households (m) 387 
Local content regulation on TV √  
Expenditure on entertainment (2010)
(Price Waterhouse Coopers preliminary 
figures) 
US$86m 
Legal system Civil Law 
Currency ¥ CNY 
Exchange rage last 5 yrs 
(Aus:foreign) 
Av 6.07; 
Range 4.19 7.12 
Source: Screen Australia (2013a: 16) 
Official coproduction films can be counted as domestic releases in China, and so are not 
restricted by the quota that limits the number of foreign films released in China each year. 
They can also gain other advantages associated with domestic films in China, including more 
box office share and better movie theatre schedules, as discussed in Chapter Four. In 
Australia, treaty coproductions are automatically regarded as Australian and do not need to 
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pass a ‘significant Australian content’ (SAC) test in order to claim the Producer Offset rebate 
(Screen Australia 2013b: 5). The Producer Offset is a guaranteed portion of the budget 
provided by the Australian government to support the development of the screen industry, as 
I will discuss below.  
In the following section, I detail some of the complexity involved in the specifics of the 
Australian agreement with China, whereas in previous chapters I demonstrated the 
intrinsically complex and uncertain character of coproductions with China in general. In the 
previous cases of Hong Kong and the US, production agreements were, typically, less formal 
than the  Sino-Australia coproduction treaty, and this makes the Australian arrangement 
doubly complex. The case studies of individual film titles later in the chapter illustrate how 
this double complexity works. 
According to the treaty (Article 1:1), an official coproduction or a ‘Joint Investing and 
Copyright Coproduction Film’ is a film made by one or more Australian producers in 
conjunction with one or more Chinese producers. It also includes a film made by an 
Australian coproducer and a Chinese coproducer in conjunction with a producer of another 
country with which Australia or China has signed a coproduction treaty. Joint Investing and 
Copyright Coproduction Films are entitled to enjoy all the advantages accorded in both 
countries to national films (Article 2:2). Each partner country has a competent authority to 
review the requirements of agreements and to approve the status of a film. The Australian 
competent authority is Screen Australia. The Chinese competent authority is the Film Bureau 
under the State Administration of Publication, Press, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT). 
China Film Coproduction Corporation is designated by SAPPRFT as the Chinese 
organisation that deals with administrative affairs and through which films are assessed for 
official coproduction status (Article 3:2). The coproducer on each side is responsible for the 
application for coproduction status in each country (Article 6:4). In China, a coproduction 
will be recognised as having completed the provisional approval process once “project 
establishment” status has been granted. The completion of the final approval process is the 
grant of a Film Public Screening Permit. In Australia, a film will be recognised as having 
completed the provisional approval process or the final approval process once a written 
notification from the Australia coproducer has been provided (Article 4:3) (Screen Australia 
2008).  
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The coproduction treaty requires that the creative contribution, financing and expenditure 
must all be in proportion; the creative contribution made by each coproducer in a project 
needs to be roughly in proportion to the financial contribution. Additionally, the budget 
raised by each party should also be roughly in proportion to the amount of the expenditure on 
each country’s elements. Each producer needs to have not less than 20 per cent and not more 
than 80 per cent financial and creative contribution of the total (Screen Australia 2013b: 28; 
Screen Australia 2008: Annex). At the moment, Chinese authorities have not formalised any 
system of quantitative measurement for the Chinese elements in a coproduced film. The 
process of application for project establishment status is much the same as described in 
Chapter Four.  
In relation to Australia, the application for provisional approval from Screen Australia is 
submitted after the finance is in place and before production commences. A non-binding 
letter of preliminary compliance can be sought before the application (this was not possible 
before late 2010). The letter, to some extent, secures a project’s coproduction status and helps 
attract finance. Australian creative contribution is determined by a points test called 
Australian Qualifying Points (AQP). The AQP must reach at least 20 per cent of the total 
creative points and, as discussed above, must be roughly in proportion to the Australian 
financial contribution. A five per cent margin either way is allowed. For example, if the 
Australian coproducer’s financial contribution is 50 per cent, the AQP can be between 45 per 
cent and 55 per cent. If the person filling a key creative role is an Australian national or a 
permanent resident, a point is scored for that role, with two points for writer and director. 
Producers do not attract points. A total of fifteen points are required for feature films and 
television drama. The compulsory points are: writer (2), director (2), DoP (1), editor/picture 
editor (1), cast (four principal roles) (4). If the Australian financial contribution is more than 
50 per cent, then at least one of the key roles should be filled by an Australian. There are 
discretionary points for composer, costume designer, production designer, script editor and so 
on (Screen Australia b: 30-35).  
The Producer Offset was introduced in 2007 and is one of a package of support measures 
called the Australia Screen Production Incentive (Screen Australia 2013e). It is available to 
Australian film and television projects which have passed a significant Australian content 
(SAC) test or to films made under official coproduction arrangements. It is a rebate rather 
than a tax credit and is applied on qualifying Australia production expenditure (QAPE) in 
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making Australian film and television. Feature films can claim 40 per cent of the QAPE, and 
all other eligible formats can claim 20 per cent. There is no cap on the amount of the offset 
payable, but there are some limits on specific types of production costs as a percentage of 
total production expenditure (Screen Australia 2013b: 8-9). 
An official coproduction can bypass the SAC test, but only money spent by Australian 
coproducers can be claimed as QAPE. Normally, the QAPE ‘includes most of the major 
production costs expended in Australia, including on goods and services, locations and the 
wages of all cast and crew (including those travelling to Australia from offshore). Above the 
line costs are included in QAPE, subject to a limit of 20% of total film expenditure’ (Screen 
Australia 2013e:20). A broader range of expenses were made eligible for QAPE after the 
Producer Offset reforms, including production insurances, completions guarantees, legal, 
audit and company fees, additional publicity and marketing costs, some distribution costs and 
carbon offsets. ‘In essence, QAPE is money spent in Australia. Despite this, the wages and 
travel costs of Australian residents working overseas during principal photography counts as 
QAPE providing the subject matter requires the use of these locations’. The threshold of 
QAPE for feature film is at least AU$500,000.  However, ‘in the case of official 
coproductions, expenditure in Australia’s partner country that would be regarded as QAPE if 
it was incurred in Australia, is QAPE for the purpose of meeting the expenditure thresholds, 
but is not QAPE for the purpose of calculating the amount claimed back under the producer 
offset as a rebate’ (Screen Australia 2013b: 19–22).  
As the portion of the budget contributed by the Producer Offset is not available until the film 
or program has been completed and a tax return has been filed, the producer needs to find 
funds to cashflow the project. Usually, feature producers rely on interest-incurring loans from 
banks and financial institutions to cashflow the offset. A company is set up specifically for 
each production, known as a special purpose vehicle or SPV, to keep it separate from the 
company’s other tax affairs and to avoid a delay in offset payment. When the offset is 
credited by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) to a company with a final certificate, the 
company’s pre-existing tax liabilities are reduced first, then the remainder is paid out as a 
refund. To avoid this situation, many producers use SPVs to ensure the availability of the full 
offset for repayment of cashflow loans. Due to this arrangement, many cashflow lenders also 
insist on using an SPV to quarantine offset activity. Additionally, in most cases, the Producer 
Offset payment is processed at the end of the financial year (30 June); however, the timing of 
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completion and final certificate may occur earlier. This can result in substantial interest costs 
in cases where offset cashflow has been borrowed. The ATO only processes a tax return 
before the end of the financial year when the taxpayer will not earn any further taxable 
income in that financial year. A separate SPV for each project is used to facilitate this early 
processing (Screen Australia 2013e: 2–15). Also, in treaty coproduction films, an SPV is 
needed. Producer Lynda Woods outlines the process that Australian producers must undergo: 
‘When we finish the film … then we can close that SPV. In that way, we can apply for the 
Producer Offset very quickly. If we didn’t have the SPVs set up, then we have to wait for the 
next financial year. That way, I can get back to my investors much faster’ (Woods 2014). 
The purpose of the Producer Offset is not only to raise the production budget, but also to shift 
the producer’s role from service provider to investor. It improves the producer’s equity share 
in the project and increases the producer’s share in the project’s potential revenue. Also, the 
producer can trade part of the extra equity delivered by the offset to attract investors, and/or 
talent, by providing them more equity than their investment alone would deliver, or an 
accelerated position on the recoupment waterfall. Besides, there is usually a margin between 
the actual offset payment received from the ATO after the project is completed, final 
certificate issued and tax return filed, and the amount cash that flows into the budget at the 
time of production. Due to the fluctuation of QAPE in the process of production, most 
cashflow lenders surveyed by Screen Australia indicated that they will provide between 85 
and 90 per cent of the anticipated offset value. This margin can be creatively used to invest 
back into the budget, as an offer to investors, to cover unanticipated extra costs during 
production, be retained to build the business or to finance subsequent projects (Screen 
Australia 2013e: 2–13).  
Mario Andreacchio (2013:18–19) indicates the double complexity facing Australian 
coproducers in dealing with both Australian tax arrangements and treaty requirements. Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, the Producer Offset ‘is often misunderstood by Chinese producers as a 
government subsidy directly to the film itself; therefore, they will argue for a share of the 
offset or say the offset is not “real money” and can’t be claimed as equity’. However, he 
argues that the offset is actually a company asset and should be treated as a cash investment 
by the production company. He suggests thinking about the Producer Offset in terms of a 
continuing coproduction slate, using it strategically for the longer-term benefit of the 
coproduction relationship with China. 
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For instance, the producer’s tax rebate could be used for the marketing of the 
coproduction film in a shared territory, or it could be used to finance the development 
and packaging of the next projects, or the accumulated rebate asset over say two or 
three movies could be used to help finance a more risky movie venture. Taking this 
approach gives a solid foundation to the coproduction relationship, and indeed gives 
the Australian company a definite competitive advantage against other international 
producers trying to establish a coproduction relationship with China (Andreacchio 
2013: 19) 
7.4 Challenges   
The most challenging areas for Australia producers wishing to become more involved in the 
Chinese screen industry, according to Screen Australia’s Common Ground report (2013d: 13–
15) were piracy, censorship, a lack of financial resources to pursue opportunities and 
difficulty establishing business relationships. However, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
piracy, censorship and finance are problems existing in any collaboration between 
filmmakers from China and their counterparts from all other countries; they are not unique to 
Australian producers. The difficulties of mounting a China-Australia treaty coproduction, 
according to Andreacchio’s own experience and that of other producers, are that the obstacles 
are deeply systemic, and lie within the Australian screen industry, rather than in China 
(Andreacchio 2013: 4-5). Furthermore, I argue that in the Australian case, developing a 
project is much harder than for their Hong Kong or US counterparts. It not only needs to 
overcome cultural distance but also the dual bureaucratic approval process in China and 
Australia. The US has the cultural distance factor but not the double complexity factor.   
The issue of finance is a permanent topic in filmmaking. However, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, China rarely lacks money for a good story. To cite a saying popular in China: ‘money is 
a problem, but the problem that can be solved by money is never a problem’. 30–40 per cent 
of the budgets of Australia-Sino treaty coproduction films, The Dragon Pearl, The 33 
Postcards and The Stone Forest (in production), have been covered by “soft” money, 
including funding from the Producer Offset and other government sources. 70 per cent of the 
budget of the second treaty coproduction, 33 Postcards, came from Chinese and Singaporean 
private investors. In the experience of the film’s director, Pauline Chan, Asian money can be 
raised very quickly. ‘For 33 Postcards, it was three days in Singapore and in China, we got 
all the investment. And in Australia, you could wait for three years’. She raised AU$3 million 
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in three days from two investors (Chan 2011). The problem is always how to develop a good 
story that can be used as a Sino-Australian treaty coproduction. Andreacchio indicates that 
talking about money should always come after cultural collaboration and creative 
collaboration. To try to use coproduction with China as a mechanism only for financing films 
will end in disaster (Walsh 2012:35). As Australian director Chris Brown said at the Film 
Financing Forum in Brisbane 2013: ‘China has money for their films, not yours’ (Brown 
2013).  
Finding finance in China should not be a major problem if a project has a good story. 
However, the challenge might be to quickly find and secure finance. Due to the fast-changing 
and volatile market, more than twelve months planning from signing a coproduction MOU to 
closing finance could be too long. ‘Given that coproduction approvals themselves can take 2-
3 months, legals and documentation, including bond guarantees, insurances and investment 
agreements can at best be done in about four months, that then leaves only 4-5 months to find 
and close financing!’ (Andreacchio 2013:15). But the complexity of the Australian system 
does not help producers who are seeking to move quickly. The number of approvals required 
by the Australian side, and the length of time required to obtain them, are even more 
complicated and longer than the Chinese side. There is also uncertainty as to whether 
approvals will be given. 
Challenges for most Australian producers may arise in the very early development stages. 
The travelling and translation fee for the early development stage of coproduction to build 
relationships and networking is high. After the early development stage, ‘on average, a 
producer should expect to travel to China every six to eight weeks and possibly more 
frequently in the last stages of closing agreements’ (Andreacchio 2013: 14). Provision for 
travelling and translation cannot be ignored in budget planning. In Andreacchio’s experience, 
the budget for developing a Chinese coproduction project is usually two to three times the 
size of a normal project (2013: 7). Government development funding is very often not 
enough considering the need to act quickly and to avoid rushed compromises at the final 
stage due to lack of finance.  
 
Given the efforts that have been put into developing Chinese coproductions, it seems better to 
have a long-term strategy for a slate of projects rather than for just a single project. By doing 
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this, the experience and resources accumulated from one production can be used again 
without extra costs. ‘A long-term plan with China will shape and influence not just which 
movie to make but which coproduction partners to seek, and what resources and capital will 
need to be assembled’ (Andreacchio 2013: 20). Having, or not having, a coproduction 
strategy that will span a number of productions is recognised by Andreacchio as the most 
fundamental challenge (Andreacchio 2013: 20). The CEO of DMG Entertainment Group in 
Beijing, Dan Mintz, also believes that the coproduction partners should establish a plan to 
develop long-term cooperation rather than disconnecting after only one film (Zhou 2011). 
The Australian producers nonetheless tend to ‘think, apply for, and develop single, distinctly 
different projects’. The Australian system currently is not designed to fund slates of projects 
(Andreacchio 2013). 
The major challenge for Australia-China coproductions is the difficulty of developing a 
suitable script that not only satisfies audience tastes, but also complies with the needs of both 
governments. Furthermore, the ambition of those producers to attract viewers from both 
countries makes the project more complex and success harder to achieve. In fact, looking for 
a suitable story is not just a challenge for Sino-Australian coproduction, but for all 
international collaborations, as was discussed in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, the situation is 
more complicated in Sino-Australian cases. The sheer number of adverse factors might also 
explain why so few films have been made under the treaty since 2006. 
Unlike Sino-Hong Kong or Sino-Korean joint productions, or for that matter intra-European 
coproductions, there are huge cultural differences between Chinese and Australian value 
systems. Scripts restricted to universal content, such as science, technology or shared history, 
may have a better chance of being successful, but this narrows down the range of subjects. 
While Hong Kong and Korean coproducers benefit from cultural proximity, Australian 
producers are left to compete with Hollywood or, more realistically, to inhabit the lower 
budget, niche end of the market while partnering with second tier Chinese producers. 
There are no treaty requirements on Sino-US joint productions. Although the Chinese 
government has imposed some regulations, the US is relatively unencumbered by restrictions. 
In the case of Australia-China coproductions, both governments have long considered 
‘cultural nationalism and nation-building’ as a reason for supporting and intervening in the 
film industry (Walsh 2012:305). This means that an Australia-China coproduction has to go 
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through a complicated two-phase approval process to demonstrate that there are both 
sufficient Australian elements and sufficient Chinese elements.  
A major challenge here is that the Australian and Chinese governments apply different 
criteria. The Australian coproduction points system is more complex than systems from other 
countries (Screen Australia 2013d:9). The tight governmental censorship control and non-
transparent reviewing process in China, which are usually qualitatively based and influenced 
by unpredictable elements, are not familiar to Australia producers. Script changes seem to be 
inevitable after scrutiny by SARFT. In China, as Mario Andreacchio’s own experience shows, 
the challenge for the producer is not only about tolerating changes but also ‘accommodating 
these script changes and having them approved again in time for the shoot to commence as 
scheduled’ (Andreacchio 2013: 16–17). He further points out that the number of elements 
subject to change with a coproduction is greater than normal production. ‘Some 
coproductions have been seen not to progress because the number of changing elements is 
beyond the tolerance range of the producer’ (Andreacchio 2013: 16–17). Additionally, the 
film financing mechanisms in Australia are different to those in China. The requirement for a 
completion guarantor and the complex legal documentation required by Australian 
productions decreases the interest of Chinese film production companies in working with 
Australian partners. As discussed in Chapter Four, the Chinese film industry lacks 
intermediaries like completion guarantors, collection agents, escrow account holders, and 
trustees. 
Screen Australia’s report ascribes the low number of coproductions with China compared 
with most other treaty countries only to the shorter duration of the treaty agreement (Screen 
Australia 2013b: 13). The relatively short cooperation time may well be one reason but it is 
not the only reason; insufficient mutual understanding of each other’s regulations cannot be 
overlooked. The Australian side lacks understanding of the Chinese market and censorship, 
while the Chinese side lacks awareness or experience of the Australia screen industry. The 
survey by Screen Australia indicates that one of the challenges for Chinese with little 
involvement with Australia is in knowing where to find information about Australian 
production companies and their capabilities (Screen Australia 2013d: 15). The advantage of 
Australian soft money like the Producer Offset is not well known by Chinese parties. The 
mechanism of the rebate is also very distinct from Chinese government investment incentives 
and thus not easy for Chinese filmmakers to grasp.  
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Insufficient knowledge of the counterpart market requires joint script development from the 
very early stage. ‘Approaching a Chinese partner with a completed script is much less likely 
to attract interest than presenting projects where codevelopment is on offer’ (Screen Australia 
2013d: 15). Mario Andreacchio observes that for a coproduction Australian producers offer 
the possible coproduction partners a project that has been extensively developed. However, 
the script for coproduction with China will have to ‘satisfy cultural elements, reflect current 
market trends in China … and comply with the censorship requirements of the Chinese film 
authorities’. If the project is developed by the foreign party alone, it is hard to meet all these 
requirements and a further development period is needed, which means extra budget 
pressures.  The extra cost tends to be borne by the originating producer. A joint development 
strategy not only ‘allows for clarity and incorporation of China-side requirements, but also 
creates an environment where the development budget can be negotiated and shared’ 
(Andreacchio 2013: 6-8). Andreacchio further points out that ‘the process of shared producer 
responsibilities with foreign partners and share financial contributions in development is not 
common in Australia’. Besides, the Chinese approach to developing projects is more market 
oriented than the Australian system, which should be an important shift in thinking for 
Australian producers. Due to long-term government subsidies, Australia filmmakers tend to 
purely focus on the film itself and, consequentially, demonstrate a lack of detailed 
consideration of market return. 
7.5  Case studies 
As we discussed above, only three treaty coproductions have been released, if we include The 
Children of the Silk Road (or The Children of Huang Shi), a three way coproduction. None of 
these films has achieved any box office or artistic success in either country.   
 China 
b.o. 
China 
admissions 
Australia 
b.o. 
 
The Dragon Pearl $US 4.8m 1,030,531 N.A.  
The Children of the 
Silk Road 
$US 1.6m 401,996 $A890,847  
33 Postcards $US 0.3m 53,678 $A47,419  
Entgroup in Walsh 2012: 307 
 
The Dragon Pearl 
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Mario Andreacchio, an Adelaide-based writer, director and producer who has many 
television and film credits to his name, such as the Emmy award-winning telemovie Captain 
Johnno (1988), is a pioneer of the Sino-Australia treaty coproduction field. After coproducing 
with Germany, France, the UK, South Africa, Canada and Japan, he saw China as a ‘natural 
extension’ (Andreacchio 2012: 34). The Dragon Pearl (2011), made between his company 
AMPCO Films and Hengdian World Studios – the largest studio complex in the world – is 
regarded as the first Sino-Australia treaty coproduction. The budget was about US $20m 
(Hatherley 2011). This fantasy adventure film, starring Sam Neill, Jordan Chan and Wangji, 
and full of attractive Chinese elements such as dragons and beautiful views and dragon-
related special visual effects, was expected to play very well in the Chinese box office. 
However, it only made around US $4.8m. 
The film tells the story of two teenagers, Josh (Louis Corbett) and Ling (Li Linjin). About 
three thousand years ago, in order to defend his kingdom, an emperor in northern China 
borrowed a pearl from a dragon. Unfortunately, the emperor died in battle and the pearl was 
lost. Without the pearl’s magic power, the dragon was trapped on earth. Josh and Ling 
accidently find the dragon trapped beneath a temple during their trip to an archaeological dig 
in China. They try to inform their parents Chris (Sam Neill) and Dr. Li (Wang Ji), but are met 
with disbelief. They decide to help the dragon return to its home. On this wild journey, they 
have to fight with an evil archaeologist, Philip Dukas (Robert Mammone), who wants to seize 
the pearl and use its power for his own distorted ambition. The use of dragon elements in this 
film brought some trouble for Andreacchio, as the current Chinese authorities are ‘very 
protective of their dragon, a still-potent symbol of creation and continuity, utterly unlike St. 
George’s fire-breathing monster’ (Hatherley 2011). ‘Everything is run by the government, 
particularly the media, and they recognise the social impact a film has. They were reluctant 
but gave us permission and then Mummy 3 [which featured multi-headed dragons] came out 
and they had promised the Chinese they would be respectful to dragons. They took back our 
film permit and said, “we don’t trust Westerners”’ (Debelle 2013). Much patience was 
required in dealing with the authorities. Even the film’s original name, ‘The Last Dragon’, 
was problematic, as the dragon is a loved symbolic creature in China, and the idea that there 
could only be one remaining was unthinkable for Chinese authorities. It was suggested that 
they use a panda instead (Debelle 2013).  The image of the dragon in this film was modified 
many times to make sure that it complied with the traditional Chinese dragon image. 
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The Dragon Pearl is a family film, a genre that is very popular in Australia but not in China. 
Andreacchio realised this and tried to market and present the film ‘as being a lot more action 
driven’ in China. (Andreacchio 2012: 36). As a cinematic experience, however, the film takes 
an inordinate amount of time to develop its action plot. The special effects devoted to the 
appearance and actions of the dragon betray the limitations of the budget and would be hard 
pressed to captivate audiences who expect a Hollywood-standard spectacular driven by 
budgets several times greater than this one. This is the problem posed by needing to market 
the film as action driven. 
Good marketing and distribution saw the film open on 3500+ screens in China in March 2011 
(Hatherley 2011). The film achieved reasonable box office success in the first several weeks 
of screening – coming in at seventeenth in the Chinese box office from January to March 
2011 (Cremin 2011). The spectacular scenery around the temple may have been unusual for 
Western audiences, but not for Chinese audiences. The role played by Jordan Chan in the 
film was not central enough to secure the benefits of his popularity. His awkward acting was 
far removed from his earlier Hong Kong gangster movies. Another main Chinese actress, 
Wangji, is well known to most 1970s or older audiences, but she is not known to younger 
audiences. In the end, there was sharp drop off in attendances, which led to a poor final box 
office performance. 
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The film was not released in Australia, although it premiered in February 2012 at the 
Adelaide Film Festival and is now available on DVD (Hood 2014). ‘Dwarfed by the large-
scale production capacity of “Chinawood”’ (Yue 2014:193-194), Australia’s junior role in the 
film is demonstrated by its late premiere and release, and marketing it as an action film in 
China. Australia’s deference to China can be seen in the film’s plot: the white man empowers 
the Chinese to protect their heritage, the enemies (the thieves) are Western, the Chinese 
teenager has a special ability that helps to restore the pearl to the dragon. ‘Like The Children 
of the Silk Road, Chinese bloodline, decent and race are upheld’, Yue observes (2014:194).  
The poor international release of this bureaucratically blessed film certainly contributed little 
to China’s soft power ambitions. Though the film itself did not achieve success, it tested the 
market, and the experience accumulated by Andreacchio through this coproduction provided 
valuable lessons for successors in the field. Andreacchio accrued cultural capital in Australia 
through the brokering role he performed for new screen relationships between China and 
Australia (Yue 2014:195). The term “cultural brokerage” is introduced by Braester (2005) to 
describe how new partnerships are leveraged by cultural capital. By leveraging experience, 
expertise and partnerships through this film, and through Andreacchio’s other action in 
China-Australia film coproduction mentioned in a later section, Yue (2014:195) points out 
that ‘film capital helps build the industry through networks rather than infrastructure’.  
33 Postcards   
33 Postcards, a coproduction between Portal Pictures and Zhengjiang Hengdian Productions, 
was made by Sydney filmmaker Pauline Chan. It was the second Australia-China treaty 
coproduction. It tells a story of love and redemption. An Australian man, Dean Randall 
(played by Guy Pearce), sponsors a Chinese orphan, Meimei (played by newcomer Zhulin), 
though a charity organisation for ten years and sends Meimei postcards that describe him as a 
devoted family man. When Meimei’s orphanage choir travels to Sydney to participate in a 
singing competition, she eagerly takes the opportunity to sneak off to thank her sponsor in 
person. However, Mei Mei discovers the shocking truth – Dean is actually a convict 
imprisoned for manslaughter. Meimei decides to stay in Australia until Dean is granted parole.  
In the meantime, she naively falls into a criminal’s clutches. To save Meimei, Dean tries to 
gain early release by testifying against one of the prison’s more violent inmates. Unlike The 
Dragon Pearl, this film is mostly shot in Australia. The two key characters, according to 
Chan (2009), are based on a story from real life. Chan and her cowriter, Martin Edmond, read 
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a newspaper story about an Australian man who wanted to sponsor someone. Chan had made 
three documentaries on Asian street kids and abandoned children. Those children’s dream 
was to meet their sponsor one day, but it never happened.  
 
Yue (2014:197) sees Australia’s junior partnership reflected in the financing of this film (30 
per cent from Australia, 70 per cent from Chinese and Singaporean investors) as well as the 
number of screens on which the film appeared: 8000 in China, compared to only 42 in 
Australia.  
Pauline Chan was born in Vietnam, grew up in Hong Kong, and went to film school in 
Australia. Such a background has given her deep cross-cultural understanding. As the writer, 
director and producer of 33 Postcards, Chan tried to ensure the film did not become a melting 
pot mess and gained great satisfaction from the plaudits of her coproduction partners who 
said 33 Postcards ‘is a shining example of the model for future coproduction work on film 
because it's not compromising either culture for the sake of commercialism or for sanitising 
something’ (Bodey 2011). 
In this sense, it is a very unusual coproduction. Almost by default, official or treaty 
coproductions will tend toward positive representations of the countries involved. They will 
stay within recognised genre boundaries, due to the need for them to work cross culturally. 
This film positions itself well in Meimei’s final decision to return to China rather than to stay 
in Australia, fulfilling both governments’ dominant proposal on migration: ‘the former 
deterring asylum claims, the latter frowning upon outbound emigration’ (Yue 2014: 198).  
Chan (2009) said that this film was for global audiences, not just one particular community. It 
was, however, almost universally panned. Basically, all reviews were negative, though Neil 
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Genzlinger (2013) from the New York Times described it as a ‘Sweet if not very credible 
film’. Some of the reviews even lamented that the dependable Australian actor Guy Pearce 
appeared in such a ‘sappy, atonal family drama’ (Elizabeth Weitzman 2013). Frank Scheck 
(2013) from the Hollywood Reporter mocked the success of this film ‘mainly in provoking 
the viewer’s sense of disbelief’. Chuck Brown (2013) from Slant Magazine directly criticised 
it as ‘a jumbled mixture of redemptive uplift and genre hijinks’. 
In this case, an art cinema director – see for example Traps (1994), her third feature – has 
tried to mix an art cinema ethos, exemplified by Guy Pearce’s character as a damaged, 
withdrawn antihero, with a melodramatic tale of the impossibly good child, who drives the 
narrative. Asian cinema is much more used to major tonal/genre shifts than Western realist 
narrative cinema (Galvin 2009). While Chan may have received the plaudits of her 
coproduction partners, it is understandable why the film may have performed very poorly at 
the box office. To balance the arguments for the poor performance of the film, Yue 
(2014:199) argues that film capital is accrued in the international leveraging of Pearce as a 
well-established Australian Hollywood star, and through ‘a Sinophone cultural capital that 
allows the film to confront the settler colonial history of Chinese migration’.  
The Stone Forest 
The Stone Forest is a contemporary 3D action adventure romance feature film that was in 
production at the time of writing. It utilises the official coproduction treaty with China and 
targets an audience in China aged between nineteen and twenty-five years. It was initiated by 
an Australian production company, NJM Film (which later changed its name to Southern 
Light films). Nicholas McCallum started this project after thirty-two years of filmmaking 
experience – involving 53 productions across 14 nations. He has become well known as an 
excellent production designer for his work on Bait 3D (2012), Sanctum (2011), The Black 
Balloon (2008) and Getting Square (2003). The project helped him make the transition from a 
production designer to a writer and director. After McCallum finished the first script, Lynda 
Woods, who has a background in finance, began to seek funding.  
The importance of partnerships in a coproduction is self-evident and has been discussed in 
previous chapters. Building a trustworthy and strong collaborative partnership is very 
important  in China, where guanxi (social capital) is so indispensable to business, The 
development stage of this project greatly relied on Nick’s experience and his background in 
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China over two decades. He learned Chinese Yijing and also set himself the motto of 
“perseverance furthers”. Nick regularly visited and travelled throughout China from 1987. 
His film work in China includes his role as production designer of the internationally 
successful television series Spellbinder – Land of the Dragon Lord, a coproduction with the 
Shanghai Film Group made in 1995.  
Over the past two decades, Nick built guanxi with Shanghai Film Group (SFG), with the 
president of SFG, Ren Zhonglun, as well as with the director of the SFG coproduction 
department, Helen Li, which provided this project the unusual opportunity to cooperate with 
China’s first-tier film company. McCallum and Ren travelled together in 2010 to Yunnan 
province.  Ren introduced McCallum to leading political figures there. The project benefitted 
from such strong partnerships and from partnerships between SFG and BUS (Beijing 
Universal Starlight, one of their main Chinese investors).  
The Stone Forest is entirely set in Kunming, Yunnan Province, in the wonderful heritage site 
of the stone forest (Shilin). It tells the story of an Australian student who travels to China 
with his archaeologist father and falls for a Chinese girl. As their romance develops they 
discover the girl must break an ancient curse that has been placed on her for lifetime after 
lifetime. The screenplay was written by Nick McCallum, based on the novel Onlooker 
written by Roger Davenport. The Stone Forest adheres more closely to the template of an 
action film than does Dragon Pearl, but there are some interesting parallels between the two 
films – archaeology, mythology and youth as central drivers of the action. Although the film 
is set in a modern city, it also acknowledges Chinese cultural heritage and was fully 
supported by Chinese authorities as a result.  
Apart from it being difficult and time-consuming to build a solid collaborative partnership, it 
is very hard to develop a script that includes the elements both countries need in proportion to 
the financial contribution of the parties. McCallum says, ‘Unless you have a long standing 
relationship with China and a sensibility to cultural issues and heritage issues and business 
issues, it is very difficult to write a story that doubly entails the elements that the Chinese 
look for, together with those that westerners look for’. After having the story and a basic 
script worked out, McCallum went to China and introduced his project to Shanghai Film 
Group, who was very supportive and encouraging. Nick returned to Australia to develop the 
script further.  
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It is a great learning experience also. I didn’t have all the answers at the beginning. 
From my living in Shanghai for one year, and the decades I have been returning to 
China, there is a way of going about businesses and storytelling: mindful and 
respectful of the history and Chinese culture…When I wrote the script, I always had 
that in mind. I had helpful support from my Chinese counterparts, and I also 
developed the script from my Australia counterparts, so we had a project that was 
quite curious, because Westerners will read it and say it is a very Chinese story, and 
the Chinese will read it and say it is a very Western story … Because it is not actually 
regarded as a Western story set in China. And it is not regarded as just a Chinese story. 
So that is what we have to do. It is very difficult to do it without the background and 
experience (McCallum 2014). 
Due to Nicholas McCallum’s understanding of the Chinese market, sensibility and censorship 
and their codevelopment of the script from the very beginning, the CFCC were very 
supportive of the project, although they still indicated a few points about the direction they 
would like to see the script take. Lynda Woods (2014) also points out that although there 
were some subsequent changes of the script initiated from China’s feedback, no one focused 
negatively on what needed to be changed or altered. McCallum (2014) said, ‘We are trying to 
make our film politically correct. We don’t try to challenge the ideology; we don’t try to alter 
history or slant Chinese perspectives to the rest of the world. We are mindful and respectful 
of all of that. Know how to present something to CFCC and then SARFT to make sure that 
they are not going to have some objections’.  
When it comes to financing Sino-Australian coproductions, the normal approach is to go to 
China and look for money. However this was not the approach of The Stone Forest. As 
Woods says: ‘using the minimum percentage of China means we can get more money from 
the Australian government…So it makes sense to maximize the Australia spend to 80%. You 
get 40% back of that 80%’. At the time of interview, in 2013, the total budget of the film was 
AU$15m. 23 per cent of the budget had been raised from Chinese coproducer BUS, with 62 
per cent from Australian sources, and 15 per cent still to be found.  
 
Australian government funding may cover 50 per cent of the budget; 40 per cent from the 
Producer Offset coupled with some direct investment from state and federal governments, 
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along with additional post-production incentives. But the 40 per cent Producer Offset 
depends on what qualifies as ‘Qualifying Australia Production Expenditure’ (QAPE). In 
Stone Forest’s case, the Producer Offset provided 26 per cent of the budget, with about 8 per 
cent coming directly from other government sources. 
Although Australian filmmakers have access to government funding, it can be hard to find 
private investment. Timothy White, another coproducer, and cofounder of Southern Light, 
points out that ‘beyond the luck, connection and tenacity, you have got to be smart enough to 
understand that certain investors do want certain projects, so there will be certain subject 
matter or the nature of films that will appeal to a range of people. So be connected to that 
range, firstly to identify them to be connected and unconnected’ (White 2013). This project 
successfully persuaded some of its service organisations, like Delux, Agenious, Pinnacle, DG, 
Arclight, to become investors.  
Woods mentioned that there are numerous rules to learn and lots of requirements to abide by 
when you attempt to make an official treaty film. ‘An interesting thing came up with Screen 
Queensland… [They] said “if you do your postproduction here, you may receive two hundred 
thousand dollars extra”, but the Victorian government will give me half a million dollars to 
have AU$5 million post production work done in Melbourne. As a producer, you have to 
know all the rules with every state government and federal government all the time, it 
changes all the time. I can save or make AU$300,000 only by doing post production in 
Melbourne’ (Woods 2014).  
One basic rule, according to the treaty is that the split of the investment should be 20/80, that 
means the portion each party put in should be equal to or more than 20 per cent and equal to 
or less than 80 per cent of the total budget. At the same time, the creative contribution should 
be in proportion to the financial contribution. Specifically, in Australia, the Australian 
qualifying points system measures the creative contribution. ‘If you have twenty per cent of 
China and eighty per cent of Australia from Screen Australia’s point of view, then only ten of 
the key creatives or department heads would be Australian because of the points, the rest 
have to be Chinese’ (Woods 2014). As most shooting was in China, and the Australian side 
provided most of the financial contribution, the AU$5 million post production was assigned 
in Australia to help with the QAPE element. 
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The long term strategy for China-Australia coproduction is emphasised by The Stone Forest 
team. As considerable time, money and effort were invested in building collaborative 
relationships and learning in the early stage of this project, it would be a huge waste if the 
production resources and experience could not be applied again. A slate of projects has been 
planned, and a commercial model created for future projects. McCallum says: ‘we have four 
productions to [take to] China and we have two productions that China brings to Australia. 
We can get all the parties in this film Stone Forest, and then we use that as a template in the 
rest of products’. The slate of projects includes different kinds of stories. The four Chinese 
productions are a family adventure (The Stone Forest), an action adventure (In the Midst of 
Darkness), a rock and roll musical (New World), and an animation (Skippy). The other two 
stories, from China to Australia, are The Divorce Story and a big studio disaster film. ‘My 
aim is to make a Western style film with Chinese elements in order not only to be accepted 
by Chinese audiences but also to bring the story to show across the globe (McCallum 2014)’. 
This was also Andreacchio and Chan’s wish, but both ended up with a melting pot that 
isolated audiences in both countries. If an authority-blessed coproduction like the Stone 
Forest coproduction can be successful not only in China but also internationally, it will 
definitely contribute to the exercise of China’s soft power in the world.  
Interviews with the filmmakers were conducted at the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 
2014. At that time, Stone Forest was expected to finish development and to soon close all 
financial deals. The original plan was for pre-production to start in early 2014. ‘The 
preproduction and shooting might take nearly 18 weeks. The postproduction will be done in 
30 weeks. So altogether, it will take nearly a year from preproduction to delivery. If all things 
go smoothly, the project will start production in the second half of 2014 and be delivered at 
the end of 2015’ (McCallum 2014).  
At the time of writing, in early 2015, the film had yet to go in to production. It has been 
confronted with numerous delays, all of which are out of the control of the Australian 
producers (Woods 2015). First, their major investor in China, BUS, changed its business 
name and registration in China, which took several months to sort out. Second, the CFCC and 
SAPPFTR, at a meeting in late 2014, suggested that Shanghai Media Group (SMG) become 
the lodging coproducing partner instead of SFG, which is one of SMG’s nine subsidiaries. As 
it is such a large organisation, decisions take longer to flow through to completion as they 
need to be presented at Board meetings. All documents need to be translated, which is time 
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consuming and very costly. Third, the distance, language and customs have sometimes 
slowed progress. When negotiations have reached a certain level, face-to-face meetings are 
needed to complete the deal. However, it has proven exceptionally difficult to bring all the 
producers together in one place; the producers are involved in other commitments in other 
counties.  Substantial effort has been put into this project since 2010; however, no one can 
guarantee that it will be produced.   
7.6 Discussion 
Australia-China coproductions exemplify China’s peripheral minor transnationalism. These 
films are marginal compared to films made in China and with major partners from Hong 
Kong, US and East Asia. Yue (2014:200) notes that such a junior partnership has benefited 
the Australian industry and increased trade with China; more Australian films have been 
released in China, and more post-production related activity has happened. Yue (2014:201) 
identifies Australia’s national distinction to be a more ‘specific post-colonial and 
multicultural frame, distinguishing itself as a Western nation in an Asian region with a 
history of Chinese migration’. I partly agree with Yue that more of these types of films in the 
future might contribute to build an identity for Australia in China. However, currently, 
Australia is still looked on as ‘part of the universal West’ (Yue 2014: 201), and Australia-
China coproductions are viewed as West-China hybrids. 
Few West-China hybrid films have achieved success in both foreign and Chinese markets at 
the same time. Two Australia-China related films that were not made under the Sino-
Australian treaty are exceptions. As a wholly Australian production without Chinese money 
and no eye on the Chinese market, Mao’s Last Dancer has been appreciated internationally 
for its artistic achievement. This independent film, in English with a Chinese theme, earned 
US$5m in the US and over US$22m worldwide, in comparison with the poor performance of 
most Chinese films internationally (Rosen 2011). Films that portray negative images of China 
seem to be more popular in the West. Although it tells a Chinese story, this film was aimed at 
the Anglophone market. The filmmakers did not need to submit the project to Chinese 
censors, and had more creative freedom as a result.  
The other film is Bait 3D – a shark in a flooded supermarket thriller. The film earned over 
US$20m in China in 2013. This film was made under the Australia-Singapore coproduction 
treaty, with significant investment from China’s Yunnan Film Group and Enlight pictures. 
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These two companies were responsible for distribution in China, enabling the film to be 
released on over 1700 screens (Screen Australia 2013d: 5). The film opened poorly at the 
Australian box office (Swift 2012). The cost of the film was about AU$20 million. It earned 
over AU$40 million at cinemas worldwide, and the Chinese market created around AU$27 
million (Groves 2013). Although the film earned a big gross in China, it was imported into 
China as a flat fee film, meaning that the Australian side did not receive payment. Arclight 
Film’s Gary Hamilton, the producer of this film, changed the partner to China to codevelop a 
subsequent project. The follow-up, retitled Deep Water, told a shark in a plane story – a plane 
mysteriously crashes into the ocean on its way to China. The film was put on hold during the 
preproduction stage, as Gary Hamilton said, ‘out of sensitivity to the Malaysia flight situation; 
we’ve decided to put it on pause for now’ (Brzeski 2014). But what we can tell from the 
success of Bait in China is that this thriller appeals to China’s Hollywood market. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Chinese market is mainly occupied by two types of film. 
Half of the box office comes from Chinese-style films, which include the pure domestic film 
and joint productions with Hong Kong, Taiwan, East Asian countries, US and other counties; 
and the other half is occupied by Western-style films, mainly Hollywood-style films. 
Australian producers must decide on their target market before approaching China with a 
proposal. For most Australian producers Western films will be their choice. In Sino-US joint 
production we have seen how American blockbusters are trying to incorporate Chinese 
elements. But, at the same time, those blockbusters targeting global audiences are very 
cautious about the amount of Chinese element in the whole film as they do not want to lose 
their original flavour. How will Stone Forest and Bait 2 perform in the Chinese market and 
internationally if they can be produced? What kind of Western-style film will help Australian 
producers to succeed in China? These questions merit further research in the future.  
Some Australian producers are practicing Chinese theme coproduction films. Mario 
Andreacchio’s project with China (Gold Road) is a Chinese themed adventure story about a 
troupe of Chinese acrobats walking through the Australian bush from South Australia to the 
Victorian goldfields. Other Australian producers were born in China and educated by their 
Sinophone parents with Chinese philosophy. They speak Chinese and understand Chinese 
society and Chinese culture. Jeff W Tseng, the director of PixelFrame, based in Brisbane, is 
one of them. Tseng was born in Taiwan and migrated to Australia when he was a teenager. 
He has made many cooperative projects with Chinese film companies and possesses great 
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guanxi (social capital) with the Chinese film industry and much inside knowledge of it. 
Currently he is preparing for a Chinese themed story focusing on a hotly debated topic – 
studying abroad. From his point of view, the reason why there has not been a successful Sino-
Australian coproduction is because most Australian filmmakers seek only to earn money 
from China rather than trying to understand the Chinese market (Tseng 2013).  
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to investigate the intricacies and complexities of international film 
coproduction in China in the context of the country’s dramatic economic growth and the 
Chinese government’s desire to wield greater cultural influence – or soft power – 
internationally. The rise of China was achieved on the basis of the country becoming the 
world’s centre for low-cost manufacturing. China has been largely successful in leveraging 
this kind of growth through strong management and control of foreign investment in China 
through joint-ventures, and knowledge and technology transfer requirements and strategies. 
When it comes to China’s projection of soft power, however, the task has been more 
challenging, even though the ambition to succeed has been, perhaps, greater. 
The Chinese government has deployed a variety of soft power strategies in recent years. 
These strategies include promoting its political values by directly funding educational and 
commercial projects in Africa and Latin America, to establishing global news agencies and 
television channels (Xinhua and CCTV) and academic centres (Confucius Institutes). China’s 
soft power push and its effectiveness, or lack thereof relative to its other successes in 
economic and military growth, has received considerable journalistic and academic attention 
both inside and outside China (Shambaugh 2013; Nye 2005a; Nye 2012; Moss 2013; Keck 
2013; Chua 2012; Sun 2010). Film coproduction as a vehicle for promoting Chinese film and 
culture around the world has become more of a focus for both the government and the film 
industry in recent years as a highly ambitious, attempted counterweight to the influence of 
Hollywood and American soft power, and as a mechanism to upgrade China’s film industry 
value chain. This thesis has shown that the projection of China’s soft power through 
international coproduction, however, remains very much a work in progress. 
This thesis has examined the history and current dynamics of Chinese film coproduction, 
engaging literature on both soft power, in general, and international film coproduction, in 
particular. It has sought to answer these research questions: what is the place of film 
coproduction in Chinese soft power strategies and ambitions? How successful have China’s 
film coproduction activities been in addressing its soft power objectives, particularly focusing 
on the past decade? What have been the motivations of non-Chinese parties in coproducing, 
given they face complexity, bureaucracy and active censorship in dealing with China? In 
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conclusion, I summarise the answers to these questions developed through the thesis, 
showing how they contribute originally to our disciplinary knowledge. 
By examining the incentives and challenges for selected territories to coproduce with China, I 
analysed the extent to which the Chinese coproduction strategy functions as a form of soft 
power designed to compete with both regional and global rivals. By looking at the 
connotations and evolving process of China’s pursuit of soft power, Chapter One examined 
how film coproduction plays a significant role in the general thrust of soft power. Chapters 
Two and Three focused on why Chinese film lacks international success and why 
coproduction has been considered to be a viable way forward. Chapter Four examined 
coproduction policies and procedures for international filmmakers to work in China. I then 
used three case studies to analyse different aspects and experiences of the coproduction 
process: China-Hong Kong (Chapter Five), China-US (Chapter Six), and China-Australia 
(Chapter Seven). 
1. Contribution to Knowledge 
International coproduction has become a focus of policy and industry debate in mainland 
China. Yet few scholarly works, in either English or Chinese, have addressed these 
developments. This thesis has contributed to an understanding of the current environment for 
film coproduction in China, as well as the history of Chinese film coproduction and three 
types of international collaboration. Utilising my native Chinese language skills, I undertook 
close analysis of Chinese policy documents and processes in order to describe and discuss the 
various restrictions and challenges faced by foreign parties seeking to work in China, 
including strict censorship, government intervention, unclear regulations and underdeveloped 
industry mechanisms. This has rarely been a feature of English language scholarship and 
journalistic commentary. 
Discussion of China’s soft power has typically focused on foreign policy, political values and 
broad cultural aspects.  This thesis differs from this view through its argument that popular 
culture is the critical shortcoming in China’s soft power exercise; for example, film could 
contribute to the enhancement of China’s cultural profile around the world if filmmakers 
were able to harness the opportunities provided by coproduction. Since former president of 
China Hu Jingtao proposed, at the 17th Communist Party Congress, that the promotion of 
China’s ‘cultural soft power’ become a national strategy and encouraged the development of 
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cultural soft power compatible with China’s international standing, Chinese policy and 
industry players have made a concerted effort to ramp up its global cultural presence. 
However, China’s cultural presence is still very underdeveloped in comparison to its regional 
neighbours. “Korean wave” and “Japanese cool” have swept through the East Asian region, 
and Korean pop and Japanese anime are known around the world. These popular culture 
elements easily transfer across nations. Chua coined the term “soft power competition” to 
describe how East Asian countries like Korea and Japan have used popular culture exports to 
positively influence the opinions and attitudes of transnational audiences. The cultural 
presence of soft power engendered by popular culture offers China a strategy to becoming 
more competitive, Chua argues. But the Chinese government has placed heavy emphasis on 
its traditional culture and heritage in its soft power strategy, founding Confucius Institutes 
around the world and promoting diplomacy principles based on China’s traditional Confucian 
values. These actions, and the establishment of a global news agency, have been viewed by 
many people in the West as simple propaganda. As a result, there has been very little return 
from the investment (Nye 2012b; Shambaugh 2013).  
Film has traditionally being regarded as a powerful tool for building soft power. By 
observing the United States’ use of soft power through its entertainment industry complex, 
especially Hollywood, the Chinese government has enhanced the status of the film industry to 
it becoming a ‘strategic industry’17 as discussed in Chapter Two. Huge studio infrastructure 
has been built to promote the development of the film industry and film “going out”.  
However, Chinese films are hindered by cultural discount (Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn 
2000); cultural models, ideas, language, and way of telling stories that are specific to China 
have prevented Chinese films being appreciated globally. I have argued in this thesis that the 
use of film as a tool of soft power needs much more than huge citadels of built 
infrastructure - a direct overhang from the strategy of China’s rise through low-cost 
manufacturing at scale. It also requires soft skills – the skills to use universally understood 
forms, ideas, and stories to speak to audiences around the world. At the same time, 
coproduction serves as an effective way to transfer skills and know-how. People with much 
needed skills have been attracted to work in, or with, China because of the lure of the 
growing Chinese consumer market. This is China’s trump card in its dealings with 
filmmakers from other countries, although, as I show in the three case study chapters, the 
                                                            
17 Guidelines on promoting the prosperity and development of the industry 2010 
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desire of the Chinese government and filmmakers for international success has not yet been 
fulfilled. 
Audrey Yue, in her treatment of Sino-Australia coproductions, summarises some of the 
insights that may be gained through the study of film coproduction. She argues that  
Coproduction cinema studies provide a pertinent framework to examine the 
economic, governmental, institutional, technological and demographic changes. 
Coproductions are sites of competing national logics, constituted in and through 
different ideological intents and institutional practices. They are bound to questions 
of allocation, power and identity; and they question, among other issues, the 
promotion of national film prestige through excellence; distinction of national 
cinemas through globalization; and unequal international division of labour (Yue 
2014:189).  
By examining three representative case studies, using original interviews and analysis of both 
English- and Chinese-language documents, this thesis has outlined the historical, cultural, 
institutional and linguistic elements of Chinese coproduction. It described how these elements 
hindered or contributed to the development of international coproduction projects, and, in 
turn, how they hindered or contributed to the exercise of Chinese soft power. 
The decline of the Hong Kong film industry and its traditional overseas markets since the 
early 1990s prompted Hong Kong filmmakers to engage more extensively with Chinese 
counterparts in order to gain access to the rising mainland market. As I outlined in Chapter 
Five, film coproduction offers substantial benefits and advantages to both mainland and Hong 
Kong filmmakers. The transfer of knowledge and know-how from Hong Kong, as Hong 
Kong directors moved north after the CEPA, contributed to the mainland film industry’s 
successful transition from an infant industry to a more mature commercial industry. The soft 
skills learned from Hong Kong laid the foundation for the mainland’s further cooperation 
with the US, and for the enhancement of China’s soft power ambition. The Hong Kong case 
represents the longest standing of China’s coproduction partnerships, and the most culturally 
proximate, but it is still a fraught relationship with ongoing distinct cultures.  
By looking at Peter Chan’s transition from Hong Kong filmmaker to Asian filmmaker to 
greater China filmmaker, I described how Hong Kong directors can display their 
professionalism and render genre films under the restrictive regulatory environment in China. 
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Chan exemplifies how Hong Kong filmmakers can grow gradually from being naïve about 
the rules that exist on the mainland, to a mature understanding of censorship that enables 
them to make their favourite genre films that are also adored by the market. In this 
exploration and adaption process – termed mainlandization –- considerable compromises 
have been made by Hong Kong filmmakers to the demands of censors in order to gain greater 
access to the Chinese market. The mainlandization of Hong Kong films and filmmaking led 
to an identity crisis in the Hong Kong film industry, although experienced Hong Kong 
filmmakers have now learned to work with the shackles imposed by the Chinese government, 
and have gained privileged access to the Chinese film market as a result.  
The China-Hong Kong case study concluded with a brief analysis of Johnnie To’s experience. 
Initially, To insisted on maintaining his Hong Kong identity, before eventually compromising 
in order to coproduce on the mainland. His experience shows the irreversible trend of the 
Hong Kong film industry to merge with the mainland market. This thesis argues that the 
Hong Kong film industry is likely to be increasingly incorporated into the larger Chinese film 
industry, and will grow with it to become a component of an audio-visual super power in the 
future. The Sinicisation of Hong Kong films in order to access the mainland market has 
contributed to the development of the Hong Kong film industry and provides the means for 
the industry’s continuing development. Though it accelerates the demise of the specific 
cultural identity of Hong Kong film due to the necessary compromises to the rules and taste 
of mainland audiences, the thesis argues that this is a necessary sacrifice, as the precondition 
of a cultural identity is the survival of the industry.  
From 2002 to 2012, 68.5 per cent (n:293) of China’s coproductions were with Hong Kong. 
Few of them achieved great international success, especially in the US and Europe. This 
thesis observes that Sino-Hong Kong coproductions have been less successful overseas than 
were Hong Kong films of the past. To match Hollywood and further deploy soft power 
through coproduction in the future, I have argued that deregulation is needed to release the 
creative freedom of filmmakers.  
The Sino-US case study outlined a different set of challenges. Collaboration with the world’s 
dominant film industry is different from collaboration with either Hong Kong or Australian 
filmmakers, since the United States has not entered into any legal binding coproduction 
agreements with other nations. By presenting the history of China-US collaboration from 
assisted production to joint production, I found that Chinese filmmakers are eager to learn 
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and are indeed learning through joint productions, while the US is conceding some ground to 
achieve its market ambitions. Historically, most China-US collaborative projects have 
involved Chinese filmmakers and companies in providing assistance to US producers 
working in China. Since the early 2000s, more joint productions have been made between 
private film companies from the US and China. From 2002 to 2012, Sino-US joint 
productions were few in number, accounting for only 8.6 per cent (n: 37) of the whole Sino-
Foreign coproduction volume. 
Though the number of Sino-US joint productions is very small, these films have been the 
principal contributors to Chinese success in overseas film markets, especially in western 
markets. The thesis demonstrates that Chinese filmmakers need to work with US filmmakers 
to access the global film market and, ultimately, to enhance its soft power, while US 
filmmakers need to work with Chinese filmmakers to gain access to the Chinese market.  I 
also describe the phenomenon of fake coproduction, whereby American filmmakers almost 
arbitrarily insert Chinese elements into their films in an effort to circumvent the restrictions 
on foreign films’ access to the Chinese market. Access is restricted visibly by the import 
quota and invisibly through the strategies of SARFT and the China Film Group to protect 
domestic players. When SARFT sensed that American filmmakers were attempting to take 
advantage of the booming Chinese market rather than doing real coproduction with China, 
access was further restricted by the tightening of coproduction policy. By examining films 
such as Iron Man 3 and Transformers 4, this thesis illustrates the delicate balancing act 
played by Hollywood studios in trying to cater to American and global audiences while also 
pleasing the Chinese government and Chinese audiences by adding positive Chinese elements. 
The thesis argues that the Chinese government is using the lure of the size and potential of its 
domestic market to induce Hollywood’s cooperation. In return, the government is seeking to 
send a more modern and favourable image about China to the world through Hollywood’s 
global reach. The Chinese government’s efforts to improve its soft power globally by taking 
knowledge capital from Hollywood has started to pay some dividends, although China’s soft 
power strategies are tested to their limit in dealings with the US.  
The deep cooperation in terms of creative, financial contribution and production encouraged 
by the Chinese government is full of hurdles due to language differences, cultural distance 
and differences in film industry mechanisms. While China-led joint productions have been 
granted approval by SARFT more readily, as they usually tell Chinese stories or are full of 
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Chinese content, these productions rarely translate to good box office returns overseas. The 
interesting finding here is that while real coproductions, even those led by China, are not easy 
to achieve and the finished ones are with less international influence, the fake coproductions, 
with positive Chinese elements, are more popular in China and elsewhere than China’s own 
films or for China-led real coproductions.  
The Sino-Australia case study described collaboration under a formal treaty. The Sino-Hong 
Kong and Sino-US cases are less formal. Although the CEPA privileged the Hong Kong film 
industry by removing quota restrictions, the CEPA cannot be regarded as a formal 
coproduction treaty. Similarly, no agreement focusing on coproduction has been signed 
between China and the US. Australia, with its relatively small film industry and domestic 
film market, represented a junior partner compared to Chinese partnerships with those bigger 
film industries in the US, Hong Kong SAR, and East Asia. China-Australia film coproduction 
is very limited; only five coproduction films have been made to date, with only three made 
under the treaty, making up 1.2 per cent of the whole volume. 
This thesis argues that Australia’s need for China as a partner is much greater than China’s 
need for Australia. The biggest beneficiaries of the treaty have been the second tier 
filmmakers from both China and Australia, who have used this opportunity to learn how to 
internationalise their productions. However, developing a coproduction between China and 
Australia is much harder than it is for those between China and Hong Kong or the US. The 
main reason, as argued in this thesis, is the doubly complex bureaucratic nature of the process 
which constrains creativity and freedom and does not counter the cultural distance. There are 
other reasons, though, such as piracy, China censorship, Australia’s lack of financial 
resources to pursue and build business relationships with China. And there are yet more 
obstacles in such areas as obtaining quick finance to close deals or setting a slate of projects 
to make best use of the resources built by the first collaboration; these being deeply grounded 
in the Australian screen industry rather than China’s. Therefore it is no surprise that low 
output and low profile China-Australia coproductions have been marginal so far, in contrast 
to China’s coproductions with big film industries like Hong Kong and US.  
The thesis further observes that, though it is in a junior partnership, Australia’s film industry 
still benefits from coproducing with China through trading and network film capital building. 
The Chinese government’s soft power strategy has been made manifest in these cases (put 
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onto paper by signing film coproduction treaty with Australia), however, they have added 
little to China’s international soft power credentials due to their limited influence abroad. 
The findings of the case studies illustrate that China’s coproduction strategy as a form of soft 
power enhancement is far from successful. While the Hong Kong film industry is likely to be 
integrated into the Chinese film industry, collaborations with the US and Australia to deploy 
soft power still have a long way to go, although substantial progress has taken place.  
The efficacy of China’s soft power strategy is undermined by the degree of control of the 
Chinese state over its media. In comparison with its main ‘soft power competitors’ 
(Hollywood and Korea), the state intervenes in all aspects of content production, most 
notably through censorship. The three case studies looked at the challenges that hinder 
coproduction mainly from cultural and industrial perspectives. However, the fundamental 
problem, as discussed in Chapters One to Four, is institutional, namely, the tension between 
artistic freedom and censorship. In terms of film, censorship, though a shackle to film talents, 
is ultimately a domestic content regulation strategy; that is, China does not have a film 
classification system. If it did, it would be able to expand its genres. Coproduced works, 
especially China-Hong Kong productions are mostly consumed by Mainland Chinese 
audiences. Censorship filters out elements that might be challenging or ambiguous for 
Mainland audiences. This in turn impacts on their marketability outside China where 
audiences are more sophisticated. Even when attempting to become an international movie 
power, the same thinking model is adopted: films are meant to take ‘socialist core values as a 
guide’ and ‘contain more elements of the Chinese Dream’ (Liu, cited in Rosen 2015). As 
Yingchi Chu (2014) has argued, government intervention into the creative process 
undermines the potential of Chinese film to win over audiences globally, which have their 
own ‘expectations’ of Chinese culture, politics and society.  
At the moment it can be argued that Hollywood’s interest in China is motivated by money. 
But despite the slate of co-productions that are being signed off, it will be a long time before 
China can compete. Controlling may be further loosened when the state feels stronger and 
safer in the ideological sphere. This is unlikely to happen soon.    
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2. Limitations and implications for future research 
China is increasingly cooperating with other counties in areas dealing with media. The 
approach and findings of this thesis can be tested through their application to other media 
such as television, animation and social media. Film coproduction is the crux in 
understanding media cooperation in China. Thus, this investigation can be further extended to 
other media areas. 
This thesis only limited itself to three case studies. However, increasingly, media cooperation 
is spreading throughout the East Asian region. In terms of film coproduction, the China-
Korea and China-Japan cases are worthy of further investigation, due to cultural proximity 
and the intense regional competition for soft power influence. Notable scholarship in this area 
of study have included Yecies (2014) focusing on Korea-China coproduction and transfer of 
technology and DeBoer (2014) focusing on Japan-China coproduction to understand the 
significance of film and media coproduction in East Asia. However, these works do not deal 
with the soft power dimension, although a current project ‘Willing collaborators: media 
production in East Asia’ focuses on media cooperation in East Asia (Keane 2015). 
Transfer of knowledge and know-how are fundamental reasons for coproduction. This thesis 
only limits itself to examining the preconditions for these transfers to occur. A worthy future 
study would be in documenting these transfers in the coproduction process and examining 
how these transfers ultimately affect the development of the industry and soft power 
enhancement. In order to do so, more interviews with industry people from both sides would 
be needed. Future research could also engage with ethnographic fieldwork in a coproduction 
project to examine what kind of soft skills are being transferred and how these transfers are 
affecting the thinking of industry people.  
This thesis focuses on the film industry and uses the concept of soft power to frame the whole 
thesis. Future research could investigate how audiences respond to films by conducting 
audience interview and using quantitative analysis to understand how much the coproduced 
film, or the positive Chinese elements, contributed to a better image of China. Further, a 
study could focus on the kinds of Chinese elements that are treated by audiences as 
propaganda information, or how much, or perhaps a study into what works in China’s favour. 
The measurement of soft power is very tricky. The intangible quality of the constitution of 
soft power – culture, ideology – is difficult to measure. Nye proposes to ask people questions 
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through polls or focus groups to measure if a particular asset is a soft power resource (cited in 
Huang and Ding 2006:24). Interviews and questionnaire surveys can both be used for this 
purpose.  
In summary, this thesis revolves around China’s film coproduction, in the context of the 
Chinese government’s embrace of soft power, especially cultural soft power, aiming to 
increase China’s global cultural presence and to enhance its international image. It is believed 
by many people, and the government, that the five thousand years of Chinese history, full of 
cultural resources and traditional values, can become an advantage in soft power competition. 
I agree, but that heritage should be transferred in a modern and smart way. The traditional 
Chinese values are not unique to China; they are comprised of universal attributes of love and 
respect for oneself, for people around us and for nature. However, these values and the 
Chinese stories that go with them need to be told through a universal code (popular culture) 
for people who speak different languages, who have different religious beliefs, and who have 
different customs. This is the first step in making Chinese culture attractive to foreign 
audiences. 
From my point of view, film is an excellent medium for projecting a universal code, better 
than other popular culture categories such as music, television, animation. It is constructed 
with thousands of pictures reflecting a real world, and each picture speaks more than a 
thousand words. This is the reason I chose film coproduction to research in relation to soft 
power. Soft power is a very intangible and abstract concept. This thesis approaches it from 
the industry perspective, from the opportunities that create it or the real obstacles and 
challenges that hinder it. This thesis mostly positions itself from a foreigner’s perspective. 
Networking, for foreigners, is the most important aspect of coproducing in China, next to 
understanding Chinese culture and market conditions. Most coproductions currently in 
progress are based on networks that were built previously. Hong Kongers are legally 
foreigners but culturally Chinese, which provides them with the best key for unlocking a 
secure and functional network for achieving success. For Americans from the big studios, 
their companies speak for themselves. For Australians and second tier American independent 
filmmakers intending to explore coproduction opportunities with China, building network 
film capital is the first step.  
Though the film market is booming and it attracts many filmmakers looking for opportunities 
to coproduce with China, it can take decades for finished works to be released. This 
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postpones further networking and compromises the speed at which China’s film mechanisms 
are improved. China’s soft power lags far behind the US and also a long way behind Korea 
and Japan. However, film coproduction is expanding China’s global cultural soft power 
footprint; it is the first step in the long uphill march that lies ahead. 
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Appendix: Interviewee details 
Tony Zhang. Vice General Manager (DMG Entertainment) / GM (Film &TV Investment Talent 
Mgmt). (2014, July). (W. Peng. B. Yecies Interviewers) Beijing 
Wu Nan. Director Asia-Pacific of China Film Promotion International. (2014, July). (W. Peng. M. 
Keane. B. Yecies Interviewers) Beijing 
Wang Jun (Allen Wang). Senior Partner of Yingke Law Firm. IP & Entertainment Lawyer.  (2014, 
July). (W. Peng. B. Yecies Interviewers) Beijing 
Miao Xiaotian. President of China Film Coproduction Corporation (CFCC). (2014, July). (W. Peng. 
M. Keane. B. Yecies Interviewers) Beijing 
Xu Shujun (Susan Xu). Vice President of CFCC. (2014, July). (W. Peng. M. Keane. B. Yecies 
Interviewers) Beijing 
Geng Ling. General Manager of Soundfirm. (2014, July). (W. Peng. M. Keane. B. Yecies 
Interviewers) Beijing 
Wan Long. American-Chinese Independent producer. (2014, July). (W. Peng Interviewers) Beijing 
Chris Oliver. Manager of Screen Australia’s Manager Partnerships. (2014, April). (W. Peng. M. 
Keane Interviewers) Brisbane  
Defrim Isai. Australian Independent producer. (2013, December). (W. Peng Interviewer) Brisbane. 
Nicholas McCallum. (2014, January). Director of njm Worldwide. (Co-Founder of Southern Light 
films Australia). (W. Peng Interviewer) Brisbane. 
Lynda Woods. Private Client Adviser of Morgans Financial Limited. Producer of njm Worldwide. 
(Co-Founder of Southern Light films Australia). (2014, January). (W. Peng Interviewer) Brisbane. 
Timothy White. Australian Independent producer. Co-Founder of Southern Light films Australia. 
(2014, January). (W. Peng Interviewer) Brisbane. 
Jeff Wei-Shun Tseng. Co-founder and CEO of Pixel Frame Australia. (2013, December). (W. Peng 
Interviewer) Brisbane. 
Elle Croxford. Business Development Longform Production of Cuttingedge. (2013, December). (W. 
Peng Interviewer) Brisbane. 
Job titles are correct as at date of interview. 
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Appendix  
The cultural innovation timeline 
Stage/theme Strategic form 
Standardized production Subcontracting (fashion, animation, software, 
toys, furnishings, electronics) 
Imitation Import substitution, local versions and 
cloning 
Collaboration Co-production and various forms of sharing 
knowledge 
Trade Beginning of soft power strategy; breaking 
out of domestic constraints 
Clusters Attempts to harness soft power by 
industrializing culture 
Creative communities Borderless social network markets; reaches 
domestic and international online audiences 
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